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Superman and Wonder Woman: 
French Champions for HIV/AIDS Prevention 
or Failed AIDS Campaign? 
 
Stephen M. Croucher 
Terry L. Rentner 
 
Abstract 
In 2004, the French government sponsored an AIDS/HIV prevention cam-
paign; AIDES.ORG using photos of AIDS infected Superman and Wonder 
Woman to persuade adolescents to adopt preventative behaviors. This article 
asserts campaign organizers cancelled the campaign because it failed to provide 
audience efficacy and incorrectly manipulated fear in its campaign messages. 
Moreover, this article compares the AIDES.ORG campaign to other AIDS/HIV 
campaigns and argues effective health communication campaigns must provide 
efficacy to facilitate adoption of desired preventative behaviors. The Social 
Norms Approach is offered as an alternative method for developing effective 
health communication campaigns. 
 
Introduction 
Between 34.6 and 42.3 million people are currently infected with the AIDS 
virus (UNAids, 2004). The AIDS virus is spread primarily, but not exclusively, 
through human sexual activity or drug use, and the spread of AIDS has been 
accelerated by the increase in global trade, travel and migration (Bardhan, 
2002). In the wake of rising global infection rates, ―communication campaigns 
remain the best way to prevent the spread of AIDS in the absence of an inocula-
tion against HIV infection‖ (Tondo & Snyder, 2002, p. 59). Currently more and 
more information about AIDS is obtained from mass media sources (Agha, 
2003; Myhre & Flora, 2000; Witte, Cameron, Lapinski, & Nzyuko, 1998). Thus, 
designers of AIDS prevention campaigns are consistently looking for different 
mass media through which to present their message to particular target au-
diences. 
One specific audience of importance is teenagers. Teenagers are a high-risk 
group because many of them do not believe themselves to be at risk of contract-
ing HIV, the virus that causes AIDS (Yun, Govender, & Mody, 2001). Byron 
(1998) stated the number of teenagers infected with HIV doubles every 14 years 
in the United States; similar statistics are present in most Western European 
nations as well (UNAids, 2004). As European nations are confronted more and 
more with the AIDS ―pandemic,‖ these nations have developed campaigns to 
enhance preventative measures. In France, campaigns such as ―No one is im-
mune,‖ ―Condoms protect you from everything, even being laughed at,‖ and 
―Everyone can be affected by AIDS‖ have targeted general audiences through 
TV, radio, leaflets, cinema spots, posters and home videos. 
5
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In 2004 aides.org, a French AIDS prevention organization produced ―Eve-
ryone should be concerned with AIDS‖ or ―On est concernés par le Sida.‖ The 
campaign depicted Superman and Wonder Woman (see Appendix), two heroes 
of the comic book world, as infected with the AIDS virus. The two superheroes 
are shown individually in separate pictures, connected to respirators, IV‘s and 
lying in hospital beds. Each superhero is thin, pale and appears to be on the 
verge of death. The bottom of the poster includes the phrase ―On est concernés 
par le Sida,‖ or ―Everyone should be concerned with AIDS.‖ Leaflets and bro-
chures were distributed during the summer of 2004 to individuals between the 
ages of 13 and 25, a high-risk infection group. However, after fewer than three 
months, the campaign was cancelled by AIDES.ORG and French Department of 
Health. This article examines this campaign and asserts reasons for its apparent 
failure to alter the beliefs of its target audience. First, this article reviews John-
son and Witte‘s Health Belief Model (HBM) as a schema of analysis for a health 
communication campaign, discusses the use of fear appeals among youth and 
describes an alternative model as the basis of health communication campaigns. 
Second, the HBM will be applied to the ―Everyone should be concerned with 
AIDS‖ campaign. Last, conclusions examine the apparent failure of the cam-
paign, discuss the necessity of focusing on campaign efficacy and offer social 
norms programming as an alternative to fear-based campaigns aimed at youth. 
 
Review of Literature 
 Pfau and Parrott (1993) defined health campaigns as communication cam-
paigns, including planning, implementation and evaluation. Various communi-
cation theories have discussed how to create persuasive health communication 
messages, including the health belief model (Airhihenbuwa & Obregon, 2000; 
Becker, 1974; Johnson & Witte, 2003; Stiles & Kaplan, 2004), the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Michael-Johnson & Bowen, 1992), 
and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Bennett & Bozionelos, 2000), 
to name a few. When synthesizing these theories, Johnson and Witte (2003) 
asserted that commonalities emerge within the theories, and these commonalities 
make up their four-part health belief framework. The following review of litera-
ture outlines Johnson and Witte‘s model. 
 
Johnson and Witte’s Health Belief Model 
Johnson and Witte (2003) provide a four-part framework outlining the four 
variables that need to be addressed in order to produce a persuasive and beha-
vioral change inducing health campaign: stimuli, motivational variables, ap-
praisals of environment and resources and outcome variables. Designers of 
health communication campaigns according to Johnson and Witte (2003) must 
first ―decide how to effectively reach the target audience and get them to listen 
or attend to their messages‖ (p. 474). To get an audience‘s attention Johnson and 
Witte propose cues to action (part of the original health belief model) ―such as 
vividness, repetition, and placement in the mass media, among others, that 
communicate this is important to your health‖ (2003, p. 474). The repetition of a 
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single message stresses the importance of producing a core, focal message for an 
effective health/persuasive campaign (Parrott, Egbert, Anderton, & Sefcovic, 
2003). Authors are keen to point out that cues to action can be internal or exter-
nal. Generally, internal cues are more affective, while external cues are more 
cognitive in nature (Albrecht & Bryant, 1996). 
Depicting diseased lungs on cigarette packages in Canada and the Nether-
lands is an example of a vivid image that designers have used to generate beha-
vioral change (Stivoro, 1997). Truth.com, an anti-smoking campaign, employs 
repetition and placement in its ads. In one on-air commercial, different people 
are shown falling (in the same repetitive, emotionless manner) to the ground 
dead due to the ills of smoking. Moreover, the airing of these commercials on 
different television channels, at all hours of the day, places the message(s) of 
Truth.com within numerous mass media outlets. 
While cues to action (stimuli) are important to generating desired behavior-
al responses, ―motivation is central to how a message is processed and whether 
or not action is taken‖ (Johnson and Witte, 2003, p. 477). Two motivational res-
ponses have dominated the literature and campaigns for more than 25 years, fear 
appeals and threat. Ruiter, Abraham and Kok (2001) define a fear appeal as ―a 
persuasive communication attempting to arouse fear in order to promote precau-
tionary motivation and self-protective action‖ (p. 614). The arousal of fear 
through images, slogans and other media, can create cognitive, affective, beha-
vioral and physiological responses (Dillard, 1994; Rogers, 1983). Such appeals 
have been shown to be effective in the fight against HIV/AIDS, but only if used 
correctly and in moderation (Witte, 1992a). 
Johnson and Witte justifiably regard the delicate nature of fear appeals, 
whereas too much, or too little fear can have little persuasive value. Individual 
thresholds for fear are either innate or learned. Such thresholds are determined 
by biological and sociocultural contexts along with individual differences and 
experiences (Nabi, 2003). Parrott, Egbert, Anderton and Sefcovic (2003) state: 
―too often, health messages intended to arouse fear fail to include message com-
ponents to address self-efficacy‖ (p. 640). The failure of many campaigns to 
provide more than just a fear appeal is one explanation for the breakdown of 
many fear-based campaigns. 
Closely related to fear appeals is threat, or ―a danger or harm that exists in 
the environment, whether it is formally acknowledged by an individual or not‖ 
(Witte, 1998 as cited in Johnson and Witte, 2003, p. 478). When confronted with 
a threat, individuals must evaluate the likelihood of the harm‘s affecting their 
life. 
When the audience evaluates its situation and appraises its resources and 
surrounding environment, the audience is appraising options to avert threats. 
Response and self-efficacy are both integral to appraising resources and envi-
ronment in the wake of persuasive/threat based communication (Johnson and 
Witte, 2003). Witte (1992a) defines response-efficacy as whether or not the pre-
scribed action helps the audience take steps to avoid the threat. Campaigns that 
provide logical responses to threats generally have heightened response-efficacy 
(Witte and Morrison, 1995). Self-efficacy is an individual‘s perception that he or 
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she can complete the behavior prescribed by the persuasive campaign. Ultimate-
ly, it is the function of health campaigns to provide the audience with specific 
knowledge about the behavior or illness under question or the desired behavioral 
change (Parrott, Egbert, Anderton & Sefcovic, 2003). To increase self-efficacy, 
campaign designers can also incorporate participatory messages to increase au-
dience feelings of self-efficacy, while at the same time heightening the au-
dience‘s commitment to a particular practice. 
The primary purpose of a persuasive campaign is an intent to modify beha-
viors, the actual modification of current behaviors or adoption of new behaviors. 
Johnson and Witte (2003) state: ―Behavioral intentions refer to the plans indi-
viduals have about whether or not they intend to perform the recommended be-
havior (from adoption to discontinuance)‖ (p. 487). The HBM as proposed by 
Johnson and Witte identifies three types of responses: 1) no response where the 
threat can be denied or ignored; 2) danger control response, in this case the indi-
vidual does what the campaign suggests; and 3) fear control response, where 
individuals take steps to control their fear such as denial and avoidance. 
Ultimately, Johnson and Witte (2003) state that effective health communi-
cation campaigns: 
Create the motivation to respond to a health threat and also cause the au-
dience members to believe they have the appropriate resources to take ac-
tion. If any link in this chain is missing, audience members will possibly ig-
nore or misinterpret the message, leading to unintended message outcomes. 
(p. 488) 
 
Fear Appeals among Youth 
Perloff (2003) argues that fear-based campaigns tend not to work as well, 
because of what he refers to as ―unrealistic optimism‖ or the ―illusion of invul-
nerability.‖ This often describes adolescents in that they do not see themselves 
as the typical person who is at-risk and may succumb to harm. For example, one 
study of college students found students underestimated their own susceptibility 
to HIV but overestimated their peers‘ risk of contracting HIV (Thompson et al., 
1996). Other researchers assert fear appeals tend to be more effective if the dan-
ger is more immediate than a threat that may happen in the future (Chu, 1966, 
Kok, 1983; Klohn & Rogers, 1991). Most adolescents do not identify with such 
health concerns as HIV, smoking or drinking as immediate threats to their 
health, thus dismissing the long-term effect of such fear messages. Additionally, 
youth tend to overestimate their ability to change their behavior before any long-
term negative health effects will occur (Dejong & Winsten, 1998). In addition to 
not identifying with long-term risks, adolescents often do not see immediate 
personal health risks. For example, students who are sexually active but who are 
not IV drug users or do not consider themselves promiscuous will not identify 
with fear tactics related to these behaviors. 
In his study on developing an anti-smoking campaign for youths, Meyrick 
(2001) argues a message can be effective without using strong fear appeals. Ac-
cording to Meyrick, fear appeals must arouse ―an appropriate level of anxiety to 
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promote paying attention to the recommended solution. It must also be credible 
and perceived to be applicable to the target audience but not so threatening as to 
provoke undesirable defensive behaviors‖ (p. 104). 
Recent studies on fear-based campaigns conclude these studies are difficult 
to implement and rarely succeed, despite their initial appeal (Dejong & Winsten, 
1998; Hale & Dillard, 1994). Other researchers also recognize fear tactics 
among youth have limited effects and may even be counterproductive. For ex-
ample, adolescents may better relate to how smoking affects their breath than 
their lungs. More and more communication campaigns are reflecting this move 
away from fear and instead emphasizing social influences. Austin suggests ado-
lescence is a time of experimentation where youth do not want to hear preaching 
but solutions (1996). Therefore, campaigns need to emphasize ―moderation and 
intervention, more than prevention‖ (Austin, 1996, p. 123). 
 
New Approach in Health Communication 
A new approach in developing health communication campaigns targeted at 
youth is gaining momentum in the field. This approach is based on attribution 
theory applied to a groundbreaking study by Berkowitz and Perkins on social 
norms and alcohol use among college students (Berkowitz & Perkins, 1987). By 
1998, Perkins and Berkowitz and other scholars developed this further into what 
is coined the social norms approach – a scientific - based approach widely used 
in addressing alcohol, smoking, weight management and other health issues that 
plague the youth population (Perkins, 2003). The approach is based on provid-
ing accurate information about healthy behaviors that may promote change and 
lead to more healthy behaviors. This is an alternative to the more traditional 
scare tactic methods used in so many health campaigns. Instead, it focuses on 
peer norms in terms of what the majority of the target audiences actually think 
and do. The social norms approach uses credible data drawn from the target au-
dience to correct the misperceptions a target audience has about a behavior and 
communicates the actual behavior. This is done in a way that avoids preachy, 
negative messages, unrealistic images and over-the-top fear appeals – all ap-
proaches known to have little influence in changing behaviors among youth. 
 
Aides.org Campaign 
During the summer of 2004, aides.org conducted a campaign to persuade 
adolescents to take steps to prevent contracting the AIDS virus. The two images 
in this campaign depict two superheroes, Superman and Wonder Woman, por-
trayed in stark contrast to their conventional portrayal. Normally, Superman and 
Wonder Woman are shown as muscular and invulnerable to anything, except for 
kryptonite in Superman‘s case and an Amazonian lasso in Wonder Woman‘s 
case. Showing these comic book icons in such vulnerable states captures the 
attention of the audience. By portraying these two superheroes as AIDS victims, 
the campaign organizers make the message salient to the audience. Thus, the use 
of such vivid images effectively fulfills Johnson and Witte‘s first criterion of a 
successful health belief alteration campaign, stimulus. 
9
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Second, motivational variables within the messages work to create aware-
ness, change behavior or both. In the aides.org campaign ―Everyone should be 
concerned with AIDS‖ organizers used fear-based appeals to make juveniles 
aware of the dangers of AIDS, and thus motivate them to change risky behaviors 
in order to protect them from AIDS. By depicting superheroes as vulnerable to 
AIDS, the campaign attempts to induce the fear that anyone can contract the 
disease, therefore bypassing the typical adolescent mantra, ―It can‘t happen to 
me.‖ Since the audience is perceived as vulnerable, attempts to create an emo-
tional response to the message make the audience more impressionable to the 
message‘s effects. 
The third criterion, appraisals of environment and resources, involves grant-
ing efficacy to the audience. When message designers introduce a threat, posi-
tioning efficacy immediately after the threat is the best tactic for promoting ac-
tion because it communicates that the receiver has control over whether the 
harm will befall him or her. Without efficacy, the receiver feels powerless and 
either ignores fear-based claims or actually takes action counter to recommend-
ed actions. 
In the case of ―Everyone should be concerned with AIDS,‖ explicit efficacy 
was not created. The logo of this organization is a condom, so it is assumed the 
audience would use a condom to prevent AIDS. However, Johnson and Witte 
argue, it is essential, especially when dealing with juveniles, that efficacy be 
explicitly stated. In the case of this campaign, simply showing a condom is not 
enough, campaign organizers needed to be more specific and explicitly recom-
mend the audience use a condom to prevent contracting HIV/AIDS. When there 
is no means of prevention introduced in the message, it weakens the message‘s 
effectiveness because the target audience does not have a specific method of 
preventing the undesirable outcomes. 
Another criterion of the Health Belief Model is outcome variables, which 
might prevent the audience from following the recommendations of the mes-
sage. Audiences are more likely to take an action if it does not violate any estab-
lished social norms or rules. On posters for ―Everyone should be concerned with 
AIDS‖ the small condom logo implies condom use. In France, condom use is 
socially acceptable because of the French people‘s regard of sex as a part of eve-
ryday life, not something to be hidden out of sight (Foucault, 1980). However, 
since the campaign did not provide efficacy, it is unable to represent outcome 
variables in its target audience, specifically because the campaign leaves it open 
to the audience as to how Superman and Wonder Woman contracted HIV/AIDS. 
These two superheroes could have contracted the disease from unprotected sex, 
drug use, blood transfusion, etc…. Thus, if the campaign provided more infor-
mation about how the disease got into the relationship or explained how to avoid 
contracting the disease, the audience could evaluate the proposed action and 
decide whether to take action or not. 
 
10
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Discussion 
This analysis suggests two implications with regard to the development of 
HIV/AIDS preventative campaigns and adolescents. First, this analysis reveals 
that campaign organizers are more apt to focus on stimuli and less prone to pro-
vide efficacy. Second, the following discussion argues that the aides.org cam-
paign was not successful because it not only failed to provide its audience with 
efficacy, it also did not take into account the limitations of fear appeals and the 
existing norms among the target audience. 
 
Efficacy in Health Campaigns 
Researchers argue that effective health campaigns need to include explicit 
efficacy to reach specific audiences (Witte, Cameron, Lapinski & Nzyuko, 
1998; Myhre & Flora, 2000; Agha, 2003). However, as this case study reveals, 
efficacy is a regularly underdeveloped element of health communication cam-
paigns. While health campaign designers devote a great deal of attention to 
drawing attention to their message, stimuli or fear appeals (Witte, 1992b), they 
are neglecting probably the most important element of preventing inappropriate 
health behaviors, efficacy. 
Witte, Cameron, Lapinski and Nzyuko (1998) emphasized the importance 
of efficacy in AIDS campaigns in their analyses of HIV/AIDS prevention cam-
paigns in Kenya. The authors analyzed 17 different posters/pamphlets by having 
focus group members complete face-to-face surveys, and focus group meetings 
were also transcribed to ascertain focus group members‘ attitudes and opinions 
of different campaigns. The research showed how participants were more prone 
to be persuaded by campaign pamphlets than posters in taking preventative 
measures against HIV/AIDS. Witte et al (1998) asserted that in all of the cam-
paigns ―perceived susceptibility and severity to the threat were emphasized and 
perceived self-efficacy and response efficacy were neglected‖ (p. 359). For ex-
ample, in the ―AIDS kills: use condoms‖ campaign, respondents stated the post-
ers suggested condom use as a preventative measure. Yet, the audience was un-
aware of how to use a condom, because ―there were no skills or instructions 
regarding condom use presented in the poster‖ (1998, p. 353). 
In another campaign, ―Let‘s care for AIDS orphans,‖ respondents stated the 
poster was effective in persuading the audience that AIDS was a serious threat, 
but according to group members the campaign did not make any mentions of the 
skills needed to prevent getting AIDS. In regard to this campaign, ―this poster 
provided no skills for performing the recommended response. Neither response 
efficacy nor structural barriers were mentioned by the respondents‖ (Witte, et 
al., 1998, p. 354). 
This campaign, and the overwhelming majority of the 17 other posters and 
pamphlets analyzed by Witte et al, found that campaigns suggest individuals 
―should protect themselves but did not specify how to do so‖ (1998, p. 353). 
Granted, protection from HIV/AIDS may seem to entail simple acts to many 
audiences, but this is not always the case. In fact, failing to specify how to pro-
tect oneself from HIV/AIDS even causes confusion for audiences who are una-
ware of AIDS prevention or general health care procedures. Thus, the lack of 
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explicit efficacy hinders the campaign‘s overall rhetorical significance among its 
target audience, adolescents (Witte, Cameron, Lapinski, & Nzyuko, 1998). 
 
Fear in Health Campaigns 
While lack of efficacy offers one explanation, the type of fear appeal used 
in this campaign offers another explanation as to why this campaign failed. 
While many researchers agree messages containing threat and efficacy informa-
tion may work, fear appeals must threaten the individual (Perloff, 2003). Fran-
kenberger and Sukhdial (1994) reviewed literature from marketing, health and 
science, adolescence, communication education and psychology and concluded 
fear appeal messages among youth must ―personalize risk‖ and past efforts have 
not been successful in doing this (P. 140). In the case of the aides.org campaign, 
the risk was personalized to Superman and Wonder Woman rather than the tar-
get audience. Youth were likely to recognize these superheroes but not identify 
with them. Adolescents were more likely to perceive these superheroes did 
something that put themselves in harms way, and without knowing what this 
was they were unable to identify with the risk. 
 In addition, much like the story ―Goldilocks and the Three Bears,‖ the level 
of fear has to be ―just right.‖ Too little is not perceived as a personal risk and too 
much is seen as unrealistic – especially among a target audience who not only 
sees itself as invulnerable but as risk takers. While the creators of the aids.org 
campaign could argue the superheroes are regarded as invulnerable and as risk 
takers, it could also be argued that the fear was so overwhelming that it was seen 
as unrealistic. Much like the 50s and 60s driver‘s education films that displayed 
horrific car crashes, the notion that Superman and Wonder Woman could get 
AIDS seemed almost preposterous. 
 
Social Norms in Health Campaigns 
Manipulating fear in health campaigns is a very delicate balance between 
injecting too much and too little. One solution to the dilemma is to not use fear 
appeals at all. Instead, health campaign planners should consider alternative 
messages such as those used in the Social Norms Approach. For example, a 
study on the cartoon character Popeye‘s love of spinach and its impact on child-
ren revealed ―children watching the spinach-eating sailor did not question why 
eating that green stuff made him stronger and more energized; the social norm 
surrounding the nutritional value of spinach did not have to be restated,‖ (Lo-
vett, 2005, p. 837). This also translated into an increase in spinach sales by 
children‘s demands (Lovett, 2005). Lovett concluded Popeye, as part of a multi-
faceted approach to child health and nutrition education, ―demonstrates that so-
cial norms directed at children about food and nutrition can have large and last-
ing effects,‖ (p. 838). 
The same approach could prove effective for AIDS campaigns aimed at 
youth. What is being offered here is the social norms approach that focuses on 
the positive, healthy behaviors. These behaviors are documented through survey 
research and are reinforced through social norms marketing efforts (Berkowitz, 
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1999). The communications efforts focus on what individuals can do, not on 
what they should not do (Berkowitz, 1999). 
While not a magic bullet by any means, the use of social norms program-
ming as part of a multifaceted campaign to change attitudes and behaviors offers 
an alternative to the more traditional health campaigns. The more traditional 
health campaigns tend to use AIDS statistical data that highlight only the nega-
tive findings, such as the number of youth infected. But, for example, if adoles-
cents knew the majority of their peers practiced safe sex and how they practiced 
safe sex, this may correct misperceptions they had about their peers and sexual 
behaviors while providing them the efficacy to practice the safe behaviors them-
selves. Furthermore, because the messages are drawn from statistical data and 
personalized to the target audience they are likely to increase credibility and 
impact among the target audience. 
 
Conclusion 
In the case of the aides.org campaign, efficacy was not provided to its target 
audience. As previously mentioned, the campaign ads state, ―Everyone should 
be concerned with AIDS,‖ but the ads do not tell individuals what they can do to 
prevent getting AIDS. Moreover, since it is not explained as to how Superman 
or Wonder Woman contracted HIV/AIDS, the audience is left wondering exact-
ly what preventative steps they should take. Should the audience avoid using 
drugs, having unprotected sex, or what other steps should the audience take? 
These efficacious questions must be addressed by campaign organizers and ex-
pressed in the campaign in order for its target audience to be persuaded to take 
appropriately prescribed preventative steps. Future health communication cam-
paigns must take into consideration their audience‘s knowledge of health care 
procedures. It is insufficient to simply grab an audience‘s attention without pro-
viding them with as specific instructions as possible for avoiding unhealthy 
health behaviors. 
Future health campaigns also must consider the impact of fear appeals. How 
does one correctly manipulate fear? When is it too much and when is it not 
enough? Without a clear understanding of the target audience, the message is 
likely to be seen as not credible and therefore have little short-term impact and 
even smaller long-term impact. In addition, if fear appeals are used to persuade 
an audience, they will only be partially effective; the fear must be accompanied 
by efficacy (Witte, 1993). 
This study does have its limitations. The main limitation is that this analysis 
is based on a single case study, of a French campaign. While the article does 
discuss how the same arguments about the aides.org campaign are applicable to 
HIV/AIDS in Africa campaigns analyzed by Witte et al, a future study should 
compare and contrast two or more campaigns simultaneously. Such an analysis 
would more than likely reveal results similar to those present in this analysis. 
Furthermore, the use of social norms campaigns has shown success in the areas 
of high-risk drinking, tobacco use, sexual assault and other health issues, but 
little has been done using social norms in HIV/AIDS campaigns. 
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Teenagers remain a pivotal target audience in the war against the spread of 
AIDS/HIV. AIDS is no longer an epidemic; the disease has transcended pan-
demic status. Ultimately, this article asserts future health communication cam-
paigns must provide audiences with explicit efficacy in order to bring about suf-
ficient behavioral change carefully consider the impact of fear appeals and focus 
on the social norms of a particular target audience. Thus, as more and more 
campaign designers look to the mass media as an outlet of prevention, new tech-
niques such as the social norms approach are needed to alter behaviors. 
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Universalism in Policy Debate: 
Utilitarianism, Stock Issues, 
and the Rhetorical Audience 
 
William D. Harpine 
 
Introduction 
Argumentation theory often includes a system of stock issues for proposi-
tions of policy. Some seem to arise from the ancient Greek theory of stasis or 
other concepts of ancient rhetorical theory (Thompson; Parker 12-15; Hultzen). 
Others appear to have developed independently (Gough; Pelsma, ―Contest;‖ 
Pelsma, ―Difficulty Problem‖). Stock issues are held to be useful for analysis in 
debate. Often enough, they are also believed to give useful criteria for decision-
making: an argument for change that meets the stock issues‘ requirements may 
be worthy of belief. Examining the latter of these two claims, this paper main-
tains that stock issues analysis can be improved by incorporating the principles 
of utilitarianism. In particular, stock issues analysis is more valid if it looks 
beyond the advantages and disadvantages of the speaker’s audience and consid-
ers the preferences of larger, even universal groups.  
This essay concentrates on the ethical dimensions of the decision criteria 
that the stock issues imply. As Swift points, out, ―from the birth of rhetorical 
study, as evidenced by Aristotle‘s works, ethics in relation to rhetoric has been 
highly valued and constantly studied‖ (46). A comparison between stock issues 
and the ethical theory known as utilitarianism shows how those criteria can be 
refined and clarified. In particular, utilitarianism implies that one has duties to-
ward persons who are not members of one‘s in-group, family, or nation. Stock 
issues analysis, in contrast, may tacitly endorse an amoral kind of thinking. To 
put the point in rhetorical terms, utilitarianism requires decision-making to con-
sider the welfare of all who are affected by the decision, whereas stock issues 
analysis often tempts a speaker, and an immediate audience, to consider only the 
benefits that might accrue to the immediate audience. Concerning Levinas‘ 
theory of ethics, Arnett writes that ―Levinas‘s argument is that we miss the phe-
nomenological reality of human life when we begin with self. He begins with 
ethics and attends to the Other‖ 42). Although this takes a broader perspective 
than this essay, the idea is similar: to broaden the reach to which the ―should‖ of 
a proposition of policy applies.  
The purpose of this essay is to look beyond the current formulations of 
stock issues. The idea is to make use of the insights from previous theories and 
accounts of stock issues to create a theory of analysis that is better grounded and 
that therefore offers a more reasonable way to conduct argumentative analysis. 
The essay shows how utilitarian theory parallels the concept behind stock issues 
analysis, proposes the importance of ethics for argumentative analysis, differen-
tiates approaches to utilitarianism, and concludes by examining the implications 
of utilitarianism for argumentation.  
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Stock Issues and Utilitarian Philosophy 
To begin, the decision-making criteria that stock issues imply bear a strik-
ing resemblance to the criteria of the ethical theory known as utilitarianism. 
Roughly speaking, utilitarianism judges an action or social practice to be right if 
it yields desirable consequences. Utilitarianism is a theory of morals, and not 
necessarily a decision-making procedure (Eggleston 451, 461; see also Louise). 
Nonetheless, the argument below shows how utilitarian principles can enlighten 
argumentative analysis. The distinction is a close one: utilitarianism argues for 
what is right, which may differ from what people know, believe, or say. It is, 
however, reasonable to hope that utilitarianism‘s criteria, if followed accurately, 
will lead people to make right decisions. By finding a foundation for the stock 
issues in ethical theory, this essay undertakes to elevate the level of stock issues 
analysis. Not proposing to find fault in previous theories of stock issues, this 
essay does employ methodological principles that differ from some previous 
theories: 
 
A theory of stock issues for policy debate should be based on a theory of 
ethics. This is because a proposition of policy advocates what should be 
done, not what will be done (see, e.g., Freeley and Steinberg 58-59). Moral 
issues predominate in debate, however implicitly, for ethics is the study of 
what people should do. This does not imply that debaters and their au-
diences always have moral issues in mind. All the same, debates on public 
policy surely encounter moral issues early in the game. One could not rea-
sonably think that the most ethical argument will always be the most persu-
asive. Thus, perhaps the objective of stock issues analysis ought to be to 
find the most reasonable arguments, not necessarily those most likely to be 
effective. 
 
A theory of stock issues should apply generally. Indeed, the concept of stock 
issues—the very word ―stock‖—implies generality. Applying a theory of 
ethics to the stock issues implies generality in an even broader and more 
important sense. In any case, many previous writers about stock issues sug-
gest that they apply universally; consider Ziegelmueller and Kay‘s discus-
sion of stock issues as ―certain specific obligations‖ that ―exist in the advo-
cacy of any specific change of policy‖ (Ziegelmueller and Kay 172).  
 
Many systems of stock issues imply a criterion that the policy judged to be 
most advantageous is the best. If a proposed policy seems likely to have a great-
er weight of advantages than disadvantages, then the audience should be moved 
to adopt that policy. For example, Ziegelmueller and Kay‘s argumentation text-
book reviews the five stock issues of jurisdiction, ill, blame, cure, and cost. The 
authors term the stock issues to ―identify the inherent responsibilities of the ad-
vocate.‖ They also state that ―the case for a proposed course of action can be lost 
if the cost of that action is as significant, or more significant, than the ill it is 
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designed to cure‖ (Ziegelmueller and Kay 172-178). Freeley explains that his 
slightly different stock issues for a proposition of policy imply several questions. 
Two of these are: ―will the plan achieve the claimed advantages?‖ and ―will the 
plan produce no disadvantages as great as or greater than those existing in the 
status quo?‖ (64). Similarly, in their discussion of the stock issues, Rieke and 
Sillars ask, ―Is the proposed change desirable? (Will its advantages outweigh its 
disadvantages?)‖ (62). None of these, however, clearly states advantages to 
whom. They leave open the question of the audience.  
One cannot help but to be struck by the similarity of these systems to the 
basic principle of utilitarianism. Thus, maybe utilitarian concepts can help to 
flesh out the theory of stock issues. The basic idea behind all the different ver-
sions of utilitarianism is to maximize goods while minimizing harms. Bentham‘s 
original formulation of the principle of utility was ―that every action is right or 
wrong—worthy or unworthy—deserving approbation or disapprobation, in pro-
portion to its tendency to contribute to, or to diminish the amount of public hap-
piness‖ (24). Bentham‘s formulation receives little sympathy from modern phi-
losophers, who generally doubt that any single good, such as happiness, can be 
the basis of morality. A similar criticism could be levied against Mill‘s dictum 
that the ―creed‖ of ―Utility . . . holds that actions are right in proportion as they 
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happi-
ness.‖ Mill then defines happiness as ―intended pleasure, and the absence of 
pain‖ (169). Richard Hare‘s version of utilitarianism, to which this essay turns in 
a moment, is currently the most respected. 
Historically, there are two major versions of utilitarianism. Some authorities 
(Bentham, for example) advocate act-utilitarianism, holding that the most just 
action is that which maximizes good. Others, such as Toulmin, take the view 
that the most just action is that which accords with societal rules (Toulmin 144-
147; Rawls, ―Two Concepts‖). (Wenzel has applied Toulmin‘s rule-
utilitarianism to argumentation theory, with results much different from the 
stock issues). The fundamentally conservative argument behind rule-utilitarian 
theories is that following societal rules of morality is likely to maximize good 
results. Hare‘s updating of this theory combines some of the best features of act- 
and rule-utilitarianism. Hare argues that, for most of our moral thinking, we re-
fer to rules that we learned during our upbringing. He assumes that following 
these rules will tend to produce, on balance, a more orderly and beneficial socie-
ty. Hare also believes that, when two moral rules fall into conflict, we engage in 
moral reasoning in which we evaluate the likely consequences of the act itself 
(Hare, Moral 44-64; see Scanlon 129). Hare does not believe that any one good, 
such as happiness or pleasure, is the goal of the principle of utility. Instead, Hare 
advocates the position that ethical beings try to maximize persons‘ rational pre-
ferences (Moral 140-146). 
 Now, utilitarians are generally interested in considering the benefits to 
society as a whole. Rhetoricians are sometimes only interested in persuading a 
particular audience. This stand does not necessarily lead to ethical argument. 
The interests of a particular audience could conflict with the audience‘s moral 
obligations.  
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The Audience and Ethical Obligations  
Argumentation is more ethical, at least from a utilitarian perspective, when 
it considers a more general audience. Aristotle pointed out that, when they con-
sider deliberative policy, people choose to do what they believed would be ad-
vantageous (Aristotle 1358b). That usually meant doing what was to the benefit 
of the polis, the city-state. Athenian speakers sometimes showed a concern for 
the welfare of other city-states only when they faced a common enemy. Thus, 
Aristotle comments that ―deliberative speakers often grant other factors, but they 
would never admit that they are advising things that are not advantageous [to the 
audience] from what is beneficial; and often they do not insist that it is not un-
just to enslave neighbors or those who have done no wrong‖ (bracketed expres-
sions are the translator‘s) (Aristotle 1358b).  
Poulakos argues that Isocrates built ―a conception of rhetoric as a citizenly 
instrument meant to promote actions for the benefit of the polis.‖ He interprets 
Isocrates‘ view as ―to the extent that students of rhetoric would learn to under-
stand themselves as citizens, they would never put oratory to evil use; for, by 
definition, they would use the art in a citizenly manner.‖ This implies the wel-
fare of the polis as the aim of rhetoric. Speakers in the Athenian assembly were 
expected to advocate the benefit of the entire polis, and not merely of the citi-
zens gathered at the Athenian Pnyx for a particular debate (Poulakos 24-25). 
(Given the structure of the Athenian democracy, one might question how often 
speakers thought about the preferences of non-assembly members, slaves for 
example, which complicates the story a bit.)  
Getting back to modern times, a more general level of analysis will often 
produce more ethically reasonable conclusions. To understand why, consider 
these scenarios in increasing level of generality: 
 
Advocacy of the immediate audience. A debater speaks to an audience of college 
students. Her wish is to persuade them that import tariffs should be imposed. In 
her communication with the audience, she stresses that import tariffs will benefit 
the students in the room. She says that they will have more spending money and 
a better prospect for employment if a tariff is passed. The debater does not men-
tion any benefits or harms that may occur for any other group of people. This is 
a very specific level of analysis, and by no stretch of the imagination does it 
address anything that we could consider to address issues of ethics or morals. 
The only interest of the speaker is to persuade the audience that the proposed 
policy will benefit the audience themselves. It is, indeed, possible for such a 
speaker to advocate unethical behavior. Such a speech might, one fears, be quite 
persuasive. 
In the Lincoln-Douglas debate at Freeport, Stephen Douglas sank to this 
level of argument during his conclusion. He made some racist remarks about 
Republicans and those who advised the Republicans. He then commented, in an 
acerbic manner, that ―those of you who believe that the negro is your equal and 
ought to be on an equality with you socially, politically, and legally, have a right 
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to entertain these opinions, and, of course, will vote for Mr. Lincoln‖ (Douglas 
424). This argument showed no concern with the welfare of anyone except those 
voters who would be prone to vote for Douglas. Its immorality, and unaccepta-
bility, lay in Douglas‘ apathy towards the rights of those who were living their 
lives in bondage.  
 
Advocacy of a larger audience. A debater speaks to an audience of college stu-
dents. This debater, however, tries to persuade them that his proposed import 
tariffs will benefit not only the immediate audience, but also most college stu-
dents. The immediate audience becomes a stand-in for a larger group. In this 
modest step up in generality, the rhetor asks the audience to consider the needs 
or preferences of other persons, but only to the extent that the immediate au-
dience is part of a larger group, and will thus have a share in the benefits that 
accrue to the larger group. 
 
Advocacy of the community. Speaking to an audience of college students, a de-
bater maintains that import tariffs will produce an overall net benefit to the en-
tire nation. She does not address the issue of whether the audience members in 
particular will benefit from the tariffs or not. Thus, she asks the audience to reify 
their level of judgment to a larger degree than in the first two scenarios. She asks 
the audience to consider the net advantage not so much for themselves, but, in 
general, for their fellow-citizens. This might roughly compare to Isocrates‘ level 
of discourse. 
 Student Alex Lennon, debating for Harvard University at an intercollegiate 
contest, advocated a plan to stabilize the planning for civilian nuclear reactors. 
One of his arguments was that this plan would reduce the danger of nuclear pro-
liferation and nuclear war, which, if true, would obviously benefit all humanity. 
However, the specifics of his argument pointed up a benefit to the greater influ-
ence that America would, he claimed, have over Japan‘s nuclear power program. 
Thus, this particular argument appeared to focus on the benefit that his proposal 
would bring to his own nation (―1990 National Debate,‖ 148).  
 The Kennedy-Nixon debates offer a number of examples of such argu-
ments. For instance, in their third debate, Vice-President Richard Nixon sug-
gested that ―the first thing we have to do is to continue to keep confidence 
abroad in the American dollar.‖ Continuing, he advocated a balanced budged 
―because at the moment that we have loss of confidence in our own fiscal poli-
cies at home, it results in gold flowing out‖ (―Third Debate‖ 406). This argu-
ment arose from a concept of good citizenship; he did not ask for the benefit of 
any particular United States group, but for the benefit of the entire nation.  
 
Advocacy of the Greater Good. A debater advocates the argument that import 
tariffs adopted by our country will yield a net advantage of good versus harm, 
not just for our own country, but also for all persons. Thinking in utilitarian 
terms, this does not imply that every person in every country will gain a benefit 
from the import tariffs, but rather that the proposed policy, taking everything 
and everyone into account, will have net good results. 
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An interesting argument of this type occurred in a 1991 Lincoln-Douglas 
college debate championship. Kevin Minch, debating for Wayne State Universi-
ty, spoke in favor of a closed Congressional hearing session for nominees for 
United States Supreme Court Justices. After reviewing the problems with the 
current process and stating the advantage of the one he proposed, Minch con-
cluded that ―everyone will benefit from my proposal and . . . the problem will be 
significantly reduced under my plan‖ (Minch 91). Minch‘s analysis may or may 
not have been correct, a matter to be decided by the debate judges (who awarded 
him the victory) but he implied a universal ethical criterion for his proposal. He 
did not address the benefits of his proposal to any one group of persons. A utili-
tarian would approve of the criterion that Minch implied. 
The first and second scenarios look much like a conventional stock issues 
analysis of a policy question. The third scenario, on the other hand, seems more 
utilitarian. The fourth is very utilitarian, in that it considers the greatest good for 
all persons, not just for the immediate audience. 
Each of these scenarios has ethical implications. Suppose that a proposed 
policy would indeed benefit one‘s own group, but at the cost of harming some-
one outside the group. This might be a very great harm. For example, a debater 
argues that college students should become interested in politics and press for 
war against another country. This war is to be fought not for national defense, 
but to colonize the other nation. The net result might be quite beneficial for the 
audience‘s own country. The country to be attacked is weak, let us say, and has 
few allies. The conquest would gain a great economic benefit for the conqueror 
at minimal cost.  
Given the suffering that results from war and conquest, this proposed action 
would probably produce a net harm, considering everything. Therefore, a utilita-
rian could not approve. However, if most of the harms are likely to accrue to the 
conquered nation, not to the conqueror, a stock issues analysis—something akin 
to any of the first three scenarios above—might well lead one to approve of such 
an action.  
Thus, the big difference between a conventional stock issues analysis of a 
controversial question and a utilitarian analysis of those questions is that the 
utilitarian analysis counts everyone the same. A stock issues analysis is likely to 
consider the benefit of the policy for the immediate audience, at worst, or the 
civic benefits of the policy, at best. A utilitarian analysis is concerned with the 
same basic issue, which is whether the proposed policy would produce more 
good than harm, but considers the benefits and harms to everyone, not just a 
group identified in some way with the speaker‘s target audience. Utilitarianism 
might not approve of the most persuasive argument, but to follow utilitarian 
principles might uplift the moral quality of argument.  
As Hare points out, ―the principle often accepted by utilitarians, ‗Everybody 
to count for one, nobody for more than one‘ can . . . be justified by the appeal to 
the demand for universalizability‖ (Freedom 118). The idea, according to Hare‘s 
analysis, is that a utilitarian considers the ―substantial inclinations and interests 
that people actually have,‖ plus a requirement that people be willing to univer-
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salize their moral judgments (Hare, Freedom 118). Hare further requires that a 
moral actor must be able to consider not just one‘s own inclinations, but rather 
also to imagine being in another person‘s shoes and to envision what that per-
son‘s inclinations and desires might be (Freedom 113; see also Hare, Moral 107 
ff.). Thus, while theories of stock issues imply generality, utilitarianism implies 
even great generality.  
From a utilitarian standpoint, the good and harm that occur to every indi-
vidual count the same as that to every other individual. Thus, the benefits to 
one‘s immediate audience are no more important than those to strangers, fo-
reigners, or members of any out-group.  
 
Two Approaches to Utilitarianism 
Hare argues that we routinely engage in moral thinking on two different le-
vels. First, we operate by various rules and principles that we have learned from 
our upbringing. If one has been well nurtured, Hare suggests, such rules include 
a dictum to tell the truth, a rule not to murder other people, a requirement to pay 
one‘s debts, and so forth. These rules may be as general or specific as necessary, 
but regardless of how general they are, they must be universal. That is, one must 
be willing to see the same rules applied in any similar case, and in particular, 
one must be willing to see them applied to yourself, not just by yourself. In this 
respect, Hare consciously echoes Kant‘s categorical imperative (―Act only ac-
cording to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should be-
come a universal law,‖ Kant 80). Hare points out that if one is well brought up, 
one will follow rules that, if followed consistently, will produce a net balance of 
greater good for society as a whole. Thus, these rules have a utilitarian impact.  
However, two rules will often come into conflict with one another. The rule 
to tell the truth and the rule to protect innocent lives may come into conflict if a 
pederast knocks at the door and asks to see your children. In such cases, one 
engages in moral thinking at the second level. According to Hare, in these cases 
one can no longer rely on the rules. One weighs the likely good and bad conse-
quences of the acts before deciding which is more moral to do (Hare, Moral 25 
ff.). In these cases, one chooses among between the acts specified by the con-
flicting rules, and not from the universe of all possible actions. This procedure 
tends to produce judgments more in line with conventional moral thinking than 
many older versions of act-utilitarianism (Scanlon 129). 
This model suggests several ways in which utilitarian theory can better in-
form argumentative analysis. First, it is important to consider the needs of all 
persons equally. Conventional rhetorical analysis often ignores the distinction 
between producing a policy that is to the advantage of the audience, or to some 
community of which the audience is a part, as opposed to the good of human-
kind as a whole, or to the good of all living things, or to some other large group. 
Utilitarian theory thus insists on a larger concept of the public and, thus, implies 
an enlarged conception of the audience.  
Second, Hare‘s version of utilitarianism clearly states that any moral rules 
must apply universally. A speaker must be willing to apply the rule reflexively, 
back to the speaker. This universality must also consider that other persons may 
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have desires that are different from those of the speaker, such that persons who 
are acted upon are entitled to freedom in choosing what good things they desire. 
This choice must still be rational, so that Hare would not approve of a drug user 
choosing to become addicted to heroin. Rather, Hare would endorse the addict‘s 
freedom to choose to pursue goods. Applying Hare‘s insights to argumentation 
and debate, debaters might place more importance on conventional ethical stan-
dards. 
 
Utilitarianism’s Contribution to Argumentation Theory 
Stock issues analysis, bears a clear relationship to utilitarian principles. Ap-
plying utilitarian analysis to the stock issues can aid in the formulation of better 
decision-making criteria for debaters. Concepts from Hare‘s theory illustrate 
this. Other utilitarian theories, as well as non-utilitarian ethical theories, may be 
equally, or better, suited.  
If one seeks an ethical principle to assist debate analysis, one can choose 
from any number of theories. Presumably, any ethical theory that suggests stan-
dards for human conduct, especially in the realm of social behavior, might pro-
vide the germinal material for an analytical system useful to debaters. This essay 
applies utilitarian theory for pragmatic reasons: utilitarianism is a well-respected 
ethical theory, and its principles resemble the stock issues. Thus, to ground the 
analysis of propositions of policy in stock issues allows for a more conservative 
theoretical adjustment than would, for instance, a system of argumentative anal-
ysis based on Rawls‘ principles of justice (see his two principles of justice, 
Rawls, Theory 60-65). Further research could examine the import that various 
ethical theories have for argumentative analysis.  
This is not an essay of rhetorical criticism. However, one suspects that a uti-
litarian view would lead one to disapprove of many of the arguments presented 
in political campaign debating. However, a utilitarian conception of the stock 
issues may accord with many of the common practices of present-day high 
school and college academic debate more closely than do the conventional stock 
issues. Awareness of the relationship between stock issues and theories of ethics 
can significantly clarify the quality of argumentative analysis. More generally, 
given rhetorical theorists‘ centuries-long efforts to overcome the calumny that 
rhetoric too easily engender sophistry, an ethical grounding for argumentation 
should beget guidance and encouragement.  
 
Works Cited 
―1990 National Debate Tournament Final Debate.‖ Ed. Christina L. Reynolds, 
Larry G. Schnoor, and James R. Brey. 1990 Championship Debates and 
Speeches. Vol. 5. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 
1990.  
Aristotle. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Trans. George A. Kenne-
dy. New York: Oxford U P, 1991. 
Arnett, Ronald C. ―The Responsive ‗I‘: Levinas‘s Derivative Argument. (Re-
view Essay).‖ Argumentation and Advocacy 40.1 (Summer 
26
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol46/iss1/12
 Speaker & Gavel 2009 23 
 
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
2003): 39(12). InfoTrac OneFile. Thomson Gale. USC Aiken Library. 2 Ju-





Bentham, Jeremy. Deontology; or, the Science of Morality: In Which the Har-
mony and Co-Incidence of Duty and Self-Interest, Virtue, and Felicity, Pru-
dence and Benevolence, are Explained and Exemplified. 2 vols. (Ed J. 
Bowring). London: Longman, 1834.  
Douglas, Stephen. ―Excerpt from the Freeport Debate: Douglas‘s Reply.‖ Ro-
nald Reid, ed., Three Centuries of American Rhetorical Discourse: An An-
thology and Review. Prospect Heights: Waveland, 1988.  
Eggleston, Ben. ―Reformulating Consequentialism: Railton‘s Normative Eth-
ics.‖ Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 449-462 
Freeley, Austin J. Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned 
Decision Making. 8
th
 ed. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993. 
Freeley, Austin J. and David L. Steinberg. Argumentation and Debate: Critical 
Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making. 10
th
 ed. Belmont, CA: Wads-
worth, 2000.  
Gough, Henry B. ―Formulas for the Special Issues.‖ Public Speaking Review 3 
(1913): 5-8.  
Hare, R. M. Essays in Ethical Theory. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989.  
---. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon, 1963. 
---. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Clarendon, 1981.  
Hultzen, Lee S. ―Status in Deliberative Analysis. Ed. Donald C. Bryant. The 
Rhetorical Idiom: Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language, and Drama. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U P.  
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Phi-
losophy. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1949.  
Louise, Jennie. ―Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and 
Evaluative Conflict.‖ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2006): 65-85.  
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Ca. 1890. Ed. John Plamenatz. Mill’s Utilita-
rianism Reprinted with a Study of the English Utilitarians. Oxford: Black-
well, 1949. 161-228. 
Minch, David. Debate speech. Shane Miller, ed., ―1991 Lincoln Douglas De-
bate.‖ 89-91. Larry G. Schnoor, ed. 1991 and 1992 Championship Debates 
and Speeches. Vols. 6 & 7. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Asso-
ciation, 1994. 
Parker, M. Jack. ―An Application of Stasis Theory to the Treatment of Issues in 
Intercollegiate Debating.‖ Diss. Southern Illinois Univ., 1970. 
Pelsma, J. R. ―Contest Orations.‖ Public Speaking Review 2 (1913): 166-170.  
---. ―A Difficult Problem for the Debater: The Special Issues.‖ Public Speaking 
Review 3 (1913): 104. 
Poulakos, Takis. Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates’ Rhetorical Education. Co-
lumbia: U of South Carolina P, 1997.  
27
et al.: Complete Volume (46)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 016
 24 Speaker & Gavel 2009 
  
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard/Belknap, 1971.  
---. ―Two Concepts of Rules.‖ Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-32.  
Rieke, Richard D. and Malcolm O. Sillars. Argumentation and Critical Decision 
Making. 5
th
 ed. New York: Longman, 2001. 
Scanlon, T. M. ―Levels of Moral Thinking.‖ Hare and Critics. Oxford: Claren-
don, 1988. Ed. Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion. 129-146. 
Swift, Crystal Lane. ―Conflating Rules, Norms, and Ethics in Intercollegiate 
Forensics.‖ Speaker and Gavel 43 (2006): 46-86. 2 July 2007. 
http://www.mnsu.edu/spcomm/dsr-tka/vol%2043%202006.pdf 
Thompson, Wayne N. ―Stasis in Aristotle‘s Rhetoric.‖ Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 58 (1972): 134-141. 
―Third Debate.‖ Ed. Sidney Kraus. The Great Debates: Kennedy vs. Nixon, 
1960, a Reissue. Bloomington: Indiana U P, 1977.  
Toulmin, Stephen Edelston. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1970. 
Wenzel, Joseph W. ―Toward a Rationale for Value-Centered Argument.‖ Jour-
nal of the American Forensic Association 13 (1977): 150-158. 
Ziegelmueller, George W. and Jack Kay. Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy. 
3
rd
 ed. Boston: Allyn, 1997. 
 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Argumentation and Foren-
sics Division at the 2001 Convention of the National Communication Association, 
Atlanta, GA, November 2, 2001. 
 
William D. Harpine, Ph.D., Department of Communications, University of 
South Carolina Aiken, Aiken, South Carolina. 
28
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol46/iss1/12
 Speaker & Gavel 2009 25 
 
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
 
Rejecting the Square Peg in a Round Hole 
Expanding Arguments in Oral Interpretation Introductions 
 
Crystal Lane Swift 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to advance the level of argument made in the introductions 
of competitive forensic oral interpretation of literature events. It is argued that 
the status quo of arguments in oral interp introductions is overall sub-par, and 
perhaps limited. Connections are made between the goals of the oral interpreta-
tion introduction and current work in the scholarship of historicity. Akin to con-
clusions performance scholars have made, it is not the truth or falsity of litera-
ture or history which is of primary concern, but rather the (potential) generative 
nature of literature. Just as Pollock calls performance scholars to make history 
go rather than go away, I argue that as a parallel, we can make oral interpreta-
tion go rather than go away through the use of an expanded understanding of the 
use of an argument in the oral interpretation introduction. In lieu of an Aristote-
lian-only reading of argumentation in oral interpretation, we can take cues from 
both our performance studies and performance-based debate colleagues in order 
to inflate the possibilities of both meaningful and generative arguments in oral 
interpretation introductions. Implications for the competitive, educational, and 
game aspects of forensics are also offered. 




 ―Pretend you don‘t see Wanda-Sue‖ (Bailey & Temple, 1996, p. 1). So be-
gan my NCCFI championship duo I preformed with my duo partner, Shaunté R. 
Caraballo, during the 2002-2003 forensic season. We were ecstatic with our 
season-long and national results, and I thought I knew a major reason it was so 
successful: it contained what I considered (perhaps because I came up with it) a 
brilliant argument in the intro: 
 
Shaunté: According to multicultural relationship theorist, Dr. Francis War-
dle, Critical Race Theory dictates that relationships between people and 
groups of people are always power relationships. 
Crystal Lane: Whites have power, minorities don't. In the following, the 
majority struggles throughout her life between the love of her half sister and 
that which society has deemed appropriate. 
Shaunté: In turn, the minority is left virtually powerless.  
Both: Southern Girls  
Shaunté: by Sheri Bailey  
Crystal Lane: and Dura Temple. 
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Clearly, from my early days of learning about forensics, I was convinced 
that the norm of an argument in the introduction of interpretation events was 
essential. Though along the way, I have learned not everyone agrees with the 
necessity of an argument, it is apparent that some clear statement of significance 
in interpretation introductions, though not enough to win on their own, will nev-
er competitively hurt.  
So, being the comprehensive Southern California forensic competitor that I 
was; I was committed to adapting for a multitude of critics in every forensic 
genre. For interpretation events, this was my strategy: win over the individual 
event coaches with my literature, cutting, and performance, and win over the 
debate coaches with my argumentative introductions. Though I was no rock star 
competitor, one aspect of my interpretation ballots was consistent: my introduc-
tions rarely got critiqued for not having an argument. Perhaps I was not nearly 
as comprehensive as I thought. Because arguments over whether or not interpre-
tation of literature events require argumentation in their introductions has been 
largely binary and somewhat unproductive, it seems time to go back to the roots 
of this issue: the definition of what constitutes an argument. Traditionally, when 
academics, especially forensicators, talk about ―arguments,‖ we are referring to 
Toulmin model-oriented, syllogistic, logical argumentation like in traditional 
debate (and argumentation texts). However, as far back as Wallace‘s (1963) 
good reasons and Fisher‘s (1989a; 1989b) narrative paradigm, communication 
studies has been quite aware that the definition of argumentation has in fact ex-
panded since the time of Plato and Aristotle.  
This paper will not provide a stringent definition of what ought constitute 
an argument, because its primary purpose is to grant that arguments in oral in-
terpretation events are an excellent element, but currently overly stringent in 
their definition. Hence, the move described in this paper for some may sound 
like a ―lens‖ or a significance statement rather than an argument. These broader 
interpretations of arguments are precisely what this paper aims to move toward, 
and the aforementioned concepts are in no way logically or conceptually incon-
sistent with argumentation. Because forensic oral interpretation venues differ 
from performance art venues, in that there is logistically no possibility for dis-
cussion after performances, the interpreter has a responsibility to his or her au-
dience to substitute that dialogue with a dialogic performance, one essential 
element of which is, a dynamic, performatively affirmed, and meaningful argu-
ment. 
Most recently, it has become obvious that the subfield in communication 
with the fastest-evolving and most contextually specific definition of argumenta-
tion is that of performance studies. Instead of just applying simple, formulaic 
structures to different sets of content, performance studies scholars look to the 
embodiment of and dialogue with the particular in order to perform, observe, 
and discover arguments. I argue that the nature of oral interpretation begs that 
we do the same. Hence, I aim to encourage the advancement of the level of ar-
gument made in the introductions of competitive forensic oral interpretation of 
literature events. First, we will delve into the status quo of arguments in oral 
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interpretation introductions. Next, we will connect the goal of the oral interpre-
tation introduction and current work in the scholarship of historicity. Finally, 
implications for the competitive, educational, and game aspects of forensics are 
also offered. 
Status Quo 
Oral interpretation of literature events are currently a staple of any compre-
hensive forensic program or tournament. As a staple genre of events, oral inter-
pretation has, of course, undergone the gamut of interrogation in forensic litera-
ture, including whether these events should even be a part of forensic competi-
tion (Fouts, 1964; Williams, 1964), how the events are judged (Hershey, 1987; 
Lewis, Williams, Keaveney, & Leigh, 1984; Mills, 1991; Trimble, 1994, Ver-
linden, 2002), how oral interpretation should be preformed (Aspdal, 1997; Sell-
now & Sellnow, 1986; Whillock, 1984), and whether or not original or unpub-
lished pieces of literature ought to be allowed in competition (Billings & Tal-
bert, 2003; Endres, 1988; Lewis, 1988; Lindemann, 2002; Green, 1988). While 
most forensic events have been studied and studied again, oral interpretation, 
possibly because of its numerous and stringent norms (Cronn-Mills & Golden, 
1997), remains a consistent site of contention for forensic scholars and practi-
tioners alike. One argument remains consistent throughout literature regarding 
oral interp: though this genre of event has a rich history of traditional elocution 
behind it (Edwards, 1999), oral interpretation is dynamic and evolutionary (Ros-
si & Goodnow, 2006). Currently, the performance aspect of oral interpretation 
events seems to be the focus over the literary nature of these events. As revealed 
by Rossi and Goodnow (2006), ―Competitive speakers are being taught that 
presentation is more valuable than message. Lack of regard for the text in com-
petitive oral interpretation translates to a lack of concern for what is being com-
municated and/or the process of communication‖ (p. 54). While this shift in ap-
parent emphasis in training oral interpretation is clearly not caused solely by the 
argument/no argument debate regarding introductions, the types of arguments 
encouraged and the level of importance associated with the argument is at least 
partially to blame. As further described by Rossi and Goodnow (2006): 
 
Additionally, the de-emphasis on quality introductions and transitions in 
many oral interpretation events has nearly eliminated the need for the stu-
dent to be a good speaker with his or her own well-organized and well-
written thoughts. They need only "perform" and need not worry about cru-
cial considerations such as clarity of personal thought and expression. The 
assumption is that the student's "voice" is heard through the interplay of 
text. How a student arranges the selections that she or he has chosen is as-
sumed to reveal the message they want to convey. While there is an artistic 
validity to this rationale, such an approach still does not test the student's 
own cogency of thought and expression. Oral interpretation as originally 
developed and connected to competitive forensics was considered another 
unique manifestation of the public speaking process, not simply as a venue 
for performance. A greater emphasis on the student's own communicative 
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abilities and acts deserves consideration; his or her thought and words need 
to be an expected and accepted part of the communication event. (p. 55) 
 
Rossi and Goodnow‘s sentiment is one that is rather traditional in many 
ways, but important. In the end, all of our events are public speaking and argu-
mentation events, from their roots. Unfortunately, while trying to be progressive, 
some of us have gotten so far from our roots that we‘ve lost sight of the original 
purpose of our activity. The de-emphasis on quality introductions is further sup-
ported by the fact that Kelly‘s (2005) otherwise thoughtful and helpful guide to 
coaching interpretation events excludes a discussion of the existence of and in-
troduction in oral interpretation events at all. Addressing norms in forensics 
generally, Gaer (2002) argued that ―When we stifle creativity in the name of 
competitive success, we do create an activity where students become presenta-
tional robots and let freedom of creation and expression go by the way-side‖ (p. 
56). Scholars tend to agree that the forensics round can and should be used as a 
laboratory (Aden, 1991; Dreibelbis & Gullifor, 1992; Friedley, 1992; Harris, 
Kropp, & Rosenthall, 1986; Jensen, 1997; Swanson, 1992a; Swanson, 1992b; 
Zueschner, 1992). The impact of the aforementioned two statements is this: we 
are in the midst of the perfect time to improve our pedagogy and students‘ crea-
tivity when it comes to oral interpretation of literature. Because the foremost 
issue of interest to argumentation, and the only issue which all agree should be 
authored by the student is, in fact, the introduction, this is where I focus my ef-
forts in this paper. 
 
Connecting Oral Interpretation Arguments and Historicity 
Akin to conclusions performance scholars have made, it is not the truth or 
falsity of literature or history which is of primary concern, but rather the (poten-
tial) generative nature of literature. Just as Pollock calls performance scholars to 
make history go rather than go away, I argue that as a parallel, we can make oral 
interpretation go rather than go away through the use of an expanded under-
standing of the use of an argument in the oral interpretation introduction. In lieu 
of an Aristotelian-only reading of argumentation in oral interpretation, we can 
take cues from both our performance studies and performance-based debate col-
leagues in order to inflate the possibilities of both meaningful and generative 
arguments in oral interpretation introductions. In the introduction to Exceptional 
Spaces: Essays in Performance and History, for which she is the editor, Pollock 
explained: 
 
It [the argument in the book] is about the kinds of history made in perfor-
mance and about history itself as a spectacular, performative rite. It constel-
lates various approaches to the nexus of performance and history in an ef-
fort to understand how performances make history go and what happens 
when history seems to go away—when it seems to either fade into its repre-
sentations or fall into the fragments of time. (p. 1) 
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I conjecture that the same performative stance can be applied directly to fo-
rensic oral interpretation of literature. The difference is that not all oral interpre-
tation of literature pieces are pieces of history; they are not all true accounts of 
events. However, as performance studies scholars who specialize in historicity 
and memory will quickly remind us, not all ―history‖ is a ―true account of 
events,‖ either. Hence, in an effort to accomplish two goals: 1) encourage mea-
ningful introductions in oral interpretation performances, and 2) to make the 
arguments we encourage in said events current, we need to look to the work that 
our performance studies colleagues are already doing. To at least lay the ground 
work for these goals, in this analysis, I will first establish why the introduction is 
of value in oral interpretation events and second show how these introductions 
can and should connect to current work in performance studies literature, which 
will lay the foundation to draw implications from this line of argument. 
 
Introductions in Oral Interpretation Need Arguments 
The disagreement which transpires between coaches and sometimes com-
petitors over whether or not interpretation introductions ought to contain argu-
ments is interesting, because it, in and of itself, is an argument. Though the con-
troversy abounds, embedded within interpersonal communicative transactions at 
tournaments, conferences, and the like, most literature specifically addressing 
this issue establishes that if not required, an argument in an interpretation of 
literature introduction is at least good (e. g. Geiger, 1952; Geiger, 1954; Geisler, 
1985; Koeppell & Morman, 1991; Macksoud, 1968; McBath, 1975; Parrish, 
1936; Parson, 1984; Sharpham, Matter, & Brockreide, 1971; Swarts, 1988; Va-
lentine & Valentine, 1981; Velleux, 1969; Verlindon, 1987). While there is no 
written rule that explicitly requires arguments in interpretation introductions, 
much of the research on norms in forensics indicate that the forensic communi-
ty‘s unwritten expectations usually trump the written rules anyhow (e. g. Cronn-
Mills & Golden, 1997; Swift, 2006; VerLinden, 1997).  
As many competitors have experienced, there is usually more competitive 
risk to omitting than presenting an argument in an interpretation introduction. 
Therefore, most competitive interpretation speeches do contain at least an at-
tempt at an argument. Argumentation skill is a major benefit of forensic partici-
pation, hence, this practice does not seem inherently dangerous. However, repe-
tition of arbitrary or underdeveloped arguments my be a problem. After all, the 
forensic round is a place for experimentation and education. ―Basically, to 
achieve the argumentative perspective in the oral interpretation events, we must 
begin to look at oral interpretation as a rhetorical transaction—a sender deliver-
ing a message to a receiver with the purpose of having some effect‖ (Koeppell & 
Morman, 1991, p. 143). By striving to train our students to make the best argu-
ments possible in their interpretation introductions, we can expand the educa-
tional opportunities they have. A way in which I think we can expand and ex-
pound the quality of argumentation in oral interpretation introductions is by par-
alleling our performance studies colleagues. 
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Oral Interpretation and Historicity 
Oral interpretation events utilize pieces of literature which are (usually) 
written by an author other than the student. These pieces of literature are some-
times factual, sometimes fictional, and most often (as characteristic of literature 
generally) somewhere in between. It is this factional/fictual nature which pro-
vides the most obvious connection between oral interpretation and historicity. 
Scholars of historicity operate from a basic assumption that history is neither 
complete true nor completely false. Further, the goal of historicity is to provide 
the most complete historical experience possible by involving a multitude of 
voices and modes in these particular historical accounts, which is embedded 
within the subfield of performance studies in communication. ―Performance is 
often referred to as a ‗contested concept‘ because as a concept, method, event, 
and event, it is variously envisioned and employed‖ (Madison & Hamera, 2006, 
p. xi ) . It is the contestation, I believe, that actually provides oral interpretation 
speakers an opportunity to make more meaningful arguments. By arguing with 
and against the particular literature which they are interpreting, the speaker‘s 
performance goes from linear to dialogic to multi-logic. ―In every instance, the 
epic theatre is meant for the actors as much as for the spectators‖ (Benjamin, 
1969, p. 152). Conceptualizing oral interpretation along the Bejaminian-epic 
theatre lines enables the argumentation and performance which the oral interpre-
tation speaker is engaged in to rupture meaning with the text, themselves, and 
the audience. 
The way in which we can attempt this change is to view the argumentation 
in the introduction of oral interpretation pieces as both important and potentially 
generative. Connerton (1989) argued that societies consent to rituals by continu-
ing to consent to performing in them. The more that we consent to the perfor-
mance of meaningless or arbitrary introductions in oral interpretation perfor-
mances, the further away we get from the potential of fresh perspectives in how 
to write and perform these arguments. ―The artistic use of oral performance is 
also part of a slightly different genealogy, one that explicitly deploys theater in 
the service of community formation and community interrogation‖ (Jackson, 
2005, p. 53). It is through the simultaneous employment of the literature, lin-
guistic argumentation, and performative affirmation that we can create a catalyst 
for our community to interrogate the literature which our students choose to 
perform. I will not outline a formula for writing these kinds of arguments, be-
cause that would negate the entire premise which performance generally, and 
historicity specifically asks us to do. Essentially, this type of argumentation is a 
type which begs the performer to argue from and toward particulars within the 
literature. This does not ask the performer to lay out the plot in the introduction. 
This does not ask the performer to find a loosely linked quotation to present in 
the introduction. This does not ask the performer to make a claim that begins 
with something like, ―We‘ve all experienced . . .‖ The first of the ―don‘ts‖ simp-
ly does not advance anything; the second does not come from particulars in the 
text; and the third is virtually meaningless.  
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What this re-conceptualization does ask the performer to do is to perform 
and experience the particular piece of literature that they have chosen to perform 
in order to discover what the meaning, significance, or perhaps beauty of that 
piece is. ―The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and 
dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a 
substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration‖ (Foucault, 1977, p. 
148). Through performing and re-performing the literature, the oral interpreta-
tion speaker‘s body becomes inscribed and re-inscribed with the text, and there-
fore, the speaker can articulate through their words and body the holistic expe-
rience of the literature. What this means is that the interpreter should be con-
stantly and consistently re-visiting the introduction in order to insure that it is 
expressing the experience of performing and viewing the performance of the 
literature, so that the argumentation keeps up with the growth of the perfor-
mance of the literature. 
 
Implications 
 I do not anticipate that this position piece will immediately (or neces-
sarily ever) revolutionize the way in which we coach and perform oral interpre-
tation of literature events in forensic competition. In fact, I would not even ad-
vocate that this is the best approach for ever student, every coach, and every 
piece. Actually, that is part of the point of this particular perspective. The major 
issue which ought to change is the one-size-fits-all approach to arguments in 
oral interpretation introductions in particular, and to forensics generally. I cer-
tainly hope that the line of argumentation presented in this paper opens up dis-
cussion on this issue in the future. Based on the re-conceptualization discussed 
in this paper, there are three areas of implications, which center on the three 
primary perspectives on forensics (Bartenan, 1994; Swift, 2008). These perspec-
tives are forensics as competition, forensics as rhetorical training, and forensics 
as game. 
 
Forensics as Competition 
 The first primary perspective that coaches and students can take on for 
the purpose of forensics is that of forensics as competition. The competition 
perspective advocates competitive success as the most important outcome of 
forensic participation. By expanding the possibilities of types of arguments in 
introductions of oral interpretation events, we could be helping to level the play-
ing field (albeit in a minute fashion) in these events. It is the restrictions that 
narrowly focused norms place upon students which continually hinder their 
creativity in forensic competition. Obviously, in order for this type of change in 
oral interpretation introduction argumentation to have an impact on the competi-
tive aspect of forensics, coaches and judges would need to be open to listening 
to these new types of arguments and willing to award them in competition. 
 
Forensics as Rhetorical Training 
The second perspective that coaches and students can take on for the pur-
pose of forensics is that of forensics as rhetorical training. This perspective puts 
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training for the real world as its foremost goal, and is as old as our discipline. 
Clearly, training students in different types of argumentation upholds the notion 
that forensics is concerned with education. By expanding our definition of an 
argument in oral interpretation introductions, we can contribute to the fulfill-
ment of the larger rhetorical tradition which forensics speaks to. Along this vein, 
Bartanen and Frank (1999) argued: 
 
In the rhetorical tradition, students are expected to face diverse audiences, 
knowing as well that different audiences and individual audience members 
require different kinds of proof. Because audiences and audience members 
hold different values and use a variety of modes of inquiry, students were 
taught the art of adaptation. Students were expected to study sociological 
pluralism and the various logics at work in the world. p. 43. 
 
This performative argumentation push will speak to a different logic than 
our more traditional logics and arguments have spoken to in oral interpretation 
introductions have in the past. 
 
Forensics as Game 
 The third perspective that coaches and students can take on for the pur-
pose of forensics is that of forensics as game. This perspective advocates learn-
ing to operate within the forensic setting with the highest skill level possible for 
the sake of playing the game. Finally, because forensics is in many aspects a 
game, a refreshed view of the introduction in oral interpretation events provides 
another piece to play and to play with. ―There are two kinds of games, finite and 
infinite games. A finite game is played for the purpose of winning, and infinite 
game for the purpose of continuing the play‖ (Carse, 1986, p. 3). Time, space, 
and its rules confines the finite game, while the infinite game is a meta-game. In 
the finite game, there is an ends of winners and losers. In the infinite game, there 
can be play not only within rules but also play with rules themselves. By dis-
cussing the manner in which we do things in forensics, we are engaging in rhe-
torical conversion, so that the game of forensics can continue. An example of 
how this has played out previously on the specific subject of oral interpretation 
comes from Rossi and Goodnow (2006) when suggesting that oral interpretation 
is not interpretation but performance: 
 
A third solution is probably the easiest and most honest; forensics organiza-
tions can recognize the performance style currently practiced and change 
the name of events to reflect this style. We would propose renaming events 
to the oral performance of literature. The cat seems to be out of the bag in 
terms of where the "interpretation" events are headed. In addition, as fewer 
and fewer coaches have training in traditional oral interpretation, the hopes 
of returning the forensics activity to its more traditional roots seems remote. 
Consequently, as coaches and organizers of forensics events we can choose 
to be honest about what our students are doing. Instead of misdirecting stu-
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dents into thinking they have mastered oral interpretation, we can rightly 
identify their mastery of oral performance. While clearly this solution does 
nothing to reinvigorate the study of oral interpretation, renaming events 
may enable oral interpretation to retain its identity as a discrete art form. (p. 
57) 
 
Through a continued discussion of the state of oral interpretation, we can con-
tinue to improve our practices and pedagogy, as well as the state of the game. 
 
Conclusion 
Through an application of performance style argumentation to introductions 
in interpretation of literature events, we have expanded the possibility of argu-
ments for interpretation introductions. I do not want to be mistaken here. Tradi-
tional arguments in oral interpretation events are in no way wrong. However, I 
do think that without other options, these introductions tend to become stale and 
sometimes meaningless. This issue is obviously rather minute in the larger realm 
of forensics generally. It does, however, speak toward what is at stake in the 
larger picture. As Swift (2008) concluded: 
 
The part of rhetoric that we, as members of the forensic community are 
primarily concerned with is the doing of rhetoric. Of course, that which we 
ask of are students on a daily basis is an arguably insurmountable task and 
analogous to the task we place on our public speaking classes. We ask fo-
rensic students, like public speaking students to master the doing before or 
concurrent with the learning of theories and logics which inform our doing. 
Not only do we want, and sometimes demand student mastery of the doing, 
but that our students doing be (at least perceived as) better than the doing of 
students from other colleges and universities. In training our students, we 
are left with an exhausting tension which must be constantly and earnestly 
negotiated. We, the directors of our forensic teams, are exactly that: direc-
tors. It is paramount that just as directors of plays embed theoretical, per-
formative, and logistical reasons within their explanations of directions to 
actors, we embed our thoughts behind why we tell students to do the things 
we tell them to do. (p. 161) 
 
In re-conceptualizing the way in which we view the introduction of oral in-
terpretation events, we can revitalize and refresh a small part of a much larger 
picture. As my assistant coach, Chas Womelsdorf, taught me this year, ―Crystal 
Lane, it is my job to teach the students to read‖ in oral interpretation events. 
When taught to read and truly interpret texts without an entirely set, stringent 
formula for introduction-writing, creativity can truly flourish. One way this kind 
of true interpretation and creativity can occur is through encouraging our stu-
dents to make performative, particular, and embodied arguments. Shaunté and I, 
I believe, performatively affirmed the argument in our introduction through 
Shaunté‘s literature selection, our cutting, blocking, and performance. However, 
that performative affirmation (at least on my part) was arguably partially seren-
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dipitous. By encouraging our students to base argumentation in interpretation 
introductions on particulars from their literature selections, we may have an ab-
undance of more meaningful arguments and performances.  
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Creating Sites for Reasonable Discourse 







presents an analysis of stasis as a means for creating common 
ground between conflicting parties and a guide to judgment in public delibera-
tion. Craig‘s (1989) approach to communication as a ―practical discipline‖ pro-
vides the theoretical justification for research that examines the practical com-
munication problems society faces. This paper examines public discourse in the 
form of arguments before local deliberative bodies, where people are attempting 
to influence the judgment of the board and the public. Using the methods of a 
rhetorically informed discourse analysis (see Tracy, 2001 & 2002), this paper 
examines the formulation, presentation, and reaction to arguments in naturally 
occurring public deliberation. The analysis focuses on the ways stasis provides a 
means of understanding, analyzing, and critiquing argument. A fundamental 
problem in public argument is a lack of common ground for proceeding with 
deliberation when opposing sides take divergent views of an issue. Stasis as a 
principle for public deliberation provides a way of conceiving common ground 
and a guide for effective public deliberation.  
 
Introduction 
Public deliberation, at any level of government, can be very divisive. Deli-
berative bodies, from national legislatures to local school boards, are often bom-
barded by groups pushing for their particular agendas. While this interest driven 
approach to public arguments runs contrary to a Habermasian notion of ideal 
speech (see Habermas, 1989), Mouffe (1999) and other theorists of public ar-
gument and rhetoric (see Hauser, 1999) argue that such interest is inherent to 
deliberation and that power differences are ubiquitous to society. When people 
use such interest based approaches to public argument, however, they tend to 
present different perspectives as incommensurable, leading to the axiomatic 
conclusion that ―little hearing goes on at public hearings‖ (McComas, 2001, 38). 
Kemmis (1990) has referred to this problem as a ―stalemate‖ that keeps citizens 
from reaching agreement and one of the practices that keeps citizens apart and 
unable to orient to a common good.  
In public argument and deliberation, it is important to discover ways of 
overcoming such apparently incommensurable differences in order to discover, 
or invent, a common good capable of sustaining agreement and providing a ba-
sis for action. The argumentative concept stasis can be used as a guiding prin-
ciple for public deliberation that provides for such a basis. Rather than attending 
to the common ground stasis can provide, the many practices in public argument 
work against establishing a clear stasis, which increases division between com-
peting interests.  
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As one of the most common practices of democracy, public meetings pro-
vide a common locus for naturally occurring public argument (see Tracy & Di-
mock, 2004). To explicate the relevance of stasis as an analytic tool and its re-
levance as a potential guiding principle, this essay examines two case studies of 
public deliberation. Both illustrate a problematic deliberative situation best ex-
plained by a lack of attention to stasis. This analysis falls into a line of research 
examining naturally occurring argumentative discourse using discourse analytic 
methods (see Tracy, 2002; Tracy and Ashcraft, 2001; Tracy and Standerfer, 
2003). Prior to analysis, it is important to examine the essential aspects of stasis 
theory, which provides a framework for the analysis, a practical ideal in delibe-
ration, and a method of judgment for public argument. 
 
Stasis and Public Argument 
Stasis theory is nearly as old as rhetoric itself. The standard forensic stases 
have been, essentially, codified since Hermagoras (Deiter, 1950; Goodwin, 
1989); the concept was referenced by both Plato and Aristotle ( Braet, 1987; 
Dill, 1988), and is also fundamental to Aristotle‘s conceptions in the physical 
sciences (Backes, 1960; Deiter, 1950). More importantly though, the concept of 
stasis represents a fundamental means of understanding the nature of argument, 
generating effective discourse, understanding conflict, and coming to judgment. 
Past research on stasis demonstrates its significance as a fundamental principle 
of argument. Contemporary research on naturally occurring argument can add to 
our understanding of stasis theory and can connect argument theory to argument 
practice. 
As Deiter‘s (1950) exhaustive analysis of the etymology of stasis explains, 
stasis is that point where motion stops. The prefix ―sta‖ literally means ―stand‖ 
and is used in reference to physical objects like water, rocks, and people. In an 
abstracted sense though, standing also refers to the stance taken by interlocutors 
in an argument (Dill, 1988). Deiter‘s analysis also explains how stasis is both 
the stopping point and the starting point of argument. Similar to the old axiom 
that you can only travel half way into the forest (otherwise you start traveling 
out of the forest), stasis refers to that point where ―in‖ and ―out‖ meet. In this 
sense, stasis is simultaneously the start, the end, and the turning point of move-
ment. Argumentatively speaking then, stasis can (and has been) applied to all of 
these aspects of argument. It is the point of conflict at which two speakers reach 
an impasse. It is the focal point of inventive strategies focused on generating 
arguments to persuade an audience to move from the stasis. Finally, it can also 
refer to the turning point of a debate, the point or issue at the heart of a disa-
greement. 
In this sense, stasis refers to a context extrinsic structure which rational dis-
course obeys just as ball bearings obey the laws of physics. Stasis in argumenta-
tion though, is more than the application of physical metaphors to discourse. As 
Kline (1979) has explained, this point of contact between otherwise incommen-
surate positions is also upheld in linguistic theory. Her argument draws on Ha-
bermas‘s position relative to systematically distorted communication (1970b) 
and communicative competence (1970a) which, in a basic sense, argues that in 
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order for there to be communication there needs to be some point of fundamen-
tal agreement. Thus, if there is conflict over a point, there must also be a point of 
agreement, such as a basic agreement on the meanings of the language used, 
upon which the disagreement may be founded. This analysis positions stasis not 
as extrinsic to language use, but intrinsic to it as well. Kline‘s work has further 
demonstrated that the stases, as potential points of conflict in the pragmatic use 
of language, correspond to the classic forensic stases.  
Research on the structure of argumentative interaction has also demonstrat-
ed that stasis is fundamental to language and entails the aspects of meeting 
point, conflicting point, and turning point. Jacobs and Jackson‘s (1981) work on 
conversational argument provides some important insight into the applicability 
of stasis to the structural features of disagreement. From their discourse analytic 
perspective, ―arguments are collaborative productions organized by conventions 
of language use in which two cooperative speakers jointly produce the conven-
tional structure‖ (Jacobs & Jackson, 1980, 251). Arguments develop in accor-
dance with the basic conversational structure of the adjacency pair. An adjacen-
cy pair is simply a conversational sequence, like question and answer or greeting 
and response, that forms the basic unit of interaction. The introduction of a first 
pair part (like ―how are you?‖) makes the second pair part (―fine.‖) conditionally 
relevant. In argument stasis emerges where there is a point of disagreement be-
tween a first and second part of the adjacency pair. A first pair part of, say a 
proposition, would make a second pair part of agreement or disagreement condi-
tionally relevant. If no response is made or a disagreement is made, the stasis is 
created and discourse should orient to the point of conflict if it is to proceed. 
It is the common orientation to the structure of interaction that discourse 
analytic research adds to the Habermasian principle of communicative compe-
tence and the logical basis of stasis theory. Unless parties are orienting to the 
same structure, they cannot communicate. For instance, in the old Hitchcock 
classic North by Northwest, the hero managed to get thrown out of an auction 
(escaping the villains) because he kept responding to the auctioneer with structu-
rally inappropriate bids (he decreased the bid rather than increasing it). He was 
then taken into custody on drunk and disorderly changes. It was the ―disorderli-
ness‖ of his speech that was both problematic and disruptive. The disorder, or 
conflict between the first part and second part of the adjacency pair, creates a 
point of stasis that must be remedied for discourse to continue.  
A second essential concept in the analysis of adjacency pairs is the notion of 
preference. In conversation analysis, preference does not refer to a psychological 
desire for agreement (although socially, there is often this feature at work in 
conversation), but to a structural design that ―prefers‖ one response over another 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). For instance, there is a structural difference be-
tween the questions ―where are you spending the holiday?‖ and ―why don‘t you 
spend the holiday with us?‖ In each case the question serves as a first pair part 
that structurally requires a second pair part, an answer. However, the answers to 
these questions require different kinds of work to conform to social expecta-
tions. To the first one might simply state, ―we‘re going to Disney Land.‖ The 
44
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol46/iss1/12
 Speaker & Gavel 2009 41 
 
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
second case structurally prefers an affirmative answer. In an interaction where 
the ―dispreferred‖ response must be given, the respondent will tend to mark the 
statement with hesitation, delay, and an account. The first question does not 
imply a preference for an answer (although situational demands may imply a 
preferred choice), and thus does not require an account for the choice. The 
second structure requires an account for a dispreferred response. This need for 
an account opens an ―expansion slot‖ (see Antaki, 1994) where an account for 
the dispreferred response may be offered. Essentially, when there is a stasis 
point, conversational structure orients to the need to speak to the stasis prior to 
continuing the conversation. These dispreferred responses are structurally 
marked by hesitation or other disruption to the flow of the conversation, as well 
as the account responding to the point of conflict. 
Accounts have a variety of features that relate to the ways they are called 
for and the structural and functional aspects of accounts (see Antaki, 1994). 
However, for present purposes, it is simply that these accounts are made relevant 
by the emergence of a stasis that provides an important link between the logical 
theory and the conversational practices of stasis. If we understand stasis, gener-
ally, as a point of disruption in the flow of what would otherwise be an agree-
ment, we can see that Jacobs and Jackson‘s work lends support to the same con-
ception of stasis offered by Dieter, and thus by Hermagoras and Aristotle. Stasis 
arises as a point where a first pair part and a second pair part do not seamlessly 
fit together. The disagreement creates a structural place (expansion slot) where 
an explanation or account relevant.
2
 Even in Plato‘s reconstructed dialogues, this 
feature of discourse is apparent. As Socrates practices the dialectical method, 
displayed below from Plato‘s Republic, he creates a stasis, which disrupts the 
flow of the conversation, shifting to the new issue that must be addressed prior 
to continuing the discussion: 
 
Thrasymachus and Socrates  
S: …Are the rulers in all cities infallible or are they liable to error?  
2 * T: No doubt they are liable to error.  
3 S: When they undertake to make laws, therefore, they make some  
4 correctly, others incorrectly?  
5 T: I suppose so.  
6 S: And a law is correct if it prescribes what is to the ruler‗s own  
7 advantage and incorrect if it prescribes what is to their disadvantage?…  
8 T: It is. …  
9 S: Then, according to your account, it is just to do not only what is to the  
10 advantage of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is not to their  
11 advantage.  
12 * T: What are you saying?  
13 * S: The same as you. But let‗s examine it more fully…  
(Plato, 380 BC/1992, 339c-339d) 
 
There are, of course, differences between a dialectical examination and typ-
ical conversation, and Plato does not show hesitations, repairs and the like, but 
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there is a structure to the emergence of stasis that is important to this conceptual 
frame. Thrasymachus‘ responses (line 2) were direct and did not treat the ques-
tions as problematic (something Socrates used later as support for his indictment 
of the position). As Socrates questioned his witness, Thrasymachus continued in 
providing short responses, up to the point (line 12) where he found fault with the 
previous turn. Therefore, this is the stasis in the line of argument. Socrates must 
be called upon to justify the claim. Argument can only continue if and when this 
point of stasis has been overcome.  
Clearly stasis is a point of disagreement that stops the progression of a line 
of reasoning, or positions an account or claim in need of justification. This is the 
point from which argumentation develops as a response to the clash of positions. 
In some debates, deliberations, and conversations this stasis is clearly identified 
and pursued, but this is more frequently not the case. No doubt the reader has 
experienced debates and conversational arguments where ―the issue‖ is never 
quite clear. Beyond this anecdotal evidence, there is also a growing body of re-
search on deliberation that points to stasis as a fundamental problematic.  
In research on deliberation and public meetings (see Tracy & Dimock, 
2004) one of the fundamental problems is with the reasonableness of the deli-
berative decision-making process. Researchers vary considerably, from boister-
ous disagreement (Ivie, 2002) to open-minded dialogue (Pearce and Pearce, 
2000), in their recommendations for addressing conflicting views appropriately. 
Each and every practice is open to failure as ―undemocratic discourse‖ (Gastil, 
1992) where people stop reasoning and arguing together to come to better deci-
sions (see Button & Mattson, 1999; Ivie, 2002; Price, 2000).  
Tracy and colleague‘s work on public meetings and deliberative practices 
(see Tracy, 1999; Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001; Tracy & Standerfer, 2003) point to a 
number of different strategies people use to negotiate tensions and argue with 
one another. Many of the argument practices they have identified manage the 
tension between unity and division in arguments. These practices often position 
getting along as more fundamental to deliberation than the reasonableness of the 
decision-making. For instance, in the course of choosing a new superintendent 
(in the context of a polarly divided school board), Tracy and Standerfer (2003) 
examined the ways the search process was positioned as unquestionable, rather 
than having contentions implications. Tracy (1999) examined how platitudes 
may be used to invoke moral principles and make nonspecific moral reprimands 
in ways that make an argument difficult to question. Kitzinger‘s (2000) research 
on idiomatic expressions found that they also function in ways that impede disa-
greement and argument. Framing arguments as concerning wording, rather than 
conflicting values (Tracy & Ashcraft, 2001), is yet another practice that limits 
disagreement in order to gain assent.  
Essentially, this line of research indexes patterns of conflict avoidance or 
circumnavigation that, while providing unity, frequently undermine the delibera-
tive process. In each case the interaction patterns suggest that the discourse is 
structured so as to avoid establishing or acknowledging some issue as a point of 
contention. The problem for deliberation more generally is that these practices 
46
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol46/iss1/12
 Speaker & Gavel 2009 43 
 
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
may undermine the legitimacy of deliberative bodies‘ decisions. By orienting to 
stases, both as an analytic tool and a practical principle, deliberative bodies 
could secure more reasoned judgment because they would be more likely to 
discover and examine the main points of conflict an issue may raise, and avoid 
those contentions that are not fundamental to a dispute. In this sense, stasis 
theory can provide a situated standard for reasoned decision making. 
Brat's (1987) research on stasis points to its potential applicability as just 
such a practical standard. He argues that the theory of stasis functions as stan-
dard for reasoned, unbiased judgment. For instance, he provides the following 
excerpt from the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Netherlands: 
 
The material or main questions of article 350: 
1. Is the fact proven? 
2. Is the fact punishable? (i.e. is the proven fact covered by a provision of 
criminal law?) 
3. Is the offender punishable? (i.e. are there exonerating circumstances?) 
4. What sanction should be imposed? 
(Brat, 1987, 87) 
 
This guide to the judge is a guide to reasoned judgment in the context of the 
criminal law courts. As opposed to the comprehensive and complex sort of 
guidance offered by the elaborate Robert's Rules of Order, this set of questions 
focuses on judgment rather than procedure. The two are no doubt interrelated, 
but the implication of Braet‘s argument is that stases provide situated, practical 
standards to guide judgment.  
 
Summary 
The basic forensic stases have long been understood as an exhaustive set of 
questions, applicable to any case. While Braet‘s (1987) research appears to 
adopt a relatively similar, context extrinsic set of stases as a guide, the research 
from Kline (1979) and Jacobs and Jackson (1983) allow us to conceive of stasis 
as a feature of interaction with broad scope. It is the starting, stopping, and turn-
ing point of a conversation or disagreement. When a stopping point occurs, 
which is as inevitable as the agreement that must precede it, interaction pauses 
and must navigate the new terrain of the disagreement. Stasis theory tells us that 
if reasoned judgment, a new agreement, is to follow the disagreement, the stasis 
needs to be addressed. Unfortunately, as research indicates and practitioners of 
public discourse have experienced, little effort is put into addressing and remov-
ing barriers to disagreement.  
In order to illustrate the significance of stasis as both a key component of 
argument analysis and guide to judgment, the two following case studies explore 
problematic treatments of stasis. Analytically, examining how arguments relate 
to the stasis allows insight into the role of arguments in guiding the deliberative 
process. In each case, the way arguments construct or avoid stases impedes the 
development of reasoned judgment. 
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Case Studies in Problematic Deliberation 
The purpose of relaying these two case studies is threefold. First, they lend 
credence the above theoretical analysis by portraying the practice of argumenta-
tion in naturally occurring discourse. Secondly, they demonstrate stasis theory‘s 
viability as a means of analysis, which can account for the destructive tenden-
cies of arguments that are not oriented to stases. Third and finally these case 
studies demonstrate that the practice of deliberation is sorely in need of a prac-
tical standard for reasoned judgment. These case studies utilize discourse analy-
sis as a method of examining naturally occurring public argument. 
 
Discourse Analysis and Argumentation 
Discourse analysis refers to a broad range of methods for textual analysis 
ranging from conversation analysis, which is marked by close attention to turn-
taking structure (see Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Schegloff, 1999), to critical 
discourse analysis, which focuses on the construction and use of power in and 
through discourse (see Gee, 1999). This analysis of public argument is con-
cerned with examining the practices of deliberation in order to discover practical 
problems and offer solutions that fit the situated ideals of the participants. This 
purpose is best facilitated by Tracy‘s (1995) Action-Implicative Discourse 
Analysis which entails a close examination of naturally occurring discourse in 
context, uses conceptual tools that explicate the structures and practices of inte-
raction, and orients toward explaining problematic practices and offering con-
structive criticism to better achieve situated ideals.  
Both of the following case studies are based on an examination of the video 
records of the deliberative proceedings (in both cases the public meetings are 
routinely recorded and broadcast on a public access channel), background re-
search recovering the ―public conversation‖ surrounding the issues (including 
press releases and news reports), and transcription of relevant speeches and inte-
ractions for close textual analysis. 
Case I: The Invisible Stasis 
On January 6
th
 2003 the Boulder Valley School District (BVSD) was sued 
in federal court for religious discrimination by the American Center for Law and 
Justice (ACLJ) over the exclusion of a ―Bible Club‖ as a student organization. 
As the event unfolded, a fragmented public conversation developed between the 
dispersed constituencies. By redefining the issue to be considered, the school 
board was able to avoid addressing the stasis and, consequently, remove it from 
the public conversation. 
In Sept. 2002, Ashley Thiele (a student in the district) petitioned her school 
to form a Bible club. Under the ―closed forum‖ policy of the school district, all 
clubs and student organizations needed to be curriculum related. On those 
grounds the petition was denied by the principle. Thiele then petitioned the dis-
trict superintendent, who also denied the petition in November. In December, 
the petition was sent on to the school board who told the ACLJ lawyers recently 
acquired by Thiele and another student, they would review the decision in Janu-
ary. On January 6th, the ACLJ filed a federal lawsuit for religious discrimination 
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naming the BVSD, ―the board of education, its president and members, the su-
perintendent of schools and the principal of the school‖ as defendants. On Janu-
ary 28th, the BVSD reviewed the petition publicly, but postponed discussion of 
the issue in order to review the student organizations policy first. On February 
11th, the board changed its student organizations policy to allow a ―limited open 
forum‖ and remanded the petition to form a Bible club back to the superinten-
dent to be reviewed under the new policy. The club was accepted under the new 
policy and on March 19th the ACLJ announced that they had reached a settle-
ment with the district.  
The general structure of the board meetings is to begin with public partici-
pation, at which time members of the public can raise any concern or speak to 
items on the agenda, followed by any board members‘ responses, reports from 
various committees, study items, and then action items. In the January meeting, 
the Board president asked for and received a motion to suspend the rules of op-
erations for the evening to hear study items prior to action items at the beginning 
of the meeting. There was no discussion on the motion and no justification of-
fered for the change. The effect of the motion was to temporally locate the dis-
cussion of changing the student organizations closed forum policy to a limited 
open forum immediately prior to the discussion of the lawsuit and the Bible 
club‘s appeal.  
When the Bible club appeal came before the board, the lawsuit was ex-
plained, and the board immediately moved to postpone discussion until the next 
meeting when it would be able to vote on the proposed student organization 
changes. By changing the student organization policy, the Board did not have to 
make a decision on the Bible club. Addressing the matter of the Bible club‘s 
appeal and the lawsuit would have involved having to account for why the Bible 
club was denied when there is a class in Old Testament Literature, and when 
other clubs such as Amnesty International and Gay/Straight Alliance (which 
have no corresponding courses) were being allowed to meet under the closed 
forum policy.  
The combination of these two issues worked in concert to undermine deli-
beration at three potential stases. First, the Board did not justify the change in 
the student organization policy. Although a community member who had been 
on the school board that unanimously established the closed forum policy ex-
plained what concerns had motivated their decision, no one on the board re-
sponded to her arguments. Instead, each speaker took time to mention how they 
had been considering changing the policy, but not to indict the current policy. 
For instance, when the superintendent introduced the new policy he stated: 
 
BVSD - 012803 3:15:00
3
 
Garcia: Yes. We have been um considering um um (.) looking at a scenario 
with a lipid-limited open (.) forum. As a different scenario from what we‘ve 
had in the past. Um, an‘ we have a proposal for a, policy along those lines. 
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Similarly, the responses from board members presented the current concern as 
stemming from a continual concern with the issue, without reference to the law-
suit. 
 
BVSD - 012803 3:18:22 
Garnett: I um, I like the proposed uh policy Ms. Mohr. I think it‘s um seems 
like fair, and a: uh reasonable way to approach using the school. um Making 
the school facilities available. I‘ve had some (1.5) uh questions about the 
closed forum (.) policy for some time, but I this is an appropriate approach 
so, .h depending on how... 
 
BVSD - 012803 3:19:00 
Phillips: Um, For a long time I‘ve been interested in a limited open forum 
uh, and the reason is that it really meets the needs of students. ...  
 
While these responses state an ongoing concern, the topic of student organi-
zations had only been raised twice in the past year (April and September). In 
both cases, the discourse was limited to a statement by one board member, with 
no responses from anyone else on the board. There was never any other discus-
sion of the matter. The important point is not whether the board members had 
actually had any concerns, but that there had been no public discourse on these 
concerns. This is a matter of presenting reasoned deliberation in the public fo-
rum (where decisions are supposed to be discussed and made). Their approach 
in this case makes the stasis invisible in the sense that it was chalked up to vague 
―concerns‖ or unstated students‘ needs whose significance was simply that they 
have been held a long time. 
The second way deliberation was undermined was the lack of an inquiry in-
to the validity of the lawsuit itself. The civil suit accused a district that prides 
itself on its ―openness‖ of discrimination against religion. While the change in 
policy would have the effect of opening up club access and, as indicated in the 
minutes of the following meeting, there would be a review of all student organi-
zations according to the new policy, the question of whether or not the district 
was engaging in discriminatory practices was dropped completely.
4
 This is fairly 
significant for a district, which like others across the country, was in tight budg-
et constraints and ended up with a bill for $12,000 from the ACLJ by settling out 
of court. 
The third way deliberation was undermined was by the lack of review of the 
petition to have the Bible club under the original policy. The petition was to 
establish the club as a student sponsored organization, an organization that is 
either part of the academic program (e.g. Band) or related to the curriculum (e.g. 
Spanish club). Without discussion of the issue, the board simply denied the peti-
tion and stated that it would be accepted under the new policy as a student in-
itiated club, the category created by the policy change which was not the status 
the students had petitioned for, and did not carry official recognition (sponsor-
ship). This decision, notably, was not discussed or voted on. The review of all 
50
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol46/iss1/12
 Speaker & Gavel 2009 47 
 
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
the clubs (and assumed changes in their status) was positioned as a result of the 
policy change, since the question of discriminatory or even unsystematic policy 
enforcement had disappeared from the deliberations. As the discussion around 
the motion indicates, when the President of the School Board (de la Cruz) raised 
the issue at the next meeting, the board members quickly moved the issue back 
into the hands of the superintendent. 
 
BVSD - 021103 1:00:45 
de la Cruz: The next item on our agenda is the appeal, of the   
   application to start a student club. A:nd (we need) a 
   [motion. 
Okolowicz: [(motion) 
de la Cruz: Janusz. 
Okolowicz: I have a motion that in light of our recent  
   discussion, we just finished, I make a motion to 
   remand the student application for reconsideration. 
*   Recognizing that the application would be granted as  
*   a student initiated club under our revised policy and  
   therefore there is no need for this board to take  
   further action.  
de la Cruz: Second? 
   (.) 
de la Cruz: Any further discussion? (.) (Julie) 
Phillips:  I just want to clarify um, that I think we‘re  
   remanding it to the superintendent. Janusz wasn‘t  
   clear but, um, 
de la Cruz Right. (.) Um, based on our approval of the policy,  
*   this would ( ) fall under a student, driven, club, at  
*   the school rather than a curriculum driven an‘ (.) So  
*   the motion is to remand it back to doctor Garcia for  
   his (.) action. [( ) 
Okolowicz  [Since since the administration will  
   have joyful task to review all the clubs now. This is  
   proper for administration to deal with all this. We  
   just updated the policy. [(.) (That) is (needed). 
de la Cruz:  [That‘s right. Any  
   other comments? (2) ( ) 
Phillips:  Well I just wanted to expand a little bit on what  
   Janusz said, that every club in our district will be  
   under review as to what category that it falls into.  
*   And that not all clubs (.) uh, will come out as  
*   curriculum related and they will end up as student  
*   initiated clubs an‘ so, .hh some clubs will find some  
 major changes and some won‘t depending on how di-
rectly and closely they‘re tied to the curriculum. 
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Both Okolowicz and de la Cruz (see lines indicated *) state that the applica-
tion will be approved and how it will be classified, even though there was no 
deliberation on the question or justification offered for their positions. Instead 
the application was placed under review for the same reason that all student or-
ganizations were being reviewed. Phillips suggested (see lines indicated *) that 
many of the already approved clubs would see their status change, but no rea-
soning was offered on this point or explanation given for why their current sta-
tus was suspect. 
In each of these instances, the stasis was made invisible by the way the 
board approached the issue. As a result many questions went unanswered, poli-
cies were approved without adequate analysis, and underlying problems were 
left to lay. Deliberation suffered overall because the board was circumnavigating 
the conflicts that give rise to argumentation and reasoned deliberation.  
 
Case II: The Fragmented Stasis 
While the stasis in the school board‘s deliberations disappeared from con-
sideration, the second case study examines the way stases can multiply to such 
an extent that they become impossible to address. In the fall of 2002 as the U.S. 
put greater political pressure on Iraq to comply with weapons inspections and 
the administration‘s discourse treated war as a more and more likely possibility, 
a number of citizens protested the war. One of the more structured protest 
movements occurred through the deliberations of city council meetings. Mem-
bers of peace activist groups and the general citizenry urged city councils across 
the country to pass resolutions against the ―war;‖ Boulder, CO was among them. 
Although the Boulder city council eventually passed a resolution opposing war 
with Iraq on January 21, 2003, a first attempt to have the city take an official 
stance against the war failed October 1
st
 of 2002. 
This case study examines the antiwar deliberations of the October meeting. 
There was no resolution passed, and in fact no clear resolution offered, but the 
concern here is not to evaluate this decision, nor to consider the efficacy of such 
symbolic resolutions. Rather, the concern is with the problematic aspects of the 
deliberations. In this case, instead of there being a strategic circumnavigation of 
the stasis, there was a proliferation of stases, issues, and propositions being con-
tended to such an extent that no stasis could be adequately addressed.  
In the City Council, like the school board, the meetings begin with public 
participation where the general public can speak to any issue other than those on 
the agenda (there are separate times set aside to speak to agenda items) for up to 
three minutes per person. In the October meeting a large group of people spoke 
out against the possibility of war in Iraq. In response, some members of the City 
Council considered taking some sort of formal action. The speeches from the 
public and the speeches of the council are structurally and sequentially distinct, 
so the stasis fragmentation of each is examined separately. 
 
The Public’s Presentation of the Issues 
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Fourteen members of the public spoke regarding the potential war (only two 
opposed to council action). Most expressed an affiliation with the Rocky Moun-
tain Peace and Justice Coalition. One of the most telling features of their dis-
course is the proliferation of topics along a wide variety of different issues. Al-
though there were twelve speakers opposing the war, there were eighteen differ-
ent argument topics on six essentially different issues and two distinct proposi-
tions (See tables 1 & 2). Notably, very few actually stated a proposition and 
fewer oriented their talk in support of a specific one. The two speakers opposing 
council action had distinctly fewer issues, partly due to lower numbers, but also 
due to more focused arguments (See table 3). 
 
Table 1: The Anti-war Topoi 
 
PROPOSITION: The potential war is bad. 
 
ISSUES War is detrimental. War is not justified. The administra-
tion is warmon-
gering. 
TOPICS War hurts the inno-
cent.* 
Preemptive Strikes* Bush wants war.* 
 Sets a bad precedent International Law Bush has a hidden 
agenda. 
 contradicts national 
identity 
Inspections Resumed*  
 economic impacts World government  
 far reaching impacts   
* indicates that the topic was raised 3-5 times. 
 
Table 2: The Pro-action Topoi 
 
PROPOSITION: The City Council needs to take action on this issue. 
 
ISSUES Action is appropri-
ate. 
Action is needed. Take a specific 
action. 
TOPICS All implicated congress to act soon* Write a letter 
 Vote your con-
science 




 Economic impacts   
* indicates that the topic was raised 3-5 times. 
 
Table 3: Opposition Topoi 
 
PROPOSITION: The city council should not support an action opposing war. 
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ISSUES Action is inappropriate. Saddam Hussein is dangerous. 
TOPICS Inappropriate Jurisdiction Comparison to Hitler 
 Abuse of power  
 More important matters  
 
The tables above display a reconstructed version of the arguments offered 
on each side of the debate. The main ―propositions‖ of those asking the council 
to take a stand were essentially arguments against the potential war and for the 
Boulder City Council specifically to take action. The second row in each table 
represents a reconstructed version of the main issues supported by the argument 
topics that follow under each one. As the tables indicate, the majority of topics 
fall in the category of arguments against war. The topic raised most frequently 
was that Bush wants war and will push for war no matter what. Along with a 
general dearth of arguments justifying a specific council action, those justifying 
the appropriateness of the action tended to be vague appeals to conscience and 
the Council Members‘ roles as responsive representatives of the city.  
The problem, from a stasis point of view, is the lack of systematic justifica-
tion across speeches as well as within speeches. The predominant amount of 
time and the most compelling arguments in the speeches were given to argue 
against going to war. The framing of the issue in those terms makes it difficult 
for the City Council to take a particular line of action. Many speakers requested 
that the board pass a resolution as soon as possible to influence Congressional 
representatives who were considering resolutions that would grant Bush the au-
thority to take military action, but this was, essentially, the full extent of argu-
ment on the subject. The overall position oriented mainly to the idea that war is 
bad, so the Council should oppose it. The justifications for passing a resolution 
were not oriented to the policy stases for the city council specifically. Conse-
quently there is no clear connection between the arguments against war and the 
proposed ―solution‖ of taking a stance against the war. 
The opposition‘s arguments, on the other hand, while few in number stand 
out as more focused attacks. Between the two speakers, one spent approximately 
half his time arguing that the Council should not devote time to this issue and 
the other half arguing that Hussein was similar to Hitler. The other speaker de-
voted all of his time to the question of Council involvement. The main stasis 
addressed by these speakers was thus not whether or not military action was 
warranted, but whether or not the City Council should be involved in the issue. 
Those in favor of a resolution offered very little refutation of the point. 
 
The Council’s Response 
The City Council Members‘ responses to this call for action were similarly 
fragmented topically, but their deliberations also lacked a basic motion or prop-
osition each member could support or refute. Importantly, the first Council 
speaker was very clear as to what he was seeking to do and the motion made, 
but the orientation of the other council members, particularly those opposed to 
the war, fragmented the stasis to such a degree that the secretary asked if there 
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was still a motion on the floor. When the Council voted, the members were still 
not in agreement over what was being voted for and another motion had to be 
proposed and voted on because the first had become so muddled. This confusion 
is primarily due to a lack of attention the fundamental stasis of the debate. To 
illustrate this point, I will outline the course of the argument, pointing to the 
ways the debate was taken off track. 
Council Member Havlick spoke first and requested that the city legal staff 
write a letter in opposition to the use of military force in Iraq due to the conflict 
such action would have with two of the city‘s core values: the sanctity of life 
and stewardship of the environment. According to the Council‘s bylaws, if three 
Council members agree to a request, then city resources may be used. All of this 
was stated clearly and repeated in the form of a formal motion.  
The second turn was taken by Council Member Poinsatte who made a leng-
thy argument against the use of military force and the supposed benefits of such 
force. Her speech ended with a recommendation to send a letter to relevant na-
tional leaders. This, though is where the stasis started to become muddled. Her 
comments did not directly relate to the motion on the floor, but raised new ar-
guments (different than those raised by the public) against war and military 
force. Given Jacobs and Jackson‘s (1981) analysis of argument structure and 
Antaki‘s (1994) analysis of ―expansion slots‖ for explanations, Poinsatte‘s turn 
violated basic argument structure because it neither responded to nor elaborated 
on the previous turn. 
Her comments were followed by Mayor Toor‘s recommendation that indi-
viduals write their own letters. This turn, while related to the original motion, 
was not formulated in the form of a motion or an amendment to the existing 
motion. Argumentatively speaking, it was a reason to reject the current motion, 
but due to the ambiguity of Poinsatte‘s recommendation to also write a letter, it 
sequentially supported or clarified a position that was irrelevant to the current 
motion. 
His comments were followed by a set of arguments for and against the war 
by two different board members. As such, neither position directly related to the 
motion on the floor, further fragmenting the stasis. These speeches were fol-
lowed by two speeches expressing different concerns regarding the Council‘s 
involvement in national/international issues, and two more turns for and against 
war. At this point the secretary asked whether or not there was still a motion on 
the floor.  
Her question was asked as a request for clarification rather than a prompt to 
reorient the discussion. The motion was reiterated, without reference to the ―rule 
of three,‖ which allows council staff to be dedicated to a project that if three 
members agree it is important. When the motion was voted down (6 to 3) there 
was disagreement as to whether or not that allowed staff to be utilized to write a 
letter opposing the war. A new motion was made (the same as the original) and a 
new vote was immediately taken. The motion failed with only two votes in fa-
vor.  
Once again, the fundamental flaw in the deliberations was a fragmentation 
of stasis, marked by expansion of issues and inattention to other speakers and 
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the propositions and issues they addressed. This led to multiple propositions 
being argued at once and thus, multiple interpretations of the motion that was 
under consideration. With so many issues clouding the discussion, it became 
impossible to reasonably consider and address particular objections to the mo-
tion. The council‘s decision not to oppose the war officially was reached primar-
ily out of confusion and error, rather than out of reasoned judgment concerning 
the council and its role regarding national policy. 
 
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
Whether in private relationships, the public sphere, or technical discourse, 
argument and disagreement are commonplace. Less common is a systematic 
means of addressing and resolving disputes. Conflict is difficult at the best of 
times, but practices that exacerbate conflict by fragmenting and multiplying 
points of contention can make conflict much more difficult to resolve. Similarly, 
avoiding the basis of conflict and hiding it from view, can let conflicts and prob-
lems fester, continuing and exacerbating problems and flaws in policies and 
practices. Given its significance as a key component of reasoned argument, it is 
problematic that a search of current communication literature will not yield 
many references to stasis, any developments in stasis theory, and little applica-
tions of its fundamental elements. What research there is, in a variety of ap-
proaches to argument, suggests that stasis is an essential feature of logical, effec-
tive argument, issue focused discourse (argumentum ad rem), and reasoned 
judgment. It also, as Braet (1987) explains, can provide a useful, topically ap-
propriate standard for assessing the reasonability of deliberations and arguments.  
This analysis demonstrates the links between stasis as the classical extrinsic 
standard for logical argument and contemporary approaches to naturally occur-
ring argument. As Kline‘s (1979) research demonstrates, inattention to stasis can 
distort communication while attention to stasis allows speakers to appropriately 
use expansion slots in a next sequential turn to address stases. This attention to 
stasis can improve communication by reducing the distortion and confusion that 
results by not addressing stasis. Research and analysis on stasis should continue 
to examine the way stases develop and are addressed in naturally occurring dis-
course in different argument spheres (see Goodnight, 1982). 
In the case studies analyzing naturally occurring deliberation it is apparent 
that 1) attention to stasis is lacking in public discourse and that more attention 
may improve such discourse; and 2) as an analytic concept stasis can improve 
argument analysis by explaining practical problems and providing situated 
ideals. The case studies presented here display the potential benefits of analyz-
ing stasis in public disputes, however further research should examine how ar-
guers can more effectively address stasis in order to reach reasoned judgment. 
Research should also examine the potential problems of addressing stasis and 
exposing fundamental disagreements that could undermine groups‘ ability to 
achieve goals.  
For the purposes of this paper, it is clear that stasis is a concept that de-
serves stronger attention, particularly if the problems of invisible and frag-
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mented stases ring true to the problems faced in public, private, and technical 
argument. I know that they are strikingly familiar for many of the committees I 
have sat on and public arguments I have observed. Engaging these problems and 





Original work on this topic was discussed in an NCA panel presentation consi-
dering approaches to teaching debate that would lead to better communication 
practices (―Dialectical Debate: Reaching beyond traditional Debate Para-
digms‖ in the Argumentation and Forensics Division at the 2003 îNCA Con-
vention) and an early draft of the paper was presented at the NCA 2006 Con-
vention (Argumentation and Forensics Division). 
 
2
 An important twist that conversational argument takes (and this is not covered 
in Jacobs and Jackson‘s (1980) examinations) is a reversal of the burden of 
proof. The person in the first turn position is not generally called upon the jus-
tify a proposal (e.g. You should spend the holiday with me for the following 




Regarding the transcripts, all vocalizations are transcribed as recorded in the 
videotaped recording. Notations for pauses, syllable stretching, and other voc-
al characteristics are transcribed using the Jeffersonian system (see Hutchby 
and Woffitt, 1998). Colons indicate stretched sounds; numbers in parentheses 
indicate timed pauses; words in parentheses indicate the transcriptionist‘s 
doubt of the wording. 
 
4
 Incidentally, the charge of discrimination dropped out of the public discourse 
in the media as well. Prior to this meeting the primary issue was the question 
of religious discrimination and the place of religion in public institutions, fol-
lowing the meeting the papers reframed the discussion in the ―policy prob-
lem‖ terms the Board used.  
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Coached by John Boyer and H. Scott Placke 
 
I‘m not proud of it, but I have cheated in extemporaneous speaking. It was 
in the second round at the State Tournament my freshman year. We didn‘t have 
any files on the questions so I answered one about our state‘s recent casino leg-
islation. There had been a large debate in my hometown over this issue so I 
knew something about the arguments. I made up all of my citations. I falsely 
cited regional papers, and even asked a teammate for the name of his local pa-
per. I knew that if I didn‘t cite any sources, I would immediately get tanked in 
the round, even if I were making the right arguments. Instead, I got the 2. What I 
did was wrong and I regret my decision, but the fabrication of evidence has be-
come commonplace in the world of extemporaneous speaking. In 2003, Daniel 
Cronn-Mills and Larry Schnoor published a controversial article in the National 
Forensics Journal. Their analysis showed that the 1998 AFA final round of in-
formative contained massive amounts of source deception and plagiarism. Their 
study highlighted and exposed unethical choices in platform speeches, and in 
2005, Ric Shafer took this one step further, examining ethics in extemporaneous 
speaking with an article in The Speaker and Gavel. Even for those outside of our 
traditional community, honesty must play a crucial role in competitive forensics. 
Ultimately, we need to hold students to a high moral standard, a standard that 
exists in every other academic venue. Consequently, this speech is not about 
suffering or body counts, but forensics criticism is vital to maintaining the inte-
grity and evolution of an activity we love. 
To begin, we will uncover the problems associated with unethical behavior 
in extemp. Second, we must determine the underlying causes, before finally, 
offer solutions to improve the ethical and educational standards of extemp. The 
problem is two fold – the excessive citation of unverified sources and general 
community apathy towards this issue. 
While there is little academic data to support it, a teammate of mine re-
ceived a ballot in a final round that claimed 13 sources were not enough, and 
this situation is not unique to my team. When the number of citations becomes 
the reason for the rank received, competitors know that to increase their chances 
of doing well, they should refer to more sources. Unfortunately, once there is a 
perception that someone is getting an unfair advantage, the temptation to follow 
is too strong.  
Unverified sources are used by some extempers at every level. The pre-
viously cited article by Ric Shafer refers to Robert Markstrom‘s 1994 thesis 
which explained that only 44% of the sources used in the 1993 AFA final round 
of extemp actually pertained to the topic of the speech. This did not evaluate 
whether or not the sources were cited accurately, so the problem could be even 
worse. We‘ll never know if these students didn‘t have enough articles during 
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prep time, were unable to memorize that many sources in 30 minutes or just 
wanted a competitive edge. Whatever the reasons, sources, information and 
ideas are being misrepresented by competitors. 
Berry, Thornton and Baker state in a 2006 conference paper entitled “De-
mographics of Digital Cheating‖ that ―to ignore cheating is to have a culture of 
dishonesty continue to grow and destroy our academic institutions.‖ A 1982 
study by Thomas and Hart found that ―85 percent of competitors and nearly 80 
percent of judges believe fabricating evidence constitutes the worst ethical viola-
tion in the activity.‖ Because forensics uniquely prepares competitors for life 
after college, we have an obligation to protect our activity from scrutiny. 
Cronn-Mills and Schnoor wrote that ―Forensic scholars believe ethics is a 
serious issue for the activity and the discipline.‖ There are two reasons for the 
prevalence of dishonesty in extemporaneous speaking: judges demand competi-
tors to be off the note card and they demand more and more sources. This does 
not remove blame from students like me who have made unethical choices, but 
it does shed some light on the situation competitors are in. 
Students who use and rely on a note card are typically ranked lower than 
those who do not. This puts significant pressure on competitors to get off the 
note card, and be able to use their 30 minutes of prep in an attempt to organize 
their speech and memorize the sources they used. It is extremely difficult for 
many students to remember 10 or more sources and attribute them all in the cor-
rect locations. Therefore, students are going to make mistakes both intentionally 
and unintentionally when not using a note card. 
Another prevalent judging paradigm is counting sources. Cronn-Mills and 
Schnoor explain, ―Judges have become preoccupied with the quantity, rather 
than the quality [of] sources.‖ Daniel Cronn-Mills and Stephen Croucher explain 
in a 2001 issue of Speaker Points that ―out of 142 ballots involved in their study 
of extemporaneous speaking, 60 judges had flowed the sources and 39 com-
mented that the competitor needed more sources.‖ Cronn-Mills and Schnoor 
concluded in their paper ―students under the intense pressure to please such 
judges may wander toward unethical behavior.‖ In combination, these practices 
by judges have entrenched the fabrication of sources in extemp.  
 Because of the difficulty in verifying violations, we must address these 
causes to eliminate the temptations. Fortunately, there are some solutions: 
judges and competitors need to alter their paradigms and the community should 
experiment with some wholesale changes to the event.  
First, judges should evaluate the analysis and arguments made during a 
competitor‘s speech and not the number of sources. In 1994, Audra Colvert, 
presented a paper on the use of sources in extemp. She argues that ―participants 
and judges must return to focusing on the arguments and not the number and 
uniqueness of the sources. Emphasizing novelty in documentation at the risk of 
good argumentation, analysis, and communication skills would be detrimental to 
the philosophical purposes of the activity.‖ Additionally, Colvert finds that too 
many sources can actually take away from the speech‘s persuasive potential. 
Yet, since Colvert‘s 1994 paper, the problem has only gotten worse. The intro-
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duction of Lexis Nexis and Internet sources has caused judges to raise their 
source bar, expecting more and more from competitors.  
Cronn-Mills and Schnoor explain, ―The ‗counting sources‘ paradigm is not 
supported by the discipline.‖ Furthermore, they looked at ―a number of public 
speaking textbooks and did not find a single reference indicating quantity of 
evidence to [be a key aspect of a good speech] … yet all the public speaking 
textbooks discussed the importance of [the] quality of the evidence/source.‖ The 
expectations of coaches and judges must change. Until they do, these violations 
will continue. 
I also urge students to take a stand. When delivering a memorized speech, 
only include a few, high quality sources. You should also use a note card when 
you are unable to memorize your sources to ensure you cite them correctly. 
Judges can still evaluate whether or not the use of a note card is distracting, but 
should reward students who use a note card well. If we encourage students to 
use note cards when they cannot memorize their entire speech, it would elimi-
nate many of the temptations that lead to the misrepresentation of sources. 
 To truly solve, we must reevaluate the event and consider macro solutions. 
For instance, Bryan McCann, in an article presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the National Communication Association in 2002, explained that one way to 
alter the event is to give students topics instead of questions. If competitors were 
presented with prompts, such as ―names of countries and leaders …[extempers] 
would be given a relative degree of free reign in constructing a topic that is in-
dicative of their own opinions‖ and be of a more personal and persuasive nature. 
While McCann‘s solution might not be perfect, forensic scholars must re-
search and publish articles about the fabrication of sources in extemporaneous 
speaking. In a personal correspondence with Ric Shafer on April 3 2008, he 
states that he does not ―believe that coaches and representatives from the nation-
al organizations have done enough to promote and/or verify that students in the 
event are ethical.‖ There is an alarming lack of research on this subject and the 
community must examine whether harsh penalties or random source checks 
would provide a deterrent. Discourse of this issue in forensic journals and at 
conferences like NCA is a step in the right direction. However, we must contin-
ue to use word-of-mouth in the community to advocate change. 
Though my time here is almost up, the time for dialogue about the misre-
presentation of evidence in extemp is just beginning. I hope you will continue 
this conversation within your own team - we need to challenge each other to be 
accountable. Extemp is a valuable event that teaches unique skills through the 
combination of limited preparation, research and analysis. Unfortunately, our 
community has become misguided by the concept that the quantity of sources 
and the lack of a note card are critical to success. The results have been discou-
raging and limit the educational value of extemporaneous speaking. Today, we 
have examined the problems, causes and solutions to the fabrication of sources 
in extemp. Hopefully, with this ‗terrible secret‘ finally exposed, we can change 
course and steer students towards more ethical and educational conduct. 
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Note: This speech was presented at the 2008 Interstate Oratorical Association 
contest and published in the 2008 edition of Winning Orations. The speech is re-
published in Speaker & Gavel with the permission of the executive secretary of 
the IOA. 
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A Functional Analysis of French 
and South Korean Political Leaders’ Debates 
 
Yun Son Choi 
William L. Benoit 
 
Abstract 
This study reports two replications of research employing the Functional 
Theory of Political Campaign Discourse, analyzing political leaders‘ debates 
from one European and one Asian country. French political debates from 1988 
and 1995 and South Korean debates from 1997 and 2002 were content analyzed 
using the Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse. Acclaims were 
the most common function, followed by attacks and then defenses, in both 
French and South Korean debates. Policy was discussed more often than charac-
ter in French and South Korean debates. In France, but not in South Korea, in-
cumbent party candidates acclaimed significantly more and attacked less than 
challengers. Similarly, in France, but not South Korea, incumbents used past 
deeds significantly more often to acclaim–and less to attack–than challengers. 
Finally, general goals and ideals were used more as the basis for acclaims than 




Most research on political debates has focused on American presidential 
debates (books on presidential debates include Benoit et al., 2002; Benoit & 
Wells, 1996; Bishop, Meadow, & Jackson-Beeck, 1980; Bitzer & Rueter, 1980; 
Carlin & McKinney, 1994; Dailey, Hinck, & Hinck, 2008; Friedenberg, 1994, 
1997; Hellweg, Pfau, & Brydon, 1992; Hinck, 1993; Jamieson & Birdsell, 1988; 
Kraus, 1962, 1979, 2000; Lanoue & Schrott, 1991; Martel, 1983; Schroeder, 
2000; or Swerdlow, 1987). However, debates among candidates for countries‘ 
leaders (e.g., presidents, chancellors, prime minister) have occurred around the 
world in such countries as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hol-
land, Israel, New Zealand, Scotland, South Korea, Sweden, Poland, Taiwan, and 
the Ukraine. In fact, Asard and Gronbeck (2000) observe that Swedish leaders‘ 
debates have taken place since 1948 (the year of the first American presidential 
primary debate; Benoit et al., 2002). Ward and Walsh (2000) noted that a politi-
cal debate was televised in Australia in 1958, two years before the U.S. Nixon-
Kennedy debates (although this Australian debate did not feature the leaders of 
the two major parties). 
Televised political debates have several important advantages as a medium 
for campaign communication. Coleman (2000) offers several reasons underlying 
the importance of these events: 
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Firstly, televised debates are the best way of reaching a large audience of 
voters. Most voters obtain their political information from television more 
than any other source. . . . Secondly, there is an impressive body of data to 
indicate that televised debates have an educational impact. . . . Thirdly, tele-
vised debates help to equalize access to the mass media. . . . Fourthly, tele-
vised debates allow the public to come as close as they can to auditioning 
the candidates for national leadership. . . . Another advantage to the demo-
cratic process of television debates is that they force rivals to know each 
other‘s positions. (pp. 9-11) 
 
Nor are these the only reasons for the merit of political debates. Televised 
debates feature the leading candidates discussing many of the same topics simul-
taneously, which helps voters choose between those contenders. Most debates 
are 60 to 120 minutes in length, providing voters an extended opportunity to 
learn about the candidates. The fact that candidates can encounter an unantici-
pated question or remark from an opponent could mean that debates may pro-
vide a more candid view of the candidates than possible with other media. The 
direct confrontation afforded by a debate provides candidates with an opportuni-
ty to correct misstatements, intentional or unintentional, from opponents. Such 
clash could benefit voters. Another advantage of presidential debates is the huge 
audience: Tens of millions of voters tune in to American presidential debates. In 
Germany, 84% of voters watched one of the three debates in 1972 and nearly 
half watched all three (Baker & Norpoth, 1981); two-thirds of the public saw at 
least one of the two 2002 chancellor debates and 41% watched both encounters 
(Faas & Maier, 2004). Finally, research establishes that American presidential 
debates have important effects on voters, creating issue knowledge, influencing 
perceptions of the candidates‘ character, and at times altering vote choice (Be-
noit, Hansen, & Verser, 2003). Research confirms effects of debates on issues 
(Jorgensen, Kock, & Rorbech, 1998) and between candidates (Baker & Norpoth, 
1981; Blais & Boyer, 1996; Faas & Maier, 2004; Lanoue, 1991; Schrott, 1990; 
Schrott & Lanoue, 1992) in other countries. For these reasons, political debates 
around the world certainly merit scholarly attention. 
 
Literature Review 
Several studies have investigated the nature of non-U.S. political advertis-
ing (Chang, 2000; Kaid, 1999; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Lee & Benoit, 2004; 
Tak, Kaid, & Lee, 1997; Wen, Benoit, & Wu, 2004). Unfortunately, content 
analysis of non-U.S. political debates is relatively rare, despite the fact that de-
bates have occurred in many other countries as indicated earlier. Baker and Nor-
poth (1981) analyzed the 1972 West German parliamentary debates (featuring 
the leaders of the four parties of the Bundestag). They report that the ―central 
focus‖ of the debates was primarily ―issues and, secondarily, ethics [character]‖ 
(p. 237). They also reported that the debates were a ―struggle between the gov-
ernment spokesmen (SPD and FDP) defending the record of their government 
and the opposition (CDU and CSU) spokesman attacking the record‖ ( p. 336). 
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Gilbert (1982) discussed presidential debates in the US (1960, 1976, 1980) and 
France (1981), considering context, highlights of the debates, and public opinion 
poll data. Some research on non-U.S. debates, as noted earlier, investigates au-
dience effects (Jorgensen, Kock, & Rorbech, 1998; Schrott & Lanoue, 1992). 
Much research (e.g., many of the chapters in Coleman, 2000; Asard & Gron-
beck, 2000) is designed as historical or conceptual treatments rather than analys-
es of the content of these encounters. Galasinski (1998) identified strategies em-
ployed to break the rules of Polish debates in 1995 (e.g., candidates were ex-
pected to respond only to questions, not to address one another directly). Matsa-
ganis and Weingarten (2001) compared the 2000 Greek prime minister debate 
with the first 2000 American presidential debate, discussing issues, strategy, and 
style.  
Recently Functional Theory has been extended to political leaders‘ debates 
in other countries: Israeli debates (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006), Ukrainian debates 
(Benoit & Klyukovski, 2006), and Taiwanese debates (Benoit, Wen, & Yu, 
2007). Acclaims outnumbered attacks, which in turn were more common than 
defenses in Israel. One of the two candidates in the Ukraine and Taiwanese de-
bates also acclaimed more than they attacked (challengers sometimes attacked 
more than they acclaimed; as we shall see, challengers tend to attack more than 
incumbents). In all three countries, policy comments were more common in de-
bates than utterances about character and the incumbent acclaimed more and 
attacked less than the challenger. It is clear that some characteristics of the con-
tent of political leaders‘ debates have been found in several countries. It is im-
portant to understand that replication is an essential component of the research 
process because it offers higher levels of confidence in the findings obtained 
from scholarship (Rosenthal, 1991). Lamal (1991) noted that replication is ―ne-
cessary because our knowledge is corrigible‖ (p. 31). In a similar vein, Boster 
(2002) observed that communication ―scholars pay relatively little attention to 
replication‖ (p. 477). Replication is even more important in cross-cultural stu-
dies. Lustig and Anderson (1991) argued that ―The fact that many social re-
search results fail to generalize across international cultural boundaries has be-
come a widely accepted principle (for example, see the essays in Samovar & 
Porter, 1988) (p. 298). Thus, this study extends existing research on Functional 
Theory by content analyzing French and South Korean debates. Given research 
on debates in Israel, Taiwan, the Ukraine and the United States (Benoit et al., 
2003, 2005, 2007; Benoit, Blaney, & Pier, 1998; Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Benoit 
& Harthcock, 1999; Wells, 1999) using Functional Theory, it will be useful to 
content analyze French and South Korean debates from the same point of view. 
 
Theoretical Underpinning 
Benoit‘s (1999, 2007) Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse 
will provide the theoretical grounding for this investigation. Benoit articulates 
several basic propositions in his theory. First, he posits that voting is a compara-
tive act. All that is necessary for a political candidate to obtain a citizen‘s vote 
(if a vote is cast) is to be perceived as preferable to one‘s opponents. This 
means, second, that candidates must distinguish themselves from opponents; one 
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cannot be preferable to another candidate if the two contenders are indistin-
guishable. Of course, candidates strive to capture the votes of citizens who are 
undecided or independent, whose beliefs frequently lie in the middle of the po-
litical spectrum (see, e.g., Downs, 1958). This leads them to take some similar 
positions as they seek the support of the same voters. For example, Page (1978) 
noted that Downs‘ 
 
economic theory of democracy calls for a candidate‘s policy stands to echo 
the policy preferences of the public, and many spatial models–especially 
those of the public opinion variety–predict that the midpoint of public opi-
nion on issues has an important influence upon the stands that a candidate 
takes. (p. 29) 
 
Page found that in 1968 ―Across a wide variety of issues, then, both 
Humphrey and Nixon took positions which corresponded fairly closely with 
what the average American favored‖ (p. 47). Importantly, Page also reported 
that the two candidates disagreed with the mid-point of public opinion on 15% 
of the 72 issues he examined: Humphrey was more liberal and Nixon was more 
conservative on some issues. So, although candidates adopt similar positions on 
many issues, there must be some distinctions or voters would have no basis for 
preferring one candidate over the other. 
Third, political campaign messages are the means for establishing distinc-
tions between candidates. Benoit‘s fourth assumption is that campaign discourse 
can establish preferability via three functions: acclaims (positive statements 
about oneself), attacks (criticisms of one‘s opponent), and defenses (refutations 
of attacks from an opponent). These three functions work as a rough form of 
cost-benefit analysis as citizens compare candidates: acclaims can increase one‘s 
own benefits, attacks can increase an opponent‘s costs, and defenses can reduce 
one‘s alleged costs (this should not be taken to imply that voters quantify costs 
or benefits or engage in mathematical calculations; the point is that acclaims 
tend to increase perceived benefits, attacks have a tendency to increase apparent 
costs, and defenses are capable of reducing costs). Benoit (2007) also postulates 
that these three functions can occur on two potential topics, policy and character. 
Functional theory also further sub-divides each policy utterance into three 
variants: past deeds (accomplishments or failures), future plans (specific cam-
paign promises) and general goals (objectives). Character comments are divided 
into three forms: personal qualities (personality traits), leadership ability (expe-
rience in office), and ideals (values or principles). Examples of attacks and ac-
claims on the various forms of policy and character can be found in Benoit and 
Brazeal (2002) or Benoit and Harthcock (1999). 
Acclaims, in principle, have no drawbacks. That is, it is possible for a par-
ticular acclaim to be offensive to voters, the act of identifying a candidate‘s de-
sirable quality is not offensive. Attacks, on the other hand, could generate some 
backlash because many voters report that they do not like mudslinging (Merritt, 
1984; Stewart, 1975). Finally, defenses have three potential drawbacks (Benoit, 
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2007). They usually occur in a candidate‘s weaker area, so responding to them 
takes the candidate off-message. They may foster the impression that the candi-
date is reactive instead of proactive. Finally, one must identify the attack to re-
fute it in a defense. This means that a defense may remind or inform voters of a 
potential weakness (this drawback is less of a concern in debates because voters 
probably just say the opponent attack the defending candidate). The first predic-
tion is that acclaims will be more common than attacks and attacks will out-
number defenses. 
 
H1. Acclaims will be the most frequent theme defenses the least common theme. 
Furthermore, public opinion poll data shows that, at least in America, more 
voters say that policy is a more important determinant of their vote than charac-
ter (Benoit, 2003). Because we expect candidates to attempt to adapt their mes-
sages to audience preferences, we expect that: 
 
H2. Policy themes will be more common than character themes. 
Incumbents usually have various advantages, such as greater name recogni-
tion than the opponent, greater ability to attract media coverage, and the ability 
to provide governmental largess to certain areas of the country. Some voters 
need to have a reason to ―change horses in the middle of the stream‖ or switch 
from the incumbent to another president. This means that challengers tend to 
attack more, and acclaim less, than incumbents. 
 
H3. Incumbent party candidates will use more acclaiming themes, and feweer 
attacking themes, than challengers. 
Functional Theory highlights the incumbent‘s record as a resource that both 
candidates use, although in quite different ways. The incumbent looks for suc-
cesses during the first term in office and uses those accomplishments as the ba-
sis for acclaims. The challenger, on the other hand, looks for failures and uses 
them as the basis for attacks. Of course, the challenger usually has a record in 
office, but the incumbent‘s record, as president, is arguably the better evidence 
for evaluating a person running for president than a challenger‘s record in a dif-
ferent office (e.g., governors and mayors have little foreign policy experience; 
senators do not have executive branch experience). So, although the records of 
both candidates are discussed, there is a tendency to discuss the incumbent‘s 
record even more than the challenger‘s, and we predict: 
 
H4. Incumbent candidates will use past deeds more for acclaiming themes, and 
less for attacking themes, than challengers. 
Finally, both general goals and ideals are easier to acclaim than to attack 
(Benoit, 2007). Few would disagree with the goal of creating more jobs or mak-
ing the country safe from terrorists. Who could dispute ideals such as freedom or 
justice? We predict that both general goals and ideals will be used more to ac-
claim than to attack. 
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H5. General goals will be used more frequently in acclaiming than attacking 
themes. 
 
H6. Ideals will be used more frequently in acclaiming than attacking themes. 
Although this study does not collect data on effects of political campaign 
messages, reason exists to believe that the functions and topics of these messag-
es merit scholarly attention. Reinneman and Maurer (2005) report evidence that 
viewers of German debates respond differently to acclaims than attacks. Anso-
labehere and Iyengar (1995) contend that negative campaigns (where attacks are 
more common than acclaims) can decrease turn out by voters. Benoit (2003) 
found that American presidential candidates who discuss policy more, and cha-
racter less, than opponents are more likely to win elections. This theory concerns 
concepts that matter in election campaign messages. 
 
Context 
Readers may not be equally familiar with the political systems of France, 
South Korea, and the United States. Obviously these three cultures have differ-
ences. However, the key assumptions of Functional Theory apply in all three 
countries: Candidates who seek political office (and are not running only to raise 
an issue) do so by persuading voters that they are preferable to opponents; Can-
didates for public office can argue for preferability on grounds of policy and 
character.  
Two rounds of voting occur in France; the top two candidates in the first 
round compete again in a second election. The term of office was seven years 
until 2002 when it was reduced to five years. There is no limit on the number of 
terms a candidate may serve if re-elected. Televised debates began in France in 
the 1974 presidential election (although in 2002 Chirac refused to debate his 
opponent because his opponent was too extreme). French debates occur between 
the first and second votes so only two candidates participate in these debates. 
One debate of two hours (it sometimes runs 10-20 minutes longer) addresses 
four topics: politics, economy, social issues, and foreign policy. The format in 
France is confrontational, with both candidates sitting at the same table facing 
one another. The French joke that the candidates are ―near enough to slap the 
opponent‘s face,‖ although they have yet to come to blows. Moderators have a 
very limited role, introducing the candidates, describing the format, and shifting 
the topic (they only occasionally ask questions). Candidates are free to ask ques-
tions of their opponents, answer questions, attack their opponents, or rebut at-
tacks from opponents. Debates were held in 1974, 1981, 1988, 1995, and 2007 
but the texts of only 1988 and 1995 are available. In 1988, Francois Mitterand 
was the incumbent party candidate and Jacques Chirac the challenger. In 1995, 
Lionel Jospin was the incumbent party candidate and Chirac the challenger. 
South Korea only uses one ―round‖ of voting and in some years more than 
two candidates competes. The term of office has been five years since 1992. No 
candidate is allowed more than one term in office, and there is no Vice President 
for South Korea; these two factors may limit the effects of incumbency. This 
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means there is never incumbent candidate who seeks re-election; candidates run 
as members of the party of the president. Official televised debates first occurred 
in 1997 in South Korea (Hoi-Chang Lee was the incumbent party candidate; 
Dae-Jung Kim and In-Jae Lee were challengers) and were held again in 2002 
(Moo-Hyuan Noh was the incumbent party candidate; Dae-Jung Kim and Hoi-
Chang Lee were challengers). Three debates were held in both elections. The 
first debate concerned politics, foreign policy, and national security. Debate two 
focused on the economy. The final debate concerned such topics as social issues, 
culture, and education. Because there can be multiple candidates, popularity 
requirements determine who is permitted to debate. As in the United States, the 
moderator plays a larger role in controlling the content of debates. So far, the 
―town hall‖ format used in some recent U.S. presidential debates has not been 
used in South Korea. 
The president of the United States is elected every four years; presidents are 
limited to two terms. The two major political parties in America are Republican 
and Democratic. General campaign debates have been held in 1960 and from 
1976-2004. The debates of only one year included a third party candidate, Ross 
Perot in 1992 (eligibility is determined by the popularity of candidates as deter-
mined by public opinion polls and the Commission for Presidential Debates); we 
chose to focus on the candidates from the two major political parties in America. 
The number of debates featuring the two major party candidates has varied from 
one (1980) to four (1960), with most years having two or three debates. After 
1960, when the four debates were one hour long, all presidential debates have 
been for ninety minutes. A moderator controls the format and asks questions or 
controls questions from journalists or, occasionally, voters. Candidates are 
usually limited to ninety seconds or less for each statement (answer to a question 
or response). Some years included opening or closing statements from the can-




This study analyzed political candidate debates in two countries other than 
the United States. France and South Korea were selected for this study. First, we 
wanted to examine debates from a European country and from an Asian country 
to provide diverse texts for analysis. Second, we wanted to use countries that 
were not too dissimilar from the U.S. in order to facilitate comparison. Further-
more, our choices were severely limited by (1) the availability of texts of politi-
cal leaders debates and (2) the availability of transcripts in languages with which 
the audiences were familiar (English, French, Korean). In all three countries 
(America, France, South Korea) the president is elected directly by citizens; in 
contrast, for example, in other countries such as Germany or Canada, voters do 
not cast ballots for the chancellor but for representatives from competing politi-
cal parties to the Bundestag; the party or coalition of parties after the election 
then in control selects the chancellor or prime minister. Finally, we were able to 
obtain transcripts of debates from two different elections in both countries: 1988 
and 1995 in France, and 1997 and 2002 in South Korea. Although debates have 
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been held in other years, we were unable to obtain transcripts of other debates 
from these countries. Data from content analysis of American presidential de-
bates (Benoit et al., 2005, 2005; Benoit, Blaney, & Pier, 1998; Benoit & Bra-
zeal, 2002; Benoit & Harthcock, 1999; Benoit & Wells, 1996; Wells, 1999) will 
also be reported to provide a point of comparison for the new data from France 
and South Korea. 
 
Method 
Content analysis was employed to test the predictions advanced here. The 
procedures replicated exactly the method employed in previous work applying 
Functional Theory to political campaign debates (Benoit, 2007). First, the unit of 
analysis was the theme, so each debate was unitized into themes (we also use the 
terms assertion and claim as synonyms). Berelson (1952) explained that a theme 
is ―an assertion about a subject‖ (p. 18); Holsti (1969) defined a theme as ―a 
single assertion about some subject‖ (p. 116). A theme is therfore a argument 
(argument1; see O‘Keefe, 1977) about the candidates (or parties). Because rhe-
toric is enthymematic, themes vary in length from a phrase to several sentences. 
Second, each theme was classified by function (acclaim, attack, or defense). The 
third step was to identify the topic of each theme as either policy or character. 
Next, the form of policy (past deed, future plan, general goal) or of character 
(personal quality, leadership ability, ideals) was identified. Two coders who 
were fluent in French and two who were fluent in Korean were trained to use the 
Functional approach and independently coded these debates (each coded about 
55% of the text, providing a 10% overlap for calculating inter-coder reliability). 
1168 themes were identified in the two French debates (584 themes per debate), 
1982 themes were found in the six South Korean debates (315 themes per de-
bate), and 7155 themes were located in the 23 American debates (311 themes 
per debate); recall that French debates tend to be longer than debates in the other 
countries. Inter-coder reliability was quantified using Cohen‘s (1960) kappa 
using a random sample of approximately 10% of each debate transcript. For the 
French debates, reliability was .82 for functions, 1.0 for topics, .92 for form of 
policy, and .83 for form of character. For the South Korean debates, reliability 
was .87 for functions, .80 for topics, .86 for form of policy, and .90 for form of 
character. These levels are acceptable: Landis and Koch (1977) indicate that 
kappas of over .80 are ―almost perfect‖ (p. 165). These relatively high figures 
for reliability may indicate that these variables (tone, topic) are more manifest 
than latent. Because the content analysis produces frequency data, chi-square 
goodness of fit tests will be used for hypotheses 1, 2, 5, and 6, and 2x2 chi-
square for cross-categorized data will be employed for statistical analysis. 
 
Results 
The first hypothesis predicted that acclaims would be more common than 
attacks and that defenses would be the least common function. This prediction 
was supported for French (acclaims: 61%, attacks: 33%, defenses: 6%; χ2 [df = 
2] = 542.64, p < .0001), South Korean (acclaims: 55%, attacks: 35%, defenses: 
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10%; χ2 [df = 2] = 595.15, p < .0001), and American debates (acclaims: 57%, 
attacks: 35%, defenses: 8%; χ2 [df = 2] = 2494.28, p < .0001). For example, Mit-
terand offered this example of an acclaim in the French debate of 1988: ―I pro-
pose a minimum guaranteed income for the poorest.‖ Although this proposal is 
bound to be controversial with some voters, other voters do want to offer assis-
tance to the poor. In contrast, Chirac criticized Mitterrand‘s record on crime in 
the same debate: ―From 1981 to 1986, there were 600 more crimes and offenses 
more per day.‖ Obviously, high crime rates are undesirable, making this state-
ment an attack. Kim was accused of having broken his promise to not to run for 
office. He offered this illustration of a defense in a 1997 South Korean debate: 
―I have already made a public apology for breaking my word about retiring from 
the political world.‖ As Table 1 reveals, acclaims in U.S. presidential debates 
ranged from 49%-74%, with a mean of 55%, the same as the mean for acclaims 
in South Korea and fairly close to the means for French (61%) acclaims. Ameri-
can debates used attacks in 24% to 42% of utterances, with a mean of 35%, 
which is the same as the mean in South Korean debates (35%) and very close to 
the means for attacks in French (33%) debates. Furthermore, defenses in U.S. 
debates varied from 2% to 14% with a mean of 10%. Again, this is the same 
proportion in South Korea (10%) and fairly close to the mean for French debates 
(6%). Clearly, the debates in all three countries employed acclaims most fre-




Table 1. Functions of French, South Korean, and American Debates 
 
 Acclaims Attacks Defenses χ2 (df = 2) 
 
French 
 1988 353 (59%) 219 (37%) 25 (4%) 542.64p < .0001 
 1995 363 (64%) 167 (29%) 41 (7%) 
Total 716 (61%) 386 (33%) 66 (6%) 
 
South Korean 
 1997 485 (54%) 323 (36%) 91 (10%) 595.15p < .0001 
 2002 559 (56%) 345 (35%) 89 (9%) 
Total 1044 (55%) 668 (35%) 180 (10%) 
 
American 
 1960 329 (49%) 258 (39%) 83 (12%) 2494.28p < .0001 
 1976 363 (52%) 294 (42%) 47 (7%) 
 1980 114 (50%) 88 (39%) 23 (10%) 
 1984 239 (53%) 164 (36%) 51 (11%) 
 1988 550 (59%) 301 (33%) 75 (8%) 
 1992 309 (52%) 203 (34%) 85 (14%) 
 1996 548 (56%) 346 (36%) 78 (8%) 
 2000 860 (74%) 281 (24%) 24 (2%) 
 2004 738 (51%) 566 (39%) 138 (10%) 
Total 4050 (57%) 2501 (35%) 604 (8%) 
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Hypothesis two concerned the use of policy and character, predicting that 
policy would be more common than character. This prediction was also con-
firmed. In France, the debates discussed policy eight times as often as character 
(89% to 11%; χ2 [df = 1] = 669.58, p < .0001). The South Korean debates em-
phasized policy over five times as much as character (84% policy, 16% charac-
ter; χ2 [df = 1] = 803.7, p < .0001). In the United States, policy was discussed 
three times as often as character (74% policy, 25% character; χ2 [df = 1] = 
1580.76, p < .0001). In 1997, Kim offered this example of a statement on policy: 
―The issue is about international competitiveness. The best solution will be to 
maintain or improve international competitiveness, without lay-offs.‖ Clearly, 
international trade is a policy topic. In contrast, Lee discussed his leadership 
ability, or experience in office, illustrating a character comment: ―I have 30 
years of experience as a judge. I also held other public offices, such as the 
Chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection and Prime Minister. I was also 
the President in the main political party‖ (2002). Policy in U.S. debates varied 
from 66% to 93% (mean of 76%), whereas character ranged from 7% to 34% 
(mean of 25%). Although debates in all three countries stressed policy more 
than character, statistical analysis reveals that American debates discussed cha-
racter more, and policy less, than either French (χ2 [df = 1] = 141.84, p < .0001) 
or South Korean (χ2 [df = 1] = 106.39, p < .0001) debates. 
 
Table 2. Topics of French, South Korean, and American Debates 
 
 Policy Character χ2 (df = 1) 
 
French 
 1988 498 (87%) 74 (13%)  
669.58 
p < .0001 
 1995 483 (91%) 47 (8%) 
 Total 981 (89%) 121 (11%) 
 
South Korean 
 1997 666 (82%) 142 (18%)  
803.7 
p < .0001 
 2002 777 (86%) 127 (14%) 
 Total 1443 (84%) 269 (16%) 
 
American 




1580.76p < .0001 
 1976 565 (86%) 92 (14%) 
 1980 188 (93%) 14 (7%) 
 1984 321 (80%) 82 (28%) 
 1988 561 (66%) 290 (34%) 
 1992 374 (73%) 138 (27%) 
 1996 620 (69%) 274 (31%) 
 2000 865 (76%) 276 (24%) 
 2004 933 (72%) 371 (28%) 
 Total 4885 (75%) 1666 (25%) 
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The third hypothesis predicted that incumbents would acclaim more, and at-
tack less, than challengers. In the French debates this prediction was confirmed, 
with incumbents acclaiming more (69% to 62%), and attacking less (31% to 
38%) than challengers (χ2 [df = 1] = 4.6, p < .05, V = .07). Although the propor-
tions of acclaims and attacks were ordered in the predicted direction in South 
Korea, the frequency of use of acclaims and attacks by incumbents and challen-
gers was not statistically significant (χ2 [df = 1] = 1.7, ns). The difference was 
significant for American debates, with incumbents acclaiming more (72% to 
54%) and attacking less (28%, 46%) than challengers (χ2 [df = 1] = 235.88 p < 
.0001, V = .19). See Table 3 for these data. Notice, however, that the effect size 
for the relationship between incumbency and function in American debates is 
noticeably larger (V = .19) than in France (V = .07). 
 
Table 3. Acclaims and Attacks by Incumbents versus Challengers in French, 
Korean, and American Debates 
 
 Acclaims Attacks χ2 (df = 1) 
 
French Debates (1988, 1995) 
 Incumbents 377 (69%) 171 (31%) 4.6, p < .05V = .07 
 Challengers 341 (62%) 205 (38%) 
 
South Korean Debates (1997, 2002) 
 Incumbents 304 (64%) 174 (36%) 1.7, ns 
 Challengers 742 (60%) 494 (40%) 
 
American Debates (1960, 1976-2004) 
 Incumbents 2082 (72%) 800 (28%) 235.88, p < .0001V = .19 
 Challengers 1968 (54%) 1702 (46%) 
 
The fourth prediction held that incumbent party candidates would utilize 
past deeds more as the basis for acclaims, and less for attacks, than challengers. 
This hypothesis was confirmed in the French debates, with the incumbent candi-
date acclaiming more (44% to 18%) and attacking less (56% to 82%) on past 
deeds than challengers (χ2 [df = 1] = 28.73, p < .0001, V = .26). However, this 
hypothesis was not confirmed in the South Korean debates (the difference insig-
nificant: χ2 [df = 1] = 1.39, ns). American debates revealed the predicted pattern, 
with incumbents acclaiming more (72% to 18%) and attacking less (28% to 
82%) than challengers on past deeds (χ2 [df = 1] = 687.78, p < .00001, V = .55). 
The effect size for this relationship in American debates was larger than in 
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Table 4. Acclaims and Attacks on Past Deeds by Incumbents versus Challengers 
in French, Korean, and American Debates  
 
 Acclaims Attacks χ2 (df = 1) 
 
French Debates (1988, 1995) 
 Incumbents 45 (44%) 57 (56%) 28.73, p < .0001V = .26 
 Challengers 60 (18%) 279 (82%) 
 
South Korean Debates (1997, 2002) 
 Incumbents 75 (46%) 88 (54%) 1.39, ns 
 Challengers 126 (52.5%) 114 (47.5%) 
 
American Debates (1960, 1976-2004) 
 Incumbents 737 (72%) 284 (28%) 687.78, p < .0001V = .55 
 Challengers 225 (18%) 1046 (82%) 
 
The fifth hypothesis predicted that general goals would be used more fre-
quently to acclaim than to attack. This expectation was confirmed in French 
(326 acclaims and 71 attacks on general goals; χ2 [df = 1] = 162.5, p < .0001), 
South Korean (511 acclaims and 92 attacks on general goals; χ2 [df = 1] = 
289.76, p < .0001), and American (1349 acclaims and 230 attacks on general 
goals; χ2 [df = 1] = 791.6, p < .0001) debates. These data are reported in Table 5. 
 




Past Deeds Future Plans General Goals 
 
French 
1988 Mitterrand (I) 41 58 18 8 74 10 
 Chirac (C) 105 73 27 13 58 13 
1995 Jospin (I) 34 30 57 10 109 22 
 Chirac (C) 21 41 19 29 85 26 
Total 201 202 121 60 326 71 
 
South Korean 
1997 Lee (I) 18 26 33 13 79 17 
 Kim 21 69 55 7 92 10 
 Lee 12 59 54 14 76 11 
2002 Lee 13 41 57 16 98 13 
 Noh (I) 27 31 47 19 68 18 
 Kwon 14 110 64 20 98 23 
Total 105 336 310 89 511 92 
 
American (1960, 1976-2004) 
 Incumbents 737 284 318 158 575 119 
 Challengers 225 1046 404 134 774 111 
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French debates: acclaims versus attacks on general goals χ2 (df = 1) = 162.5, p < 
.0001. 
South Korean debates: acclaims versus attacks on general goals χ2 (df = 1) = 
289.76, p < .0001. 
American Debates: acclaims versus attacks on general goals χ2 (df = 1) = 791.6, 
p < .0001. 
 
The last hypothesis predicted that, as with general goals, ideals would be 
used more frequently to acclaim than to attack. Only three utterances concerned 
ideals in the two French debates analyzed here; all were acclaims. This is cer-
tainly in the predicted direction but with the number of ideals so small it cannot 
be considered to be very strong support. Somewhat strong evidence for H6 can 
be found in South Korean debates: 68 acclaims and 1 attack on ideals (χ2 [df = 1] 
= 63.14, p < .0001). Candidates in U.S. presidential debates followed this pat-
tern, with 413 acclaims and 91 attacks on ideals (χ2 [df = 1] = 204.44, p < 
.0001). These data are reported in Table 6. 
 












1988 Mitterrand (I) 9 24 6 2 0 0 
 Chirac (C) 10 16 4 2 1 0 
1995 Jospin (I) 19 7 7 0 1 0 
 Chirac (C) 7 2 3 0 1 0 
Total 45 49 20 4 3 0 
 
South Korean 
1997 Lee (I) 2 29 2 1 10 0 
 Kim 3 26 6 8 6 0 
 Lee 2 28 5 4 9 1 
2002 Lee 9 16 6 1 10 0 
 Noh (I) 7 17 4 3 7 0 
 Kwon 4 17 0 0 26 0 
Total 27 133 23 17 68 1 
 
American (1960, 1976-2004) 
 Incumbents 143 138 108 47 201 54 
 Challengers 178 225 175 118 212 37 
French debates: too few instances to calculate acclaims versus attacks on ideals. 
South Korean debates: acclaims versus attacks on ideals χ2 (df = 1) = 63.14, p < 
.0001. 
American debates: acclaims versus attacks on ideals χ2 (df = 1) = 204.44., p < 
.0001. 
75
et al.: Complete Volume (46)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2016
 72 Speaker & Gavel 2009 
  
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
 
Implications 
The two replications reported here provide support for the claim that some 
factors influencing the production of political campaign discourse work across 
cultures. Overall, acclaims are the most common function, attacks are the second 
most frequent function, and defenses are the least used function in France, South 
Korea, Israel (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006), and the U.S. Functional Theory explains 
that these three functions have different drawbacks which lead to this distribu-
tion of functions. Attacks may upset those voters who profess to dislike mud-
slinging. Defenses, in contrast, have three drawbacks (two most applicable to 
debates). First, one is usually attacked in an area of weakness, so defending 
against an attack is likely to take a candidate ―off-message.‖ Second, defenses 
may encourage the impression that a candidate is reactive rather than proactive. 
Third, if there is a chance the audience is not aware of an attack, or has forgotten 
it, a defense could inform or remind voters of a potential weakness (although 
this not likely to be a concern in debates). For these reasons, we expect acclaims 
to outnumber attacks and defenses to be the least common function. It is clear 
that some attributes of political campaign messages occur across countries (al-
though of course we cannot from these data conclude that these relationships 
will hold true in all countries). 
Second, Functional Theory predicts that policy will be more common than 
character because public opinion poll data reveals that more American voters 
report that policy is a more important determinant of their vote for president 
than character. Although we do not have comparable public opinion data from 
France, South Korea, or Israel (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006), content analysis of 
their debates reveal that these candidates emphasized policy more than charac-
ter. Another similarity is the emphasis on policy over character in political de-
bates. The results on topic emphasis from these countries are also consistent 
with Baker and Norpath‘s (1981) study of the 1972 German debates. Of course 
we cannot be sure this pattern will replicate in other countries (or in every de-
bate), but so far discussion of policy is more common than character in debates 
in several countries. 
In fact, the emphasis on policy was significantly greater in both France and 
South Korea than in the United States or Israel (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006). If can-
didates are responding to the interests of their electorates, this could mean that 
character is even less important (or important to even fewer voters) in those two 
countries than in America or Israel. The tradition of quite sharp political party 
ideological differences in France may be one reason policy is emphasized so 
much more in France than in the United States. 
Third, predictions for incumbency (H3 and H4) were upheld in France, the 
United States, and Israel (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006) but not South Korea. In 
France, candidates from the incumbent party acclaim more, and attack less, than 
challengers. Incumbent party candidates in that country are also more likely to 
use past deeds for acclaims (and less for attacks) than challengers. This is rea-
sonable because, as the theory posits, only the incumbent party candidate has a 
recent record in the office sought. That record provides a resource (past deeds) 
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which incumbents can use to acclaim (but not to attack) and challengers can use 
to attack (but not to acclaim). Of course, challengers can acclaim records in oth-
er offices, and incumbents can attack the challenger‘s record in other offices, but 
the record in the presidency is more relevant to the vote choice for president. 
Similarly, the leaders of the challenging parties in the 1972 German debates 
tended to attack the incumbent party‘s record, which the incumbent party candi-
dates defended (Baker & Norpoth, 1981). In contrast, no candidate in South Ko-
rea had a record in the office sought, a key element of incumbency in functional 
theory. Interestingly, this prediction was upheld overall in Israel, but not in 
1988. However, the close election results in 1984 led to a unity governing from 
1984-1988 in which the prime minister was from one major party from 1984-
1986 and the other major party from 1986-1988. Thus, Functional Theory ac-
knowledges that when neither candidate, or both candidates, have a record in 
office, this situation influences production of messages by incumbents and chal-
lengers. Of course, it is possible that other factors, such as cultural differences 
between countries, contextual differences, or individual tendencies of particular 
candidates, could account for contrasting results. 
The situation in France underscores the importance of understanding the 
specific political context when interpreting data on such variables as incumben-
cy. France has both a president (elected by direct vote of the people) and a prime 
minister (who represents the party or coalition of parties with the most seats in 
the assembly). In 1988, Mitterand was the president and his opponent, Chirac, 
was the prime minister. In 1995, neither Chirac nor Jospin served as president or 
prime minister. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that past deeds (most 
of which are acclaims or attacks on the incumbent party candidate‘s record) 
were employed much more frequently in 1988 (when the candidates were a pres-
ident and a prime minister) than in 1995 (when neither candidate was a president 
or a prime minister): 277 to 126. The candidates apparently shifted to more dis-
cussion of general goals in the latter debates (242 in 1995, up from 155 in 1988). 
This generally consistent relationship between incumbency and function, 
however, did not occur in South Korean debates. This difference could arise 
from several factors. First, candidates are limited to a single term in office, so no 
sitting incumbent president may run for reelection in South Korea. Furthermore, 
the South Korean government does not have a vice president. In the U.S., vice 
presidents (e.g., the first George H. W. Bush and Al Gore, for example) usually 
run for the presidency when their running-mate cannot run again. Third, political 
parties may be less well-established in South Korea (South Korea‘s two political 
parties have not existed for as long as the Democratic and Republican parties in 
the U.S.), weakening the incumbent party ties. The fact that both debates fea-
tured three candidates (two ―challengers‖) may also have influenced the results 
(in the United States, only one campaign, 1992, featured three candidates). In-
cumbency appears to have a larger influence on political debates in America and 
France than in South Korea. This underscores the importance of understanding 
the differences in political systems of the countries from which political cam-
paign messages are being investigated. 
77
et al.: Complete Volume (46)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2016
 74 Speaker & Gavel 2009 
  
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
 
Finally, candidates in political debates use general goals and ideas much 
more often as the basis for acclaims than for attacks. So many goals, values, and 
principles are considered desirable (e.g., creating jobs, equality) by most voters 
that it is much easier to acclaim than attack with these message forms. This sug-
gests that all forms of political campaign discourse (e.g., general goals, ideals) 
are not equally easy for candidates to use for acclaims and attacks. 
We believe it is important to acknowledge limitations of this analysis. First, 
it includes only three countries. Second, in two of those countries, France and 
South Korea, only two campaigns are represented. Finally, we do not attempt to 
answer every potential question about these debates. However, these replications 
add to our understanding of political leaders‘ debates around the world. 
 
Conclusion 
This replication of research on political campaign messages in France and 
South Korea, two different contexts, extends our cross-cultural understanding of 
an increasingly important message form: political leaders debates. The analysis 
reveals both similarities and differences across culture. It seems clear that addi-
tional research will help clarify the nature of political campaign research in the 
many countries which elect their leaders via political campaigns. It is possible 
that other factors, such as historical or cultural differences, influenced the nature 
and content of these debates. And, of course, the questions asked in debates en-
courage the candidates to address particular topics. However, regardless of what 
factor or factors influenced the content of these messages, this is the content that 
was available to voters and the news media for their consideration. One obvious 
need is for research on televised political debates in countries with a parliamen-
tary system (such as Germany). However, as became evident in the discussion, 
we must remain cognizant of diversity in the political systems of different coun-
tries. 
This line of research can be extended and augmented in many ways. First, 
debates are being held for other offices (such as mayor) both in the U.S. and 
other countries. This method could be expanded to help understand debates for 
other political offices. Second, this approach can be applied to other forms of 
discourse, such as political televison spots, webpages, blogs, stump speeches, or 
direct mail advertising (see Benoit, 2007, for discussion of Functional Theory 
research on other message forms, mainly on American campaigns). Research in 
this traditional has contrasted campaign messages from incumbents versus chal-
lengers and Democrats versus Republicans (Benoit, 2007); research could also 
investigate the influence of other variables such as gender, age, or ethnicity on 
candidate messages. Fourth, case studies of specific political campaigns for of-
fices at various levels and in different countries could help illuminate the influ-
ence of contextual factors. Furthermore, Functional Theory does not attempt to 
address every potentially important question about political debates. Other inter-
esting questions include the use of supporting materials in campaign messages, 
such as evidence or metaphors. Mixed-method research (see, e.g., Benoit & 
Holbert, in press; Creswell, 2003, or Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) could com-
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bine Functional Analysis of campaign messages with audience effects research 
(e.g., focus groups, survey) of the same messages. Many opportunities exist for 
extending our understanding of political campaign messages around the world. 
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Appendix: Political Debate Participants 
 
 Incumbency Outcome 
France 1988 
 Francois Mitterrand Incumbent Winner 
 Jacque Chirac Challenger Loser 
France 1995 
 Lionel Jospin Incumbent* Loser 
 Jacque Chirac Challenger Winner 
South Korea 1997 
 Hoi-Chang Lee Incumbent* Loser 
 Dae-Jung Kim Challenger Winner 
 In-Jae Lee Challenger Loser 
South Korea 2002 
 Moo-Hyun Noh Incumbent* Winner 
 Hoi-Chang Lee Challenger Loser 
 Young-Ghil Kwon Challenger Loser 
U.S. 1960 
 Richard M. Nixon Incumbent* Loser 
 John F. Kennedy Challenger Winner 
U.S. 1976 
 Gerald Ford Incumbent Loser 
 Jimmy Carter Challenger Winner 
U.S. 1980 
 Jimmy Carter Incumbent Loser 
 Ronald Reagan Challenger Winner 
U.S. 1984 
 Ronald Reagan Incumbent Winner 
 Walter Mondale Challenger Loser 
U.S. 1988 
 George W. Bush Incumbent* Winner 
 Michael Dukakis Challenger Loser 
U.S. 1992 
 George W. Bush Incumbent Loser 
 Bill Clinton Challenger Winner 
 H. Ross Perot Challenger Loser 
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U.S. 1996 
 Bill Clinton Incumbent Winner 
 Bob Dole Challenger Loser 
U.S. 2000 
 Al Gore Incumbent* Loser 
 George W. Bush Challenger Winner 
U.S. 2004 
 George W. Bush Incumbent Winner 
 John Kerry Challenger Loser 
*incumbent party candidate 
 
 
Yun Son Choi, School of Mass Communication, Youngsan University, 150 Ju-
nam-ri, Ungsang-eup., Yangsan, Gyeongnam 
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Critiquing Debate 
James P. Dimock 
 
Debaters enjoy debating more than debate itself. The closer one gets to be-
coming ―an old debater‖ (a category to which I will inevitably have to resign 
myself sooner or later), the more likely we are to find ourselves debating on the 
side of ―the way debate used to be‖ or ―the way debate is supposed to be.‖ I 
don‘t malign this seemly inevitable progression or even my place in it. I think 
the tendency to re-examine ourselves says something about our activity. 
I enter this debate about debate, I think I should begin by defining my side 
of the flow, or to at least identify which side of the flow I am attacking. My pur-
pose is not to condemn debating or to defend the good old days of debate. Ra-
ther I hope to engage in a critique of the activity. Debaters are familiar with cri-
tique, often spelled with a ―k,‖ as an attack upon the philosophical or ideological 
assumptions of the opponent‘s argument but critiques exist outside the world of 
debate as well and their purpose is not merely to win arguments. Critique, as 
Ingram and Simon-Ingram (1992) noted, aims ―at emancipating … addresses 
from ideology‖ (p. xxviii) and McKerrow (1989) argued the practice of critical 
rhetoric is ―to unmask or demystify the discourse of power‖ and ―to understand 
the integration of power/knowledge in society‖ (p. 91). My critique is concerned 
not with what is good or bad debating, but with how debate constructs ―a partic-
ular vision of the world‖ and the ―forms of power … embraced or implicated‖ 
(McKerrow, 2001, p. 621) by the activity. Specifically, the focus of my effort is 
on the practice of competitive debating, in particular how debate practices con-
trol and organize knowledge in fundamentally undemocratic ways.  
That debate should lend itself to undemocratic ideology is ironic. The activ-
ity of debate has long been justified and defended on the grounds of its demo-
cratic-ness. Advocates of debate, at both the high school and collegiate level, 
have grounded their support for the activity on its capacity to train students in 
the skills necessary for citizenship in a democratic society. Freely (1996) con-
tended that, ―Society benefits if debate is encouraged, both because free and 
open debate protects the rights of individuals and because debate offers society a 
way of reaching optimal decisions‖ (p. 6). The connection between participation 
in debate and democracy is a core assumption of debate coaches and forensic 
educators. In Mitchell‘s (1998) words, the connection between democracy and 
debate is a ―faith inscribed in the American Forensic Association‘s Credo, re-
produced in scores of argumentation textbooks, and rehearsed over and over 
again in introductory argumentation courses‖ (para. 2). The advocates of debate 
support the link between debate and participation in a democratic society. Muir 
(1993), for example, has claimed: 
 
… debate involves certain skills, including research and policy evaluation, 
that evolve along with the debater‘s consciousness of the complexities of 
moral and political dilemmas. This conceptual development is a basis for 
the formation of ideas and relational thinking necessary for effective public 
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decision making, making even the game of debate a significant benefit in 
solving real world problems. (p. 287) 
 
The advocates of contest debating assume almost categorically that debating 
teaches students to question assumptions, think critically and research posi-
tions—all keys to arguing effectively. If we take as a given the premise that a 
democratic society depends upon argument and, second, that debate provides 
students with instruction in the art of argumentation, then it is reasonable to con-
clude debate should be valued by and fostered in a democratic society. Such 
reasoning holds, however, only insofar as we can reasonably assume all argu-
ment is equally democratic. If the assumption doesn‘t hold, however, then un-
democratic argumentation must be distinguished from the democratic. Thus, the 
purpose of my critique. 
I believe two aspects of contest debating run counter to the democratic 
goals of the activity: concision and the unqualified obedience to authority; each 
aspect addressed in turn. 
 
Concision 
One of the most anti-critical dimensions of debating is the structural imposi-
tion of concision upon argumentation. I borrow the concept from Noam 
Chomsky who identified concision as a property of the propaganda model of the 
media. The model posits that the mass-media filters news and information in 
order to marginalize dissent and protect moneyed and powerful interests. In the 
context of mass-media, ―concision means you have to be able to say things be-
tween two commercials‖ (Chomsky, 2002, p. 387). Concision as a structural 
constraint ―imposes conformism in a very deep way because if you have to meet 
the condition of concision, you can only either repeat conventional platitudes or 
else you sound like you are from Neptune‖ (p. 387). If a person says, for exam-
ple, that Iran sponsors terrorism, the claim sounds perfectly reasonable and the 
speaker is simply repeating a position said over and over again. Thus, little if 
any evidence is required to back up the claim. The claim can be made concisely. 
Suppose, however, the speaker was to make an unconventional claim by stating 
the United States sponsors terrorism. Under such conditions, Chomsky con-
tended, people have a right to demand evidence in support of that claim. 
Chomsky explained the dilemma: 
 
This structural requirement of concision that‘s imposed by our media disal-
lows the possibility of explanation; in fact, that‘s its propaganda function. It 
means that you can repeat conventional platitudes, but you can‘t say any-
thing out of the ordinary without sounding as if you‘re from Neptune, a 
wacko, because to explain what you meant—and people have a right to ask 
if it‘s an unconventional thought—would take a bit of time. (p. 387) 
 
One only need watch television news pundits like Bill O‘Reilly to see the 
concision principle in action: the more the guests‘ opinions differ from the host, 
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the less they are allowed to speak. Even those who do get to talk at length are 
getting only a minute or two to explain themselves. Only those who are able to 
express simple ideas that require little or no supporting analysis or evidence are 
able to get their point across clearly. The further outside the mainstream an idea 
is, the more likely the guest will sound like someone ―from Neptune.‖ Intention-
al or not, Chomsky concluded, concision is ―highly functional to impose thought 
control‖ (p. 387). It makes it very difficult to challenge established political 
dogmas and makes it easy to ridicule those who do. 
Experts on debating and argumentation have derided the impact of conci-
sion on other forms of debating. The first broadcast political debate in the Unit-
ed States, a presidential primary debate between Thomas Dewey and Harold 
Stassen, lasted for an hour with each candidate being given twenty minutes for 
his opening statement and eight and a half minute for rebuttals. The debate was 
on a single topic: whether or not the communist Party should be outlawed. In his 
analysis of the debate, Kane (1987) suggested the debate had a meaningful im-
pact on the Oregon State Primary after which Dewey‘s failing campaign was 
―resurrected‖ and Stassen‘s ―was all but finished‖ (p. 252). Since then, however, 
the political campaign debates have gotten considerably shorter. Kennedy and 
Nixon had only eight-minute opening statements followed by two-and-a-half 
minute responses to questions. In the 2004 Presidential debates between George 
Bush and John Kerry, the time allotted per question was only two minutes. 
While the length of time for the debates permits the covering of many subjects, 
nothing can be covered in any depth. The format for debates in presidential 
campaigns has been tinkered with many times over the years but, as Kane ob-
served, ―No degree of tampering … will compensate for the basic inadequacy 
that one cannot develop a meaningful position in a very few minutes‖ (p. 250). 
Debates may influence voters, yet scholars of argumentation and debating have 
been negative in their assessment of the quality of these ―debates.‖ The debates 
are certainly not critical in the sense I am using the term here nor could they be 
so constrained by concision. 
This principle of concision is also at work in contest debating. Time con-
straints ensure argumentation is limited and that conventional points of view 
will dominate the debate. Positions firmly within the mainstream require only 
the sparsest analysis and scantest evidence. The quality or depth of support is 
hardly at issue since the position is presumed already. Opposition, on the other 
hand, requires considerable support and is subjected to intense scrutiny. A deba-
ter need only suggest Iran has no right to arm itself with nuclear weapons, but 
considerable resources would be required to support the contention that the Un-
ites States has no right to their weapons. 
Concision is not simply a byproduct of the time constraints imposed on 
speakers; after all, we must be some reasonable time limits both to ensure that 
the debate is fair (both sides get equal amounts of time) and that the debate tour-
nament is manageable (you can‘t schedule multiple rounds of competition unless 
you have some sense of how long each round will be). Placing limits on time is 
perfectly reasonable. We should observe, however, how short time limits are 
given the complexity of the issues considered. Even a simple question of policy 
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must consider reasons for changing policy (harms and inherency), the nature of 
the change to be made (plan) and the grounds for expecting positive change in 
conditions (solvency). The complexity of topics debated has increase dramati-
cally since formal intercollegiate debating began, yet time limits have changed 
little. The topic of the first National Debate Tournament in 1947 was ―Resolved: 
That labor should be given a direct share in the management of industry‖ (Na-
tional Debate Tournament, n.d. ―Anticipating,‖ para. 10). In 2008 - 2009, deba-
ters will consider: 
 
Resolved: that the United States Federal Government should substantially 
reduce its agricultural support, at least eliminating nearly all of the domestic 
subsidies, for biofuels, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, corn, cot-
ton, dairy, fisheries, rice, soybeans, sugar and/or wheat. (NDT, n.d. ―Top-
ics,‖ para. 1) 
 
 As the complexity of the topic increases, the inherent complexity of policy 
questions increases exponentially. Yet the time permitted to address complexity 
has not. 
As complexity of topics increases, so too does the need for concision. More 
issues means the time dedicated to each issue is less. Good debaters are at least 
tacitly aware of this condition and use it to their competitive advantage, wherev-
er possible taking the stance most likely to have little need of rigorous advocacy. 
Such positions are likely to favor the existing structure and current political 
dogmas. Change can be advocated, but the basic structure and assumptions of 
the status quo are not challenged. To extend a metaphor used by radicals (see, 
for example Friedberg, 2007), it‘s permissible to rearrange who gets how much 
of the pie, as long as the baker remains the same. 
The pedagogical foundations of debating, assume that students engage in 
the activity in order to develop skills conducive to their participation in a demo-
cratic society as informed and engaged citizens. Debating should habituate stu-
dents to questioning assumptions and demanding that claims be justified on the 
basis of accurate information and sound reasoning. Debaters conditioned upon 
concision as both a structural constraint and a strategic necessity, however, in-
culcate blind spots and constrain thought. Debaters trained to argue within the 
status quo but not to challenge its basic assumptions might well be more dan-
gerous to the cause of genuine democracy than had they had no such training at 
all. Those who have had no training are, at least, not brainwashed into believing 
they have reached the limits of what can be argued. 
 
Obedience to Authority 
Since Aristotle, scholars of argumentation have identified different types of 
arguments debaters might use in defense or refutation of a given claim. How 
those types of argument are delineated depends upon the person making the 
classifications. We generally recognize arguments can be divided into two dis-
tinctly different classes. Aristotle (1946) distinguished between artistic proofs 
(ethos, pathos and logos) and inartistic proofs (―witnesses, evidence given under 
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torture, written contracts, and so on‖) (p. 1355b). Rhetorician Richard M. Weav-
er (1974) classified arguments as ―‗internal‘ in the sense that they involve our 
own interpretation of experience‖ and ―‗external‘ sources‖ of argument ―which 
utilize the interpretation of others‖ (p. 144). External arguments, in the simplest 
form, involve citation of authorities or the quoting of witness testimony. I, for 
example, could have made the distinction between internal and external argu-
ments based upon my own understanding of the structure of arguments. Instead, 
however, I invoked Weaver and Aristotle as authorities in order to make my 
argument. The basic structure of the argument from authority can be seen in 




The syllogism makes apparent such arguments ―have no intrinsic force; 
whatever persuasive power they carry is derived from the credit of the testifier 
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or the weight of the authority‖ (Weaver, 1974, p. 146). The lack of intrinsic 
force does not mean, however, that arguments from authority and testimony are 
not legitimate forms of argument. Rather, it means such arguments depend upon 
the credibility of the witness or expert which lie outside the argument, thus they 
are called external arguments. 
Even the best arguers will often base claims upon authority and it is certain-
ly true that critical thinkers, speakers, and writers cite sources of their informa-
tion (Dimock, Treinen, Cronn-Mills & Jersak, 2008). It is important, however, 
to avoid obfuscating the distinction between citing sources and the argument 
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The arguments in Figures 1 and 2 are both based on Toulmin‘s (1964) mod-
el of argument but I have modified them slightly to highlight the distinction be-
tween citing sources and arguing from authority. In Figure 1, the argument is 
supported by authority in order to establish key facts or concepts but the argu-
ment itself stands on the strength of the arguer‘s inference, the conclusion drawn 
from those facts and concepts. The argument from authority, as seen in Figure 2, 
is distinctly different. Therein, the conclusion is sustained entirely by authority. 
The data (where Steven was born) and the warrant (who is a British subject un-
der British law) are presumably there but they are in the mind of the expert. As 
auditors we are not privy to the data used, the concepts that provide the warrant; 
only the conclusion and the assurance (which is often enthymematic) that we 
should take his or her word for it.  
I think it is important to stress nothing inherently wrong with the argument 
from authority. Authority is especially valuable to arguers who are unable to 
ground arguments in their own experience (just because I have never been to 
Iraq doesn‘t mean I should be disqualified from arguing about the Iraq War), 
provide arguers with perfectly reasonable shortcuts (it is easier and more rea-
sonable to defer to experts on legal questions than research all of the statutes and 
relevant case law on my own). Indeed, in some cases the conclusions of res-
pected authorities and experts should trump those of the inexpert. If I choke on 
biscotti at my favorite coffee shop, the only opinions I am interested in are those 
of persons who are trained in the Heimlich maneuver. No one else‘s opinion 
matters. 
In such cases, the argument from authority can be qualified. If we draw 
upon the testimony of those who have been to Iraq when we have not been there 
for ourselves, we would look at the quality of that testimony: How many wit-
nesses do we ground our argument upon? What is the range of the witnesses‘ 
experience? Are the witnesses reliable and credible? When we allow experts to 
synthesize information and ideas for us, as in the case of legal scholarship we 
ask different questions: Is the expert qualified? Is the opinion rendered within 
the expert‘s field of experience and training? Does he or she have the support of 
other experts within the field? Does he or she have any agenda which might call 
into question his or her conclusions? Finally, with respect to technical processes 
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or procedures, we can qualify the technician: Where and how was the technician 
trained? How much experience does he or she have? 
Arguments from authority are an important component in the arguer‘s tool-
box. It is important that we, as scholars of argumentation, understand the prin-
ciples and limits of authority as a mode of argument. Unfortunately, however, 
scholars of argument have tended to pay little attention to the argument from 
authority. Neglect of the argument from authority begins with Aristotle (1946) 
who chose to ignore the ‗inartistic proofs‘ and concentrate upon those proofs 
―such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric‖ (p. 
1355b). In the Enlightenment, the argument from authority was considered a 
fallacious ―reluctance to challenge authorities that are learned, eminent or po-
werful‖ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 162). The philosopher John Locke called arguments 
from authority ―argumentum ad verecundiam,‖ and dismissed as fallacious the 
invocation not only of ―worthless authorities‖ but also those ―worthy authorities, 
whom it is normally reasonable to trust, maybe wrong‖ (Hamblin, 1970, p. 162). 
Contemporary scholars have continued to marginalize the argument from au-
thority. For example, in what might be the most extensive treatment of argumen-
tation and argumentation theory in recent years, van Eemeren and his colleagues 
(1996) invest almost nothing in the subject of the argumentation from authority 
continuing to favor other modes of inference and reasoning. But if scholars have 
been dismissive of the argument from authority, debaters have embraced it 
whole heartedly.  
Freeley‘s Argumentation and Debate has been a standard in the discipline 
for more than 40 years and the textbook is noted for being principally a work on 
debate rather than argumentation theory (Hostettler, 1961; Bjork, 1994). Thus 
Argumentation and Debate is a good indicator of what is valued by instruc-
tors of debate as opposed to those who emphasize argumentation. Now in its 
11th edition, Freeley and Steinberg (2005) have dedicated chapters to the struc-
ture of arguments (Chapter 8), the types of arguments (Chapter 9), and fallacies 
(Chapter 10). Balancing this treatment of argumentation, three chapters are ded-
icated to evidence wherein Freeley and Steinberg‘s treat such topics as the loca-
tion of sources, reading critically, types of evidence, tests of evidence, and other 
dimensions of the argument from authority. As much weight is placed upon the 
argument from authority as is given to all other modes and types of arguments 
combined. Clearly, Freeley and Steinberg give considerably more attention to 
the argument from authority than van Eemeren et al. give the topic. 
I do not wish to suggest that I have conducted a systematic investigation of 
argumentation or debate textbooks. I believe, however, the difference between 
Freeley and Steinberg‘s attention to testimonial and authoritative evidence and 
that given by van Eemeren et al. is indicative of the different treatment given the 
subject of authority is given in the two arenas. In argumentation studies, the sub-
ject is given little attention and clearly marginalized as a form of argument while 
in debate it is prioritized. Argumentation scholars may unfairly exclude the ar-
gument from authority but within the sphere of interscholastic and intercolle-
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giate debate, the argument from authority is not merely a mode of argument; it is 
the primary mode of argument.  
All arguers probably make use of the argument from authority to some ex-
tent or another and using such arguments is perfectly reasonable. My concern 
here and what I believe should concern all of us who think debate should be 
grounded in a democratic pedagogy is the overreliance on the argument from 
authority to the exclusion of other modes of argument.  
Arguments from authority have a presumptive status in competitive debate. 
If a debater must choose between the use of authority and any other mode of 
argument, debaters will pick the argument from authority opting other forms of 
argument only when the option to cite evidence is not available. The opponent‘s 
rebuttal will predictably be that, although the argument might be cogent, there 
was ―no evidence.‖ When evidence clashes with any other form of argument, 
evidence wins and debaters know it. As coaches and judges we reinforce it. 
I think the reliance upon a single mode of argument is unquestionably un-
critical, like a carpenter who might have had some theoretical training in the use 
of tools but who really only uses a hammer. Certainly, the hammer is a useful 
tool and necessary for some tasks but I would have a hard time calling anyone a 
master carpenter who did not also have a working knowledge of the saw, the 
screwdriver, and a host of other essential tools. In the same way, we cannot just-
ly claim to be teaching argumentation when in truth we are only teaching one 
type of argument, even if we are teaching it very well. 
This prioritization of one mode of argument at the expense of all others is 
more than just educationally unsound, it is also uncritical. Rhetorician Richard 
Weaver (1953) said that how a person argues ―tells us how he is thinking about 
the world‖ (p. 55) and is thus ―a truer index of his beliefs than his explicit pro-
fession of principles‖ (p. 58). Weaver concluded that those who prefer the ar-
gument from definition, as he did, tended toward conservatism while those who 
argued from circumstance were liberal. Extending that position, I contend that 
those who favor the argument from authority are not necessarily conservative or 
liberal but technocratic. 
Democracy assumes people are able to understand social, political, and eco-
nomic questions, to weigh evidence, and make reasoned decisions. Conversely, 
technocracy (as I am using the term herein) assumes that people are generally 
incapable of understanding, analysis, and reasoned decision-making on such 
issues.  
Noam Chomsky (2006) offered an example of the distinction between dem-
ocratic and technocratic thinking. Chomsky noted that although he is perhaps 
most well-known for his political and social commentary, he is education and 
expertise is in the field of linguistics. His critics have often used this fact against 
him, suggesting that he is unqualified to render commentary on matters of public 
policy and international relations. Chomsky‘s response is that such criticism is 
not only irrelevant but indicative of an undemocratic mindset. ―The alleged 
complexity, depth and obscurity‖ of political and social questions are: 
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…part of the illusion propagated by the system of ideological control 
which aims to make these issues seem remote from the general popula-
tion and to persuade them of their incapacity to organized their own af-
fairs or to understand the social world in which they live without the tu-
telage of intermediaries. (p. 70) 
 
The insistence upon authority to validate claims raised in the political sphere 
precludes ordinary citizens from voicing their beliefs on political questions re-
moving them from the political process. It effectively domesticates the demos 
and excludes them from the political sphere. The citizen is positioned outside 
the political discourse, assigned the role of passive observer while participation 
is left to experts. 
Debaters are not to analyze issues for themselves or exercise what Chomsky 
called their own ―Cartesian common sense‖ which he believed required little 
more than ―willingness to look at the facts with an open mind, to put simple 
assumptions to the test, and to pursue an argument to its conclusion‖ (Chomsky, 
2006, p. 70). Instead, debaters are required to cite experts, to make not their own 
judgments but to discover those of qualified others and recite them at the pre-
scribed moment.  
Ultimately, privileging authority is incompatible with the critical perspec-
tive. The obedience to authority, the assumptions that for every question there is 
an expert who can provide the answer, and ordinary people are not competent to 
discuss policy options without appeal to those who have the ‗right‘ kind of 
knowledge: these are the core premises of technocratic thinking. I would con-
tend, no great step is required to move from the position that experts alone have 
the right to draw conclusions about policy questions to the position that experts 




The problems posed by concision and the overemphasis of the argumenta-
tion from authority are interrelated concerns. The problem of concision is ex-
acerbated by overly-broad topics. So is the problem of overreliance on authority. 
As Ziegemuller (1996) noted ―although there was, over the years, some gradual 
increase in the amount of evidence used by debaters at the NDT, the rapid ex-
pansion in the quantity of evidence used largely coincided with the adoption of 
… broad topics‖ (para. 8). As topics become unmanageably broad, it makes it 
difficult for debaters to develop their own sense of the ideas or to explore them 
in depth. Unable to make personal judgments upon the issues, debaters are 
forced to rely upon the judgments of others. 
Debaters who use the argument from authority are also able to argue more 
concisely than those who develop other modes of analysis. One need only return 
to Figure 2 and Figure 3 to see which is more concise. Furthermore, the argu-
ment from authority aggravates the uncritical nature of concision. Concision 
favors dominant opinions and current political dogma which are repeated over 
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and over again in the media. It is thus far easier to find evidence to support 
mainstream viewpoints and perspectives. Constrained by concision, authorities 
whose conclusions are too far outside the mainstream must be quoted at greater 
length in order to make their claims appear rational. Debaters who keep their 
positions within the very narrow range of the dominant paradigm have a consi-
derable tactical advantage over those who attempt to argue from outside that 
paradigm. 
Concision and the overreliance on authority are practices which make it 
very difficult to challenge the dominant paradigm. Because they reinforce the 
dominant ideology, which has tended to favor some groups (white, male, 
straight, Christian, Western, elites, etc.) while marginalizing others (people of 
color, women, GLBT, non-Christian, non-Western, poor, etc.). For a long time, 
we have justified our activity on the grounds that it prepares young people for 
leadership. But what kinds of leaders will they be? Whether they move on to 
take roles in government, industry and finance or even the academy, will they be 
the kind of leaders who are instilled with a respect for democracy? Debate, as it 
is currently practiced, is designed to produce technocratic elites not democratic 
citizens. 
In our civic culture, individuals are feeling more and more distant from the 
processes of democracy. Zinn (1997) has noted, for example, that ―surveys since 
the early seventies show that 70 to 80 percent of Americans are distrustful of 
government, business an the military‖ (p. 474). An even stronger indicator of 
people‘s alienation from the political process is the low voter turnout, especially 
among the most disenfranchised segments of the population. The Census Bureau 
reported that in 2004 voter turnout was up but still only 64 percent and rates 
were lower among those who are the most marginalized in the status quo: racial 
minorities, the poor and the youth (Faler, 2005). Voter turnout rates are dismal 
but the rates of actual participation in politics have been pathetic. While there 
was an upsurge of participation in 2008, whether this is the beginning of trend or 
an anomaly remains to be seen. We can conclude, however, that a democratic 
society is not possible without citizens who see themselves as empowered 
agents of action capable of understanding issues and making reasoned decisions. 
We cannot train leaders to do not believe that ordinary people are capable of 
understanding issues and making reasoned decisions and expect democracy to 
flourish or even survive.  
I debated throughout high school and college. I don‘t write this critique be-
cause I hate debate or resent debaters. I genuinely believe that no activity has 
done more for me intellectually than debate. I am convinced that it is an empo-
wering activity and I believe thousands of others like me are proof of that.But as 
a critical scholar, I cannot come to the conclusion that debate is personally em-
powering and stop there. I cannot accept the conclusion that debating develops 
critical thinkers but not critically-minded citizens and believe we are doing good 
enough. I don‘t believe debate has failed. I believe debate has failed to take the 
next step. 
We can improve the critical capacity of debating and transform the activity 
into a truly critical education: 
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1. We need to fight concision and allow for arguments and positions to be fully 
considered. This means we need to extend time limits and to ask narrower 
questions. We simply cannot expect anyone to explain what is wrong with 
the Horn of Africa and how to fix it in less than ten minutes. 
2. We need to value alternative modes of argument and not just as off-beat kri-
tiks offered as merely another way to try and win the ballot. Thus, we need to 
stop being just judges of debate and start becoming scholars and students of 
argumentation. Arbitrary changes to the rules have been tried and have failed 
because we have continued to think of ourselves as debaters rather than as 
arguers and judges of debates rather than as teachers of argument.  
3. We need to start taking our mission seriously. Debate is a game but like any 
good game its purpose is to instruct and to instill values. If we truly believe 
we are preparing students for leadership in a democracy and that our activity 
exists in order to strengthen the foundation of a free society, we should start 
acting like those values matter. 
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New Wine in Old Wineskins 
Questioning the Value of Research Questions 
in Rhetorical Criticism 
 
Richard E. Paine 
 
 Recent years have seen a trend toward the inclusion and heightened valuing 
of research questions in competitive Rhetorical Criticism (Communication 
Analysis). The inclusion of this content element is quite a new phenomenon on 
the national-level competitive circuit. In fact, the absence of such research ques-
tions in competitive speeches was highlighted by Ott as recently as 1998. But by 
2007-2008, the inclusion of a research question was established as essentially de 
rigueur for a vast number of judges. For example, consider the ballots received 
this past year by a competitively successful rhetorical criticism entry I coached. 
At one tournament, all five ballots written in response to this speech (2 in Pre-
lims, 3 in Finals) wrote the research question at the very top of the ballot. For 
four of the five judges, their assessment of the handling of this question was 
clearly central to the scores they assigned. Three questioned the quality of the 
question: (1) ―this is a big question to ask based on this one incident,‖ (2) ―Isla-
maphobia: relevant, but a bit out of the public consciousness (for a while now),‖ 
and (3) ―your research question needs clearer, specific focus – you could apply it 
to many artifacts. How can you focus the question on this specific artifact?‖ The 
fourth judge meanwhile focused on the adequacy of the question‘s answer, stat-
ing that the response needed to be ―extended.‖ Ballot comments about this 
speech‘s research question continued throughout the year – requiring this aspect 
of the speech to be the single most frequently rewritten and rethought aspect of 
the speech across the length of the competitive season.  
 To borrow language from many Persuasive speakers, ―this is not an isolated 
incident.‖ As both a coach and a frequent tab-room worker, I have read innu-
merable ballots written by critics judging this event. Research questions have 
clearly become a crucial component in many judging paradigms. Given the pre-
cipitous rise of this speech component, it is important that we assess the nature 
and worth of emphasizing research questions in competitive rhetorical criticism. 
In order to do so, we will: first, establish a philosophical perspective from which 
to answer the question (we will privilege the vision of forensics as an ―educa-
tional liberal art‖); second, speculate about the reasons why this element has so 
quickly gained favor among judges; third, assess the degree to which this ele-
ment meshes with other required elements of competitive speeches in this cate-
gory; and fourth and finally, propose a paradigm shift. 
 
A Philosophical Grounding 
The philosophy we accept dictates the forensics world we build. Ott (1998) 
stresses this fact, opening his article with a quotation from Faules (1968), which 
states: ―At some time during a teacher‘s career he [sic] will be asked to explain 
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why he [sic] is asking students to perform in a certain way or to carry out a par-
ticular task. His answer will determine whether he is an educator or [simply] a 
trainer, whether he himself is educated, and whether he has considered the rea-
son for his beliefs. The educator knows the ‗why‘ of what he does, and to him 
theory and conceptual knowledge take precedence over conditioned res-
ponses….Pedagogy is generated by theory, and theory comes from a philosophy 
which is grounded in certain values (p. 1).‖  
 Perhaps the most popular metaphor used over the years to frame the discus-
sion of forensics-as-education has been McBath‘s ―educational laboratory‖ 
(1975). For example, Burnett, Brand, and Meister (2003) point to Ulrich (1984) 
and Whitney (1997) as examples of community members who have relied on 
this metaphor. But while the laboratory metaphor can be interpreted in quite 
positive ways (particularly if we envision the laboratory as a place where explo-
ration and risks are dared within a safe environment), this metaphor becomes 
problematic if we envision the laboratory as a site where ―one right answer‖ (a 
single Platonic ―Truth‖) is envisioned as the ultimate end sought. Thus, Aden‘s 
definition of forensics as a ―liberal art‖ (1991) may be a more satisfying way to 
conceptualize the field. In any case, a significant numbers of scholars have 
stressed the significance of educational goals in forensics. Others, however, 
question this vision. Instead, some believe it is better described as a competitive 
playing field – a world in which education is an appealing shibboleth but com-
petition is a full-blooded reality. Thus, Burnett, Brand and Meister (2003) title 
their article ―Winning is Everything: Education as Myth in Forensics.‖ Provid-
ing an explanation for this title, they write: ―current practices in forensics focus 
on competition and not on an often-referenced education model….although fo-
rensics can be viewed as both an educational and a competitive activity, the 
practice of competition co-opts education. In Burke‘s terms, through the focus 
on competition, we have developed a ‗trained incapacity‘ to focus on the merits 
of education….Our training at best blinds, and at the least clouds, the mythic 
―educational‖ virtues of the forensics community (p. 12).‖  
 In the face of these two visions of our activity, this essay is committed to a 
value paradigm which asserts the primacy of educational values over competi-
tive values. While the activity undeniably is highly competitive in nature, my 
concern is with what I see as the ―ultimate justification‖ for forensics. The posi-
tion staked out here asserts that the value of forensics is massively diminished if 
it is defined primarily as an act of competition. This is not to deny that competi-
tive is a powerful and valuable teacher of many valuable concrete skills and 
mental perspectives. However, I believe that competitive goals are too often 
privileged to the detriment of more important ethical, practical, emotional, spiri-
tual, and life-learning educational goals. Thus, as applied to the question at 
hand, this paper seeks to determine whether or not the inclusion of research 
questions in competitive rhetorical criticism: (1) does or does not make ―logical 
sense‖ within the context of critical writing at this level of educational growth 
among students, and (2) does or does not help students to better prepare for 
graduate work in communication studies (or related fields). 
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Why Have Judge-Critics Embraced 
the Use of Research Questions? 
 The answers suggested here in response to this question are at best specula-
tive. I have not yet attempted to gather any empirical data on this subject, and so 
I am relying on informal conversations, a reading of the extant literature, a study 
of various ballots written by judges, and my own instincts in order to reach my 
conclusions. Tentatively, I believe that the circuit‘s turn toward research ques-
tions is based in part upon: (1) a general desire for change in the event/activity, 
(2) a desire to deepen the level of thinking (cognitive complexity) demanded by 
the event, (3) a desire to connect students more deeply to the scholarly traditions 
of our discipline, and (4) a desire to clarify the extant judging criteria (an urge 
for additional standardization). 
 First, humans desire change. While we appreciate continuity and tradition, 
we also want to try new things and take new paths. We need to believe that we 
have new insights to offer, new discoveries to make, new vistas to look out over, 
new roads others have not seen before that deserve to be traveled. When it 
comes to academia, schools periodically create new ―Five Year Plans‖ that 
project goals and objectives for the future that will take them beyond where they 
stand at present. Academic departments periodically review their curricula and 
major/minor tracks with an eye toward updating and enhancing them. Instructors 
regularly rethink the individual courses they teach, looking for ways (both minor 
and major) to improve them. This general urge certainly applies to the educa-
tional laboratory of forensics at large as well as to the written and unwritten 
―rules‖ the community employs in relation to the individual speaking events. We 
do not want to ―do the same thing forever.‖ Nor do we need to. Nor should we. 
In fact, even the quickest glance at the field of rhetorical criticism as an academ-
ic discipline demonstrates the need to evolve our practices. As noted by Foss 
(1989, p. 71), the modern-day pursuit of rhetorical criticism can be (in a certain 
sense) dated to its birth in 1925 with the publication by Herbert A. Wichelns of 
his article ―The Literary Criticism of Oratory.‖ For the next forty years or so, 
Neo-Aristotelianism constituted the virtually singular track critics trod in their 
work. But this all changed in the mid-1960‘s, triggered by the work of Edwin 
Black. As a field, we discovered that there were a lot more ways to look at rhe-
toric, a lot more tools available to dissect it, a lot more questions to ask about it, 
and a lot more insights to be derived from it. Today, rhetorical critics revel in 
and rely on the freedom to study a vast array of rhetorical artifacts from a ple-
thora of perspectives. These perspectives are typically grounded in the work of 
other critics, but each work of criticism is a unique blend of past knowledge, a 
particular rhetorical artifact, and the unique insights of the particular critic. No 
critic is ―locked in‖ to the boundaries established by another. To a very mea-
ningful degree, each writer is free to write and rewrite the rules they individually 
play by. Thus, as it relates to competitive forensics, it makes sense that our 
community ―bucks against traditional constraints‖ and wants to find new ways 
to pursue this event. 
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 Second, in our role as educators we genuinely yearn to teach our students 
more. One aspect of this desire is particularly relevant here. Adherents of the 
traditional Western style of thinking, we want our students to demonstrate their 
ability to think in depth by showing us that they can connect the fragments of 
their thoughts on any given subject in a linear and maximally-realized way. In-
cluding a research question, at first glance, appears to be a way to demand great-
er coherence in speeches. It‘s presence implies that the student has followed a 
logical and mentally progressive process in writing the speech: they must have 
begun with an artifact, which then gave birth to a research question, which then 
caused the student to search for and locate the ―ideal tool‖ by which to answer 
that question, which then demanded an application of the tool to the artifact, 
which then (through the application process) produced a clear and coherent an-
swer to the question. This is, after all, the research paradigm associated with the 
―hard sciences‖ we often idealize and seek to emulate. Littlejohn (1983) defines 
the process of academic inquiry accordingly: 
 
Inquiry involves processes of systematic, disciplined ordering of experience 
that lead to the development of understanding and knowledge …. Inquiry is 
focused; it involves a planned means or method and it has an expected out-
come. The investigator is never sure of the exact outcome of inquiry and 
can anticipate only the general form or nature of the results. These scholars 
also share a general approach to inquiry that involves three stages. The first 
and guiding stage of all inquiry is asking questions. Gerald Miller and Hen-
ry Nicholson [1976], in fact, believe that inquiry is ‗nothing more…than the 
process of asking interesting, significant questions…and providing discip-
lined, systematic answers to them.‘…the second stage of inquiry is observa-
tion….The third stage of inquiry is constructing answers. Here, the scholar 
attempts to define, to describe and explain, to make judgments. This stage, 
which is the focus of this book, is usually referred to as theory. (p. 9) 
 
This general process substantially reflects the standardized outline we expect 
students to employ when writing competitive rhetorical criticism speeches to-
day: ask a question, observe the phenomenon (apply a rhetorical method to a 
rhetorical artifact as a lens through which to view its properties), and then an-
swer the question (derive critical conclusions). Thus, many judges may well 
believe that they are enhancing the education of the students they critique by 
requiring them to present clear and pointed research questions. In this context, 
the use of research questions is perceived by judge-critics as a valuable addition 
to the educational laboratory. 
 Third, as rhetorical scholars ourselves, we seek to pass on the knowledge of 
our field to our students. We want to aid them as they begin the journey toward 
becoming rhetoricians. Ott (1998) reminds us that ―[t]he academic discipline of 
speech communication and the activity of intercollegiate forensics are natural 
allies….Collectively, these two traditions represent a unique intersection of 
theory and practice (p. 53).‖ Accordingly, LaMaster (2005) observes that ―Rhe-
torical Criticism is modeled after academic rhetorical criticism‖ (p. 32). At some 
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level, we hope and intend that participating in this competitive event will better 
prepare our students for possible future study in the discipline. The value of 
working with this event for students who are considering going on to graduate 
school is often stressed – and indeed, a significant number of forensics competi-
tors ultimately pursue careers in the area of rhetorical scholarship. 
 A fourth reason also can be suggested as to why judge-critics have em-
braced the inclusion of research questions in competitive speeches. As partici-
pants in forensics, we feel a constant pressure toward higher levels of standardi-
zation. We want to be able to evaluate students as fairly as possible. We feel 
pressure to offer ―mainstream‖ comments that demonstrate our understanding of 
and adherence to ―unwritten rules‖ that enhance the do-ability of coaching and 
the predictability of results. As a rising number of our colleagues talk about and 
vote on the basis of research questions, the likelihood that we also will adopt 
this practice increases. Thus, it becomes even more important that we evaluate 
the advantages and disadvantages of this trend now, before it becomes even 
more deeply entrenched in our collective judging paradigm. 
 
Evaluating the “Fit” of the Research 
Question in the Practice of Competitive Rhetorical Criticism 
 In order to conduct this evaluation, it is essential to begin with Littlejohn‘s 
preceding description of the inquiry process. By analyzing the progression he 
describes, we can observe that two critical concepts are central to it: (1) a linear 
time progression, and (2) a step-to-step freedom to make choices at any given 
stage of the process depending on what has happened in the preceding stage. I 
will argue that both of these essential components of the inquiry process are 
impossible to achieve in a genuine way within the current standardized rhetori-
cal criticism model. 
 First, the inquiry process mandates that the research question pre-date the 
selection not only of the general body of theory the researcher employs (Marx-
ism, feminism, or whatever), but also – and much more importantly – precedes 
the selection of the particular rhetorical tenets (―methodological elements‖ we 
often call them in forensics) the critic employs in relation to the general body of 
theory. Thus, the research question points the way to a general critical perspec-
tive, but does not immediately mandate the selection of particular ―methodolog-
ical constructs‖ (those appear later in the process). An extended quotation from 
Ott (1998) helps to clarify the point here: 
 
Modern textbooks on rhetorical criticism survey several methods. These 
methods are unified, not by a set of narrow rhetorical tenets, but by a gener-
al outlook. In Rhetoric and Popular culture, for instance, Brummett identi-
fies five key methods: marxist, feminist and psychoanalytic, dramatis-
tic/narrative, media-centered, and culture-centered. Brock, Scott, and Che-
sebro‘s Methods of Rhetorical Criticism is organized around the methods of 
fantasy-theme, neo-Aristotelianism, dramatistic, narrative, generic, feminist, 
and deconstructionist. Similarly, Foss‘s Rhetorical Criticism covers cluster, 
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neo-Aristotelianism, fantasy-theme, feminist, generic, ideological, narrative, 
and pentadic….All of these methods exist, not as a narrow set of controlling 
terms, but as a general perspective on discourse. Genre criticism generally 
examines the shared expectations created by classes of texts…and so forth. 
This scholarly view of method has two important consequences. First, each 
method can produce an infinitude of distinct, yet valuable analyses. A fe-
minist criticism of a text, for instance, might look at repressed desire, or 
phallic representations, or sexist language, for there is no single, pre-
scribed way to do feminist criticism. Second, any number of methods could 
be brought to bear on a single text, each yielding its own valuable insights. 
(p. 62, emphasis added) 
 
Only after the critic selects her or his general method (their broad critical out-
look) does she or he start to dissect the artifact, studying it closely in order to 
then identify the particular critical constructs that will be useful in order to dis-
sect this particular artifact from this particular general stance. This brings us to 
the second key issue at stake in our discussion: the concept of intellectual free-
dom. To reiterate Ott once more, ―a feminist criticism of a text, for instance, 
might look at repressed desire, or phallic representations, or sexist language, for 
there is no single, prescribed way to do feminist criticism‖ (p. 62, emphasis 
again added). The writer-critic must be free, based on their analysis of the rhe-
torical text at hand, to make choices about which specific rhetorical constructs 
will and will not be essential in order to unlock certain aspects of the text (not all 
aspects) from this particular critical angle, with no presumption being made that 
this is the ―only‖ viable angle, or even necessarily the ―best‖ angle. In fact, the 
words ―only‖ and ―best‖ are invalid and intellectually stunting descriptors of the 
task being attempted.  
 Rhetorical criticism, as practiced in competitive speeches, robs the research 
process of both its temporal flow and its intellectual freedom. We require that 
students model their work after that of a more ―established‖ scholar. According-
ly, we require that they select ―a model‖ and use only the tenets (steps, concepts, 
components) directly employed by that earlier scholar when that scholar ana-
lyzed some other artifact. Ott (1998) again illuminates this process, noting that 
―what passes as method in forensics is simply one critic‘s analysis of a particular 
instance of discourse. Although scholarly critics use methods, such as the ideo-
logical perspective, their analyses are themselves not methods (pp. 62-62).‖ In 
other words, ―feminism‖ is a ―method‖ – but the particular concepts used by 
author Jane Doe to study the feminist aspects of Artifact One do not in and of 
themselves constitute a ―rhetorical method.‖ The pitfalls inherent in this tenden-
cy to misdefine the word ―method‖ are also noted by Ott, when he explains that 
any given author ―identifies certain principles at work in the examined dis-
course, but those principles are not a method. They are the scholar‘s critical 
observations, and when a student uses those observations as a method, the stu-
dent critic is, in effect, pirating someone else‘s critical observations concerning 
a specific rhetorical artifact and forcing those observations to account for anoth-
er instance of discourse‖ (p. 63, emphasis added). Thus, by defining the phrase 
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―rhetorical method‖ in this manner, the following holes in the intellectual 
process inevitably arise. 
 First, students become hopelessly tangled in the intellectual time-
progression they should be following. They are unavoidably locked into an infi-
nitely regressive circle of action. They cannot choose a question then choose a 
(general) rhetorical method then choose relevant constructs, because once they 
get to stage three (choosing relevant constructs) they discover that those con-
cepts have already been chosen for them. They can‘t choose constructs that fit 
their research question, especially as that question applies to the artifact they 
want to study. Instead, they must follow the lead of the earlier author. And that 
earlier author was trying to answer a particular research question of their own in 
relation to a particular artifact of their own choosing. Logically, the only way 
the student can coherently enter this circuit is to use the same research question 
the original author pursued, and to apply it to a rhetorical artifact that is as simi-
lar as possible to the original rhetorical artifact. Doing this is difficult at best and 
impossible in toto. And when the student tries to do anything else, the process 
disintegrates completely. How can they possibly answer a different question 
about a different artifact using the same constructs? Again, Ott explains this 
well: 
 
Competitive RC is still caught in the 1960s model of methodological plural-
ism. Although student criticisms are characterized by a wide variety of 
theories, the overall approach to RC continues to entail a narrow and reduc-
tionistic conception of methods and to be animated by method. In forcing a 
narrow set of principles gleaned from a specific rhetorical analysis to ac-
count for the rhetoric they are analyzing, student critics tend to fall into one 
of two traps. On the one hand, many students mangle a critic‘s controlling 
principles until they fit the discourse they are analyzing. Some students, on 
the other hand, disfigure a discourse until it fits the controlling principles 
found in a published rhetorical analysis. Hence, students shred their artifact 
by ignoring language that does do [sic] not fit the method and by quoting 
textual fragments out of context to create a perfect correspondence between 
text and method. Competitive rhetorical criticisms tend to lack any real ex-
planatory power because they force the practice to fit the theory, or the 
theory to fit the practice. (p. 65) 
 
 Locked into the use of another author‘s ―method‖ (as the term is misde-
fined), students must resolve the time-progression problem by abandoning the 
ideal of freedom. They must march lock-step with the author whose work they 
emulate. Thus, grasping one horn of the dilemma, students who seek to answer 
their artificially-duplicated research questions can only replicate the same an-
swer discovered by the original author. The student can only produce ―unima-
ginative and unenlightening criticism‖ (Ott, 1998, p. 63). The only alternative is 
to grasp the other horn of the conundrum and distort the tool and/or the artifact 
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in a way which produces a ―new answer‖ generated by critical misrepresenta-
tion. Neither horn is educationally appealing. 
 It is important to note that Ott observed this problem arising prior to our 
contemporary addiction to the research question. For him, it is generated by our 
misdefinition of the term ―method‖ alone. And I agree with him. But I take the 
position here that this problem is significantly exacerbated by the movement 
toward including research questions. At an earlier time in our field‘s history, 
students and coaches at some level ―understood‖ that competitive RCs were 
inevitably emulative acts of learning. They have always been similar to the an-
cient practice of ―learning by imitation.‖ This style of teaching has a long and 
respectable history in our field. It dates back to the school of speech founded by 
Isocrates in 392 B.C.E., at which students relied heavily on imitating models in 
order to develop their own skills (Golden, Coleman, Berquist and Sproule, 2003, 
p. 83). In the same way, competitive rhetorical criticism has long encouraged 
students to copy others first (rely on the clusters of critical terms recognized 
scholars in the field have shaped), learn from that, then go on to do more ―origi-
nal‖ work. But our demand that students use research questions (as well as the 
relatively recent escalation in the time allotted to ―critical conclusions‖) produc-
es a significant shift in our mental imaging of the game. Students are now being 
told that they must produce original questions and reach original answers – but 
that they can only do so by using absolutely unoriginal clusters of critical con-
cepts (―methods‖) developed by somebody else to take some other intellectual 
journey. We are asking students to do the ultimately un-doable. 
 
Proposing a Paradigm Shift 
 At least as recently as the early 1980‘s, the typical competitive rhetorical 
criticism speech employed a largely ―imitative‖ approach to the study of rhetori-
cal theory. It relied on requiring students to imitate/emulate the critical process 
followed by established scholars in the field in order to learn through modeling. 
But in recent years, as we have de-emphasized the importance of detailed ―ap-
plication steps‖ and escalated the prominence of ―critical conclusions,‖ as we 
have shifted away from canonical ―mainstream‖ or ―previously discussed‖ rhe-
torical artifacts and toward the study of artifacts typified by ―recency, shock 
value, and obscurity‖ (Ott, 1998, p. 55), we have moved further and further 
away from a primarily imitative approach to writing competitive rhetorical criti-
cisms and evolved toward a writing model that edges closer to the academic 
inquiry process. This evolution is clearly apparent in our recent efforts to graft 
the research question (an element central to the academic inquiry process) onto 
the competitive prototype. Accordingly, we are currently attempting (conscious-
ly or unconsciously) to reap the benefits of two quite different types of teach-
ing/learning approaches: the ―old‖ imitation-based style and an emerging ―aca-
demic inquiry‖ style. While either model in and of itself has value, the two 
simply do not blend very well – and students who attempt to travel down both 
paths at once are very likely to end up writing speeches which distort or misre-
present the learning process, the actual ―process-as-experienced‖ chronology of 
their work, their understanding of theory, their operational definitions of critical 
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constructs, their selection and interpretation of data from the artifact, and the 
conclusions they attempt to reach. 
 I believe that we must abandon the attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable 
and choose between these two models. Or rather, we should make room in this 
competitive event for students to choose (based on their personal and individual 
levels of expertise, based on their personal and individual learning needs) which 
of the two writing models to employ when constructing any given speech. 
 There is no reason why every single rhetorical criticism speech needs to 
cleave to exactly the same writing format. If the goal of forensics is in fact to 
educate students (we return to the philosophical roots established for this paper 
at this point), then we need to coach and judge all competitive events based on 
their ability to enable student learning. Ultimately, I believe that we‘ve gotten 
our priorities turned around. Overall, forensics events have evolved to the point 
that a single ideal unwritten prototype tends to define our thinking relative to 
any given event. This prototype tells us in great detail exactly what the structure, 
content elements, delivery, research base, topic choice and so on of any given 
speech in any given competitive category ―should be.‖ These standardized pro-
totypes make it easier for us to coach any given event, easier for us to judge any 
given event, and easier for students to ―learn the rules to win‖ in any given 
event. But since when is education supposed to be about making things ―easy?‖ 
Granted, any student who follows the prototype will learn ―something.‖ But 
there are so many things that the prototype cannot teach – and so many students 
who will learn the prototype, perfect it, and then ask (in the words of the old 
Peggy Lee song): ―Is that all there is?‖ The answer, of course, is that is not all 
there is. There is so much more to learn, if we‘ll just give ourselves permission 
to teach it and our students permission to immerse themselves in it.  
 Which brings us to a proposal. Let us make room for at least two different 
prototypes in the event we call ―Rhetorical Criticism‖ (―Communication Analy-
sis‖). Students who feel that they can learn more from the imitative approach at 
any given point in their career should be allowed (better yet, encouraged) to re-
vert to the writing style of the early 1980‘s, when comparatively more time and 
effort were invested in the ―application‖ step of the speech, research questions 
were not expected, and critical conclusions (which play a minor role in pub-
lished journal articles anyway) were minor or nonexistent. Students who employ 
this model could ―learn from the masters‖ and dig deep into a set of critical con-
structs deemed coherent by an established scholar. They would be held account-
able for demonstrating a clear, coherent, and detailed ability to understand and 
apply a limited set of critical constructs. Yet, even as we consider returning to 
this model, it is important that such a return should ideally attempt to address 
and resolve some of the problems noted by scholars at that time. For example, as 
noted by Givens (1994, p. 31), Murphy (1988) bemoaned the fact that, even 
twenty years ago, too much speech time was being devoted to the explanation 
and building of method and not enough to actual analysis and application. Ac-
cording to Murphy, as of 1988 ―judges want[ed] an introduction to the method, 
an explanation of the method, an application of the method, and methodological 
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conclusions (p. 4).‖ As a result, according to Givens (1994, p. 31), competitors 
made ―the methodology, not the artifact, the focus of their speeches.‖ A return to 
a model which eliminates research questions and de-emphasizes critical conclu-
sions would still face the challenge of optimally balancing the explanation vs. 
the application of theory. 
 On the other hand, students should also have a second choice. They should 
be able to write speeches which reflect a full and genuine use of the inquiry 
process if they so choose. These students would produce work highly similar to 
what we see published in our professional journals. They would start with a re-
search question, select a ―method‖ (defined as feminism, Marxism, genre criti-
cism, or the like), then select a set of specific critical constructs which they per-
sonally are convinced will operationalize that method for the particular artifact 
they have chosen, then apply these constructs, then draw critical conclusions. In 
other words, the crucial difference between this second model and the style we 
currently employ on the circuit lies in where the precise list of sub-steps or criti-
cal constructs comes from. Under this model, I propose that we abandon the 
search for a particular article or book chapter written by somebody else which 
offers up a pre-digested set of ―steps.‖ These ―steps‖ are in any case a sort of 
Holy Grail which many authors don‘t really offer, even though forensics con-
ventions and terminology compel us to look for these ―concrete lists.‖ These 
conventions pressure us to deduce or identify a ―set of steps‖ which often aren‘t 
there in the original article to begin with. If we simply abandon the search for 
the ―perfect list‖ or the ―ideal article‖ – if we rethink our definition of and ex-
pectations concerning what constitutes a ―critical method‖ – then we can clear 
the way to genuine critical inquiry. Students can create their own ―lists of steps,‖ 
select their own clusters of ―critical constructs,‖ and thus be empowered to ask 
and answer research questions in a much more genuine way. 
 Ultimately, we are drawn back to the question of what philosophy we wish 
to be guided by. Are we really just ―trainers‖ who can coach students to follow a 
set of rules in order to win awards? Or are we in fact educators, who are deter-
mined to offer each student who comes to us an optimal opportunity to learn as 
much as possible from as many different angles as possible in order to develop a 
cognitive groundwork which will serve them well as they move on toward the 
graduate schools (possibly) and careers (probably) and lives (definitely) which 
will follow the brief span of their undergraduate competitive careers? Con-
sciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, every choice we make as 
coaches contributes to the answering of this question – for the circuit at large, 
and for the individual programs we are invested in. Whether or not we include 
research questions in Rhetorical Criticism is just one small piece of this puzzle. 
We are certainly not defined as teachers, or as a community, by the way we re-
spond to this one ―narrow‖ conundrum. But the way we approach the answering 
of this question, wherever we ultimately take our stand, forces us to confront 
basic issues we cannot ignore. How can we refine any given event to ensure that 
it makes logical and theoretical ―sense?‖ How can we make sure that each event 
exists not in ―competitive limbo‖ but rather in relation to our general field of 
study? How can we use each event to teach our students things they don‘t al-
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ready know and skills that will serve them well later? What responsibilities do 
we bear as educators? 
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Distortion in the Description 
of Scholarly Research Methods 





Communication analysis, or rhetorical criticism, has been my favorite event 
since I first competed in the category my senior year of college. Now as a coach, 
I enjoy watching my students wrestle with academic theory as they struggle to 
communicate arguments. Students who initially found the event intimidating are 
drawn to its lure as an activity which challenges them to see social events from a 
constantly changing perspective. Ballots present new questions never consi-
dered, which often lead to further revisions as the student tries to master her or 
his analysis. I am always eager to judge this category. I am continually im-
pressed with the critical observations our students are making. As Rosenthal 
(1985) argues ―The roots of intercollegiate forensics are planted firmly in the 
field of rhetoric. Thus, rhetorical criticism is one of the most important speaking 
events, since it may be used to educate students in the scholarly intricacies of the 
academic parent‖ (p. 137). Simply put, I never tire of this event.  
As with all love affairs, however, the object of my affection has flaws. I 
have tried my best to ignore or rationalize these flaws. I argue with myself that 
the event just needs more time, perhaps two more minutes, to really show its 
potential. Maybe all the event lacks is an opportunity to ask and answer ques-
tions. But now that communication analysis and I have been together for nearly 
two decades, I must come to terms with the fact that our relationship is growing 
stale. Older, I am no longer comfortable embracing an event that is not meeting 
its full pedagogical potential.  
Since the inception of the event, forensic educators have struggled to define 
their expectations for competitive rhetorical criticism or communication analy-
sis. Harris (1987) writes ―rhetorical criticism means different things to different 
parts of the forensic community and the result is confusion about how the event 
should be judged and prepared and what expectations we have regarding the 
final product‖ (p. 21). Yet if this is still indeed the case, I wonder why of all the 
events it seems to have become one of the most standardized. Ott (1998) argues 
―certain identifiable traits pervade the event of rhetorical criticism; moreover, 
judges police and thereby reinforce these traits through their judging practices‖ 
(54). According to Ott (1998), these traits include; topics driven by ―recency, 
shock value, and obscurity‖ (p. 55); ―a three-point organizational pattern featur-
ing method, application, and implications‖ (p. 56); a method which ―drives the 
analysis section‖ (p. 57); and a final section ―proving the rhetor was a rhetorical 
success or failure‖ (p. 57). Like Ott (1998), I find myself most troubled by the 
way the event has been driven to a limited definition of what is an appropriate 
methodology for a rhetorical criticism. He argues, ―In forensics, a rhetorical 
109
et al.: Complete Volume (46)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2016
 106 Speaker & Gavel 2009 
  
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 46 (2009) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
 
method most often refers to a student‘s reduction of a practicing critic‘s rhetori-
cal analysis to a set of key principles‖ (Ott, 1998, p. 56). In practice, this means 
a student is allowed to use one (and on rare occasions two) scholarly publica-
tions from which to pull her or his analytical framework.  
Dean and Benoit‘s (1984) content analysis of ballots in rhetorical criticism 
revealed ―Judges indicate that they consider it the critic‘s task to choose one 
approach and then justify the utility of that selection‖ (p. 105). The justification 
for this limited approach is based on the idea that ―methodology provides a nar-
rowing function so that the student can hope to fit the analysis and criticism into 
the ten minute framework which is mandated by the contest situation‖ (Dean, 
1985, p.121). This ―narrowing function‖ is where many of my concerns with the 
event are found. Specifically, in this article I am concerned with our expecta-
tions regarding how students select and apply ―methods‖ to their chosen topics. I 
argue that due to artificial expectations dictated by the unwritten rules of the 
event, students are not able to engage in accurate application of their selected 
scholarly articles. I will develop this argument by examining four communica-
tion analysis speeches presented in final rounds at the AFA-NIET to determine 
how accurately these students explain and represent their selected scholarship. I 
conclude the essay by offering suggestions for how we can encourage students 
to incorporate rhetorical theory into speeches in a more educationally sound 
way. 
 
Analysis of Student Speeches 
In an effort to offer the most accurate analysis of current practice, I random-
ly selected my sample speeches from the twelve speeches presented in the 2007 
and 2008 AFA-NIET final rounds of communication analysis. Before selecting 
my sample, I made certain I could locate all twelve of the scholarly articles the 
students cited as the sources for their methodologies. Once I had collected the 
articles, I randomly drew the names of the four students whose speeches I would 
analyze. Once my sample was finalized, I viewed each of the four speeches and 
transcribed all elements of the speeches pertaining to the explanation of the se-
lected methodologies. I then carefully read each of the scholarly articles, com-
paring the content of the articles to my transcriptions of each speech. I took note 
of any instances when I perceived there to be inaccuracies between the argu-
ments stated in the articles cited and the explanations given by the students in 
the speeches. When discrepancies were noted, I would watch the speech again to 
verify the accuracy of my transcriptions. 
Before moving into the results of my analysis, I would like to offer an ex-
planation regarding how I categorized two distinct approaches to utilizing scho-
larly articles as sources for methodologies. German (1985) compares critical 
methodologies in rhetorical criticism to camera lenses which ―provide varied 
perspectives on the photographer‘s subject‖ (p. 86). In my experience as a 
coach, there seem to be two main ways to use an article as the method, or lens, 
for a communication analysis or rhetorical criticism speech. Essentially, the me-
thod is what allows one to build their analysis, and this is guided by either the 
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―blue print‖ or the ―tool box‖ approach. In the blue print approach, a student will 
use an article that clearly lays out specific steps or stages a rhetor must follow in 
order to accomplish some rhetorical act. In a sense, the student layers the preex-
isting blueprint on his/her artifact and shows how the concepts appear in the 
application. The tool box approach, however, is not nearly as tidy. Here, the 
student, usually with the help of a coach, extracts a framework from the article. 
The ideas used for the analysis are present in the article, but not mapped out in 
any clearly identifiable way. Essentially, the student picks and chooses the ideas 
that are needed to conduct the analysis. German (1985) warns, however, that 
―because distortions of complex systems of thought are not acceptable, a critic 
should be careful when using only selected aspects of the methodology‖ (p. 96). 
Generally, as long as the tools are indeed found in the article, and the combined 
use of those tools does not create major contradictions, this approach can be an 
effective way to manage the significant constraint of having to explain a method 
for analysis in no more than 3 minutes.  
The first speech I selected for my analysis was delivered at the 2007 AFA-
NIET. Hopper‘s (2007) speech analyzes the ―Ova the Rainbow‖ web site, which 
is sponsored by an egg donation and surrogacy agency. Hopper asks the research 
question, ―Does the new advertising and selection process of ―OvatheRain-
bow.com‖ rhetorically commodify human life?‖ To analyze this artifact, Hopper 
utilized Hirschman and Hill‘s (2000) article, ―On Human Commoditization and 
Resistance: A Model Based on Buchenwald Concentration Camp.‖ In her 
speech, Hopper seeks to argue that the Ova The Rainbow web site functions to 
commodify the women who choose to serve as egg donors for the agency. In 
that the article provides a clear model, her use of this essay places her in the 
―blueprint‖ category. 
 My analysis of Hopper‘s (2007) speech reveals several concerns re-
garding the accuracy with which the original article is applied in the speech. My 
first observation is Hopper gave the incorrect article title and publication date 
for the method. Hopper cites the article as ―On human commodification and 
resistance‖ as published in the June 2006 Journal of Psychology and Marketing. 
The article, however, seems to only appear in the June 2000 issue of Psychology 
and Marketing and the full title is ―On human commoditization and resistance: 
A model based on Buchenwald concentration camp‖. I assume the discrepancy 
in the date is the result of a memorization error, rather than any calculated at-
tempt to alter the citation. Additionally, students often drop the secondary level 
of an article title to either avoid confusion or save time. Of far greater concern to 
me, however, is that the term commoditization is replaced in the title of the ar-
ticle, as well as throughout Hopper‘s speech, as commodification. At no point in 
Hirschman and Hill‘s (2000) essay do they use the term commodification. They 
specifically state, ―Our intention is to construct a model of human commoditiza-
tion derived from a historic instance of this process‖ (Hirschman & Hill, 2000, 
p. 470). They define commoditization as ―the transformation of a human being 
into the property of another person" (Hirschman & Hill, 2000, p. 469-470) and 
clearly indicate that they are basing their work in the original model of commo-
ditization as presented by Kopytoff (1986). Hopper gives no nod to the fact Hir-
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schman and Hill‘s model is not original, nor does she explain her choice to use 
the term commodification rather than commoditization.  
A brief investigation of the terms in several online dictionaries reveals that 
the words can be used interchangeably and are often considered synonyms. Yet, 
I can think of no reason, other than a memorization or clerical error, why a 
speaker would not honor the original choice of the authors. This seems especial-
ly important when Hirschman and Hill (2000) are clearly building off the work 
of a previous scholar who chose the term commoditization rather than commodi-
fication. Although little is lost in the meaning of the term substitution, I will 
admit it took me considerably longer to track down Hopper‘s (2007) method 
than it did to find others included in this study.  
Other inconsistencies between the original article and Hopper‘s (2007) 
speech occurred with respect to how she explained and applied the principles of 
the commoditization process. Initially, Hopper describes the first stage of the 
process, ‗pre-commodification,‘ [sic] as ―recognition and identification of 
wanted and unwanted characteristics in a product.‖ This definition, however, is 
not mentioned in any form in the two paragraph explanation of this stage of the 
process as given by Hirschman and Hill. In fact, the explanation of pre-
commoditization given in the article makes no mention of products, but rather is 
focused on consumers and their choices. Hirschman and Hill (2000) define the 
pre-commoditization stage as one where people ―are assumed at the outset to 
enjoy all the rights and privileges of selfhood‖ (p. 474). Consistent with the ar-
ticle, Hopper does explain how our collective purchase choices come to define 
us as individuals. What she does not clarify, however, is according to Hirschman 
and Hill, when one becomes a commoditized person, the previously unimportant 
consumption decisions become crucial to personal identity. They argue, ―The 
absence of meaningful choice can wreak havoc on the maintenance of selfhood 
and identity‖ (Hirschman & Hill, 2000, p. 474). Given the article is analyzing 
the narratives of those who were held as Nazi prisoners at Buchenwald, to ig-
nore the significance a loss of consumer agency has on the commoditized seems 
fundamental to the method and problematic that it is not mentioned in Hoppers 
speech.  
When Hopper explains the second stage of the process, initiation, she does 
discuss the stripping of individuality felt by the commodified [sic] but still does 
not clarify the importance of the loss of agency. Rather she focuses on how the 
loss of the commodified‘s [sic] individuality results in the person being seen as a 
unit who is ―assigned an identifier such as a number‖ (Hopper 2007). Although 
the explanation of the method in the article does not mention the assignment of 
identifiers, the application section does use the example of camp prisoners being 
assigned serial numbers and colored triangles as a means to externally impose a 
new identity. My analysis shows Hopper‘s discussion of the second stage of the 
commoditization process to be the most consistent with the article. 
Hopper‘s (2007) discussion of the third stage of the commoditization 
process reveals further inconsistencies with the original article. Hirschman and 
Hill (2000) label the third stage of the process ―Externally Imposed Maintenance 
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of Commoditization versus Resistance to Commoditization‖ (p. 474) which 
Hopper abbreviates to simply ―Externally Imposed Maintenance‖. Due to time 
constraints, speakers often need to abbreviate or revise labels found in a selected 
method, but my concern with this relabeling by Hopper is by truncating the label 
she ignores the key aspect of this stage of the commoditization process. Accord-
ing to Hirschman and Hill (2000), this stage of the process focuses heavily on 
the idea that ―those enforcing commoditization will do so by restricting all mea-
ningful consumer-behavior choice‖ (p. 475). Hopper makes no mention of con-
sumer behavior, once again ignoring the agency of the commoditized. The major 
misrepresentation of the method is found, however, in that the authors clearly 
imply that at this stage of the process there is ―an ongoing struggle‖ (Hirschman 
& Hill, 2000, p. 474) between those seeking to commoditize others and those 
struggling to resist that commoditization. At no point in her explanation of the 
method or during the application of the method to her artifact, does Hopper 
make mention of the presence of a struggle between the commoditizer and the 
commoditized.  
Essentially, Hopper (2007) has removed any aspect of agency of the com-
moditized from her discussion. Perhaps this choice would not bother me if the 
subject of Hirschman and Hill‘s (2000) essay wasn‘t one of the most horrific 
examples of human commoditization in history. To not mention the significant 
role of resistance in the process seems to remove the one shred of agency the 
commoditized still have. Ignoring that element of the article is somewhat like 
Hopper‘s own version of ideological commoditization of Hirschman and Hill‘s 
article. The difficulties Hopper has in accurately representing her selected scho-
larly article are directly tied to the constraints she must deal with as a speaker in 
this competitive context. Judges will not allow her to ignore or adapt a step in an 
established model, but she is also dealing with a time limit which prevents her 
from ever fully explaining every nuance in the methodology. It is highly possi-
ble the distinction was present in an earlier draft of the speech. My assessment is 
that Hopper‘s inaccuracies with respect to the application of this segment of the 
method are significant, but short of using an entirely different article, I am un-
sure how she could fully explain the tension between the commoditizer and 
commoditized.  
The second speech I selected for my analysis was presented at the 2008 
AFA-NIET. Moscaritolo‘s (2008) speech analyzes the ―Blasphemy Challenge,‖ 
which is a call for people to denounce the Holy Spirit in self-posted videos on 
you-tube, as presented on www.blasphemychallenge.com. He asks the question, 
―How effectively does the Blasphemy Challenge‘s use of coming out rhetoric 
give voice to the American atheist movement?‖ To analyze this project, Mosca-
ritolo used Chirrey‘s February 2003 Journal of Sociolinguistics article, ―‘I here-
by come out‘: What sort of speech act is coming out?‖ which he inaccurately 
cited as being from the July 2003 issue. Given that the actual month does not 
appear on the printed copy of the article, and one must look specifically at the 
electronic index to verify the publication month, his citation error is understand-
able. In that the article centers around the presentation of interview data, does 
not provide a clear model or process to be followed and Moscaritolo extracts his 
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framework from the general ideas of the essay, he is using the ―toolbox‖ ap-
proach to constructing his method.  
In his explanation of the base assumptions guiding the article, unlike Hop-
per (2007) who neglected to mention the theoretical base on which her authors‘ 
grounded their article, Moscaritolo (2008) does indicate that Chirrey‘s (2003) 
study is grounded in an understanding of J.L. Austin‘s concept of speech acts. 
He specifically mentions prelocutionary acts which are those that produce psy-
chological consequences. Although Chirrey does define Austin‘s concepts of 
locutionary and illocutionary acts as well, Moscaritolo‘s choice to reference 
only prelocutionary acts is justified because the article focuses on ―the extent to 
which and the ways in which the speaker‘s and hearer‘s realities are altered‖ in 
the utterance of coming out (Chirrey, 2003, p. 26). Although he does not go into 
detail regarding the performative aspects of such speech acts, Moscaritolo is 
able to make his reference to Austin in one brief clause, therefore adding accu-
racy to his interpretation of Chirrey‘s article without taking too much of his li-
mited time.  
The accuracy with which he sets up the general assumption of Chirrey‘s ar-
ticle, however, is not consistent with the remainder of his speech. My major 
concern with Moscaritolo‘s speech is that he seems to have taken a very liberal 
approach to the toolbox style of method construction. He states Chirrey ―articu-
lates three main tenets‖ which he labels ―external catalyst; listener response; and 
collective representation‖ (Moscaritolo 2008). This wording implies that Chirrey 
is presenting clear argument claims related to each of these ―tenets‖. A close 
reading of Chirrey‘s article does not easily reveal the argument sources for these 
tenets. I believe misleading statements such as this are common in competition 
given that judges expect clearly identifiable steps or stages which they can out-
line and then follow throughout the second point. If one is using the toolbox 
approach to building a method for analysis, competitive success hinges on the 
student‘s ability to present those ideas as if they appeared in the article as bolded 
subject headings. 
Initially, when describing the first tenet, Moscaritolo (2008) states, ―Chirrey 
finds that the choice to come out is often catalyzed by an external force‖ and 
then he cites Chirrey‘s example of a lesbian whose ―choice to come out was in 
response to her relatives constantly asking when she would get married‖. At no 
point in Chirrey‘s article do I find a direct discussion of the necessity of a cata-
lyst in order for someone to come out. In fact, the example Moscaritolo offers is 
actually found in a section of the article where Chirrey is describing the ex-
pected outcomes many gays and lesbians hope to experience as a result of com-
ing out. Chirrey (2003) states, ―One lesbian told me that her hoped-for outcomes 
included that relatives would stop asking her when she would get married‖ (p. 
34). The presence of a catalyst motivating coming out statements seems some-
what self-evident, but my reading of the article does not identify this as one of 
Chirrey‘s main lines of argument. I do not disagree with Moscaritolo‘s claim 
regarding the importance of a catalyst; I just disagree with the isolation of this 
idea as a specific tenet found in Chirrey‘s article. 
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When explaining the second tenet, Moscaritolo (2008) states, ―Chirrey ar-
gues that coming out is dependent on the listener‘s subsequent behavior and 
thoughts‖. This is consistent with my reading of Chirrey‘s (2003) article, in that 
to truly explore the prelocutionary aspect of the ac t of coming out, the vast ma-
jority of her essay focuses on the reactions of listeners to coming out statements. 
She offers numerous examples of both positive and negative reactions from lis-
teners. The example provided by Moscaritolo to correspond with his explanation 
of this idea fits well with the argument and is explained in a way consistent with 
how the example was originally used by Chirrey.  
Moscaritolo (2008) explains his third tenet as the argument that ―coming 
out creates a collective representation‖ and then describes Chirrey‘s example of 
how the British media represented the coming out of British Pop Idol, Will 
Young. The way Moscaritolo frames this example, however, is not consistent 
with Chirrey‘s use. In her article, Chirrey (2003) argues she seeks to ―examine 
the diversity of prelocutionary acts in which a coming-out locution may result‖ 
(p. 31). She recognizes ―subjectivity has an influence on the prelocutionary acts 
of coming out‖ (Chirrey, 2003, p.31). To illustrate this argument, when describ-
ing the experiences of Will Young, she cited both positive and negative media 
portrayals of Young‘s statements. For example, she reports The Guardian 
―frames Young‘s action in terms of a neutral act of revelation of information 
that is viewed in a non-judgmental way‖ (Chirrey, 2003, p.32). She also offers 
examples of newspapers that framed Young‘s statements as an ―admission‖ or 
―confession‖ thus identifying his homosexual identity as something criminal or 
deviant. Moscaritolo limits his interpretation of Chirrey‘s argument to these 
negative examples, ignoring the possibility that a coming out statement could 
result in a positive collective representation. Although I do not disagree with 
Moscaritolo‘s identification of collective representations, I am concerned with 
his framing of this tenet as primarily a negative outcome. As with my critique of 
Hopper‘s (2007) speech, I suspect this decision was driven by time constraints, 
rather than any calculated attempt to disregard an aspect of Chirrey‘s article.  
The third speech I selected for my analysis was presented in 2007. Schultz‘s 
(2007) speech analyzes the Washington Defense of Marriage Alliance‘s success-
ful effort to send forward ballot initiative 957. This initiative satirically called 
for all heterosexual couples in the state of Washington to prove the biological 
ability to procreate before being allowed to marry as well as produce a child 
within three years to avoid having the marriage annulled. Schultz analyzes this 
satirical movement asking the question, ―How does the introduction of a law 
shape the culture around a particular social issue?‖ He uses James Boyd White‘s 
essay, ―Law as rhetoric, rhetoric as law: The arts of cultural and communal life‖ 
published in the summer 1985 University of Chicago Law Review as the source 
for his critical method. Schultz argues that because the article ―examines the 
way that law communicatively reflects and shapes culture‖ it is a useful lens 
through which to process his artifact. White‘s essay offers Schultz a toolbox 
from which to build his analytical framework, but as compared to other speech-
es, this toolbox is more neatly organized. Although Schultz does need to extract 
the framework he uses, his first two tenets are clearly previewed as main argu-
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ments of a core section of the essay. The third tenet is pulled from a synthesis of 
the overall argument of the piece. 
Initially, Schultz (2007) does an excellent job of summarizing the main idea 
of the essay into a concise yet highly accurate overview. Schultz explains White 
(1985) ―rejects the traditional Western notion of law as synonymous with au-
thority, instead adopting a more classical notion of law as a series of discourses; 
as an ongoing conversation.‖ This is consistent with the opening paragraph of 
White‘s essay where he writes, ―law is most usefully seen not, as it usually is by 
academics and philosophers, as a system of rules, but as a branch of rhetoric…as 
the central art by which community and culture are established, maintained and 
transformed‖ (White, 1985, p. 684). My only concern with how Schultz contex-
tualizes the essay is that he argues White ―steeps‖ his writings ―heavily in com-
munication theory‖ when White actually focuses exclusively on rhetorical 
theory. The distinction is not imperative, as one can easily argue rhetoric is a 
branch of communication theory.  
Schultz‘ (2007) explanation of the first two tenets of his framework is quite 
consistent with how White (1985) presents the ideas in the essay. The first two 
tenets are pulled from the third main section of the article where White outlines 
what he views as the ―three aspects of the lawyer‘s work‖ (688). Although 
White does not give these aspects tidy labels, the tags Schultz applies to the ar-
guments are tightly grounded in the text. Schultz calls the first tenet, ―law as 
rhetoric‖ and explains that this means a lawyer is a rhetor who is expected to 
speak in the language of his or her ―time and place.‖ This is clearly grounded in 
White‘s (1985) argument that, ―the lawyer, like any rhetorician, must always 
start by speaking the language of his or her audience, whatever it may be‖ (p. 
688). Schultz refers to examples given by White to help explain this idea. 
Schultz (2007) labels the second tenet ―legal rhetoric as ever changing‖ and 
explains this as the principle that it is a lawyer‘s responsibility to change lan-
guage in order to fit strategic needs, in that the lawyer must not just interpret a 
case, but also help determine how we should talk about the case. This is consis-
tent with White‘s (1985) explanation of the second aspect of a lawyer‘s work 
which he argues, ―For in speaking the language of the law, the lawyer must al-
ways be ready to try to change it…. That is, the lawyer is always saying not on-
ly, ‗here is how this case should be decided,‘ but also, ‗Here—in this lan-
guage—is the way this case and similar cases should be talked about‘‖ (p. 690). 
Schultz starts to drift from the neatly organized part of the toolbox when he 
identifies the third tenet he wishes to use from the essay. Whereas White (1985) 
explains the third aspect of a lawyer‘s work is an acceptance of ―ethical or 
communal character, or its socially constitutive nature‖ (p. 690), Schultz choos-
es to not discuss the link to ethos, but focuses only on the aspect of what he la-
bels ―legal rhetoric as constitutive‖. Schultz describes the third tenet of his me-
thod as the idea ―in any legal proceedings, some narratives are privileged over 
others‖ and as a result, ―the persons or social groups associated with those narra-
tives are also privileged, thereby reshaping the fabric of our society‖. Toward 
the end of the essay when White (1985) begins to synthesize his ideas, he writes, 
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―The basic idea of the legal hearing is that two stories will be told in opposition 
or competition and a choice made between them‖ (697). Thus, although Schultz 
is basically building a specific tenet for analysis from one of the most general 
arguments of the essay as a whole, the argument is clearly present in the essay as 
the constitutive nature of legal rhetoric is White‘s primary claim.  
Of the speeches analyzed, Schultz (2007) provides the most accurate repre-
sentation of his selected article. This may in part be due to the fact that White‘s 
(1985) article offers the freedom of a toolbox approach while also giving some 
clear organizational clues regarding his key arguments. Schultz, therefore, can 
select the aspects of the article that best meet his needs, but is not at as much 
risk as Moscaritolo (2008) who had to do more to impose an artificial structure 
on the ideas found in his article. 
The final speech I analyzed for this project was presented in 2008. Conner‘s 
(2008) speech analyzes people‘s nonviolent reactions to the interactive video art 
installation ―Domestic Tension.‖ This installation appeared at Chicago‘s Flatfile 
Gallery, but anyone could logon and take part in the experience which involved 
allowing people to shoot the artist with a remote control paintball gun. Some 
participants responded by creating a virtual shield to protect the artist. It is this 
response that Conner explores by asking the question, ―How did participation in 
interactive violence encourage some players to adopt non-violent rhetoric?‖ To 
explore this issue, Conner used Shuen-shing Lee‘s essay ―‘I lose, therefore I 
think‘: A search for contemplation amid wars of push-button glare‖ found in the 
December 2003 online journal Game Studies: The International Journal of 
Computer Game Research. She suggests that because this article ―attempts to 
explain why some violent video games cause players to act or think in a non-
violent way‖ it is an appropriate method to use when examining Domestic Ten-
sion. My main concern with Conner‘s application of this essay springs from her 
justification statement. Lee explains the goal of the essay is to examine comput-
er games ―imbued with socio-political critique‖ which he describes as games 
involving ―a careful examination of certain aspects of society, often self-
reflexively criticizing the dominant tendencies of the game industry itself. They 
appropriate and twist the established gaming models and schemas of popular 
games. These re-calibrations challenge the supposition that games equal fun‖ 
(para 1). Therefore, the purpose of his essay is to explore how such games result 
in contemplative or critical thinking rather than nonviolence. Clearly a cognitive 
response can be considered nonviolent, but Conner‘s justification of the method 
implies that the article‘s main focus is on the nonviolent actions of gamers ra-
ther than the ways such games influence gamers‘ critical reflections of the game 
industry itself. 
Conner (2008) also uses the toolbox approach to building a critical frame-
work. Lee‘s (2003) essay is essentially a discussion of several games which he 
describes as art games, or those that are ―serious in their desire to transform 
games into a medium of expression for voices unheard, visions seldom seen‖ 
(para. 30). He turns to current scholarly critiques of video games to guide his 
analysis. From Lee‘s article, Conner extracts three ―qualities‖ that need to be 
present in a video game if ―players will respond with nonviolent rhetoric‖. As 
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previously stated, this misrepresents the article, in that Lee is discussing the 
qualities of art games which lead gamers to critical reflection of the violence 
present in games not their nonviolent responses. With the exception of the third 
quality, however, I am able to find clear links between Conner‘s selected tools 
and Lee‘s arguments. 
Initially, Conner (2008) explains that in order for there to be a nonviolent 
response to a video game, ―the game must be endless.‖ She explains this as the 
idea that regardless of the actions taken in the game it will continue indefinitely. 
Her assessment is that the ―endlessness of the game represents the endlessness 
of violence‖. This is consistent with Lee‘s arguments with respect to how art 
games can lead to critical reflection among gamers. He describes such games as 
having, ―a metaphorical end, en route to which a specific kind of player is able 
to realize the implications of "to lose" in an intentionally un-winnable form‖ 
(Lee, 2003, para.11). Conner references Lee‘s example of the game New York 
Defender where players unsuccessfully try to protect New York from a terrorist 
attack. Because the attackers continue to multiply, there is no way for the gamer 
to successfully intercept them all. Thus, the game never ends and the message is 
that it is impossible to stop the violence of terrorism.  
Conner (2008) states the second quality needed in a game to provoke a non-
violent response is ―the game must avoid score keeping.‖ Lee (2003) spends a 
significant portion of his article discussing how art games do not keep score in 
the traditional manner of other video games. He suggests that by ―Faithfully 
addressing painful issues of the real world, both games [New York Defender and 
Kabul Kaboom] ‗show‘ their message in action rather than ‗tell‘ it in a non-
interactive statement, an accomplishment made possible mainly by the anti-
competitive twist of the you-never-win form‖ (Lee, 2003, para. 8). Conner‘s 
explanation of this quality as the idea that one ―can‘t be a winner in a situation 
where people must risk their lives to find food‖ is consistent with Lee‘s (2003) 
assessment that an art game ―embodies a tragic form‖ by illustrating the real 
horrors of the daily lives of those ―characters‖ often depicted in traditional video 
games (para 2). Thus, Conner is accurate in her use of the argument the lack of 
score keeping in a videogame leads to a nontraditional response to that game. 
Although I can find evidence of the first two qualities Conner (2008) dis-
cusses, I struggled to determine a direct link in Lee‘s (2003) article to her third 
quality which she states is ―games must produce feelings of guilt‖. At no point 
in the article do I find a discussion of guilt. Lee does mention the idea of regret 
as it relates to how gamers bemoan choices they made during the game that hin-
dered their performance. Yet this discussion does not link to feelings of guilt. 
My assessment is Conner is equating Lee‘s discussion of basic critical disson-
ance a gamer feels when playing an art game with a more specific feeling of 
guilt guided by ethical concerns. Conner states Lee argues for a game to provoke 
nonviolent rhetoric, it uses realistic elements which ―forces players to consider 
the ethical implications of their actions in the game.‖ Lee does discuss how the 
use of real identities in a game can lead a player to engage in social critique, and 
he does cite the same example Conner provides, but he does not tie this to spe-
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cific feelings of guilt. Lee (2003) describes such elements as transforming ―play 
from a gaming action into a thinking event, from a means of fun-seeking to a 
schema for the revelation of the games' critical engagement (para. 26). By link-
ing this argument to issues of guilt and ethical implications, Conner seems to be 
overreaching what Lee is arguing. Conner adds an element of value judgment to 
an argument where Lee is suggesting critical reflection. In that Conner bases the 
answer to her stated research question on the fulfillment of this third tenet, the 
inaccuracy of this representation of the article is concerning. I do not dispute 
Conner‘s evaluation of the situation she is analyzing, only her interpretation of 
Lee‘s stance. Once again, much like the other speeches analyzed, I suspect this 
discrepancy has much more to do with Conner‘s obligations as a speaker to 
mimic a standardized speech format, than any strategic choice to misrepresent 
the article. 
 
Discussion and Recommendations 
My analysis of these four speeches revealed all of the speakers have pre-
sented, to varying degrees, inaccuracies between their original scholarly articles 
and how they represent that scholarship in their speeches. Some of these inaccu-
racies can be explained by simple human error. Often when a student is memo-
rizing a speech, details such as the exact month in which a publication appeared 
get misconstrued. This does not excuse the inaccuracies, but rather serves as a 
reminder to coaches that we should periodically do a ―fact check‖ with our stu-
dents‘ speeches to verify that the citations and quotations in the original manu-
script are indeed what have been memorized. I honestly believe many of the 
discrepancies found in student speeches are the result of busy lives and over-
crowded minds. I would rather see us focus our efforts on being more careful 
than wasting time assessing the motives of our peers. 
As a forensic educator, the larger level inaccuracies I identified cause me 
significant discomfort. As a scholar I respect the obligation we have to represent 
each other‘s work in a way that is accurate and respectful. Yet, at the same time, 
as an educator I also understand the limitations with which my students are 
working. I therefore must agree with Paine (2008) when he wrote of rhetorical 
criticism, ―We are asking students to do the ultimately un-doable‖ (p. 125). I 
support Kay and Aden (1989) who wrote ―We maintain that the use of metho-
dology hurts, rather than helps, student efforts to provide original insight. The 
method tells students what to find and how it should be presented – a recipe in 
all sense of the word‖ (p. 35). I believe we as coaches and judges are responsible 
for developing unobtainable expectations for this event. In our attempts to create 
standardization for evaluation (Dean 1985; Larson 1985; Harris 1987), we have 
created a situation where our students must cut corners and engage in academic 
practices we would not accept in any other educational setting. With this as-
sessment in mind, I propose we need to seriously consider dismantling some of 
the destructive norms we have created. 
Neither the AFA-NIET nor NFA event descriptions dictate such a limited 
conceptualization of methodology be used in communication analysis or rhetori-
cal criticism speeches. The AFA-NIET description explains the event is, ―de-
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signed to offer an explanation and/or evaluation of a communication event such 
as a speech, speaker, movement, poem, poster, film, campaign, etc., through the 
use of rhetorical principles‖ (AFA-NIET 2006-2007 Description of Events). 
Nowhere in this event description does it mandate these principles must be 
found in easily applied units of three tenets and pulled from a recently published 
book or article. These are constraints we ourselves have imposed on the event. 
The NFA event description for rhetorical criticism is not quite as general, as it 
explains the event is ―designed to offer an explanation and/or evaluation of a 
rhetorical event. Any legitimate critical methodology is permissible‖ (NFA By-
laws). NFA does use the term methodology. Yet current practice in academic 
rhetorical criticism allows for significant flexibility in the interpretation of this 
term. I propose we follow this lead in our own competitive practice and support 
Murphy (1988) who argued twenty years ago, ―The importance attached to the 
development of the methodology in the student speech, however, should be re-
duced‖ (p.8). As I agree with Kay and Aden (1989) who state in response to 
Murphy ―if we abandon the idea of theoretical foundation entirely, we find our-
selves without standards‖ (p. 36) I am not yet willing to completely relinquish a 
critical lens through which to guide analysis, but I am ready to search for some 
alternatives. 
I am most drawn to the ideas advocating the use of a broad theoretical pers-
pective as a student‘s guiding analytical framework. This idea has been pre-
sented by various scholars over the course of the past two decades (Kay & 
Aden, 1989; Ott, 1998; Paine, 2008) yet we have not yet allowed ourselves to 
relinquish the comfort provided by event standardization in order to move for-
ward. Initially, Kay and Aden (1989) argue that students should use a ―perspec-
tive rather than a set of labels‖ (p. 36). They hope to find an approach that will 
respect ―the need and desirability of both an established theoretical approach 
and independent student insight‖ (Kay & Aden, 1989, p. 37). They suggest the 
community embrace the use of a critical perspective which they define as: 
 
A critical perspective differs from a methodology in that no concrete step-
by-step instructions are laid out; a perspective is basically a theoretical 
foundation from which the student can build his or her own ideas within the 
province of rhetoric. Students borrow the basic ideas of rhetorical scholars 
to make their own ideas clearer and more complete (Kay & Aden, 1989, p. 
37) 
 
Ott‘s (1998) suggestions for improvement are consistent with Kay & Aden. 
Ott references rhetorical criticism textbooks which organize methods into gener-
al categories related to the types of questions they can answer and how they ap-
proach discourse as a broad concept. He addresses the criticism this approach 
will result in students falling into the habit of using only a handful of well 
known traditional scholars stating, ―each method can produce an infinitude of 
distinct, yet valuable analyses. A feminist criticism of a text, for instance, might 
look at repressed desire, or phallic representations, or sexist language, for there 
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is no single, prescribed way to do feminist criticism‖ (Ott, 1998, p. 62). Had our 
community allowed Moscaritolo (2008) the use of a general perspective in guid-
ing his analysis, rather than the limiting constraint of having to select one scho-
larly article, he may have been able to turn to current writings in queer theory 
that clearly do indicate the presence of a catalyst in coming out rhetoric. He then 
could have used the Chirrey (2003) article to support his claim coming out rhe-
toric can be applied to a variety of situations where one finds him or herself 
marginalized and maligned. Further, Conner (2008) could have embraced the 
general concept of cognitive dissonance as a theoretical perspective which she 
could have then layered into a discussion of how interactive violent games can 
provoke critical thought. Rather than closing doors, this approach seems to open 
them. 
Some skeptics of this approach argue undergraduate students are not yet 
able to handle the difficulties of being responsible for exploring multiple rhetor-
ical perspectives. In fact, some critics also question the ability of judges to eva-
luate speeches grounded in less specific critical frameworks. Paine (2008) offers 
an intriguing compromise. Although Paine reached his conclusions based on his 
critique of our activity‘s commitment to the obligatory research question in 
communication analysis and rhetorical criticism, his recommendations serve my 
purposes quite well. Paine (2008) suggests we need not formally ―choose‖ an 
acceptable formula for the event for ―if the goal of forensics is in fact to educate 
students…then we need to coach and judge all competitive events based on their 
ability to enable student learning‖ (p. 125). To that end, he suggests novice 
competitors be encouraged to use the ―imitative‖ approach to the event that was 
popular in the early 1980s. This approach, which is much like what I have 
termed the ―blueprint‖ style of method development, ―relied on requiring stu-
dents to imitate/emulate the critical process followed by established scholars in 
the field in order to learn through modeling‖ (Paine, 2008, p. 125). I would sug-
gest these students return to using the primary works upon which so many aca-
demic works have been based. There is a reason scholars continue to turn to 
influences such as Bitzer, Burke, Foucault, and Condit. These scholars have 
offered us important understandings about how rhetorical arguments function. 
Why do we expect our forensic students to ignore these influences in speeches 
when in our classes we still teach these theories as fundamental? Students 
choosing this approach would, ―dig deep into a set of critical constructs deemed 
coherent by an established scholar‖ (Paine, 2008, p. 126). This approach is not 
unlike popular assignments in introductory rhetorical criticism courses and will 
serve to introduce forensic students to the concept of rhetorical analysis. 
For those students who wish to push themselves with the event, Paine 
(2008) offers the ―inquiry‖ approach. He explains 
 
I propose that we abandon the search for a particular article or book chapter 
written by somebody else which offers up a pre-digested set of ―steps.‖…If 
we simply abandon the search for the ―perfect list‖ or the ―ideal article‖ – if 
we rethink our definition of and expectations concerning what constitutes a 
‗critical method‘ –then we can clear the way to genuine critical inquiry. 
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Students can create their own ‗lists of steps,‖ select their own clusters of 
‗critical constructs,‖ and thus be empowered to ask and answer research 
questions in a much more genuine way. (Paine, 2008, p. 126) 
 
I do not believe that this approach is beyond the capabilities of our students. 
In fact, I firmly believe by embracing Kay & Aden‘s (1989) critical perspective 
or Paine‘s (2008) inquiry approach to communication analysis and rhetorical 
criticism, our students will finally have the freedom to illustrate how insightful 
they really can be. Rather than having to constantly rework and revise a speech 
so all the pieces ―fit‖ the constraints, students would be allowed to open their 
analyses in a variety of directions. 
The difficult step, however, is not recognizing what needs to be changed, 
but rather putting those changes into practice. When students choose to violate 
the norms in our events, they run the risk of limiting their competitive outcomes. 
I don‘t know how many times I have encouraged a student to do something in an 
unconventional way, to only reverse my advice a few tournaments later. I feel 
badly that the student is becoming demoralized by receiving low scores because 
he or she chose not to use a research question in communication analysis or used 
a statement of reasons organizational pattern in persuasion. I challenge judges, 
myself included, to think carefully about the ways in which our application of 
evaluative norms may be harming the pedagogical outcomes of our events. 
Change happens slowly in our activity. Often the change is seen one ballot at a 
time. We all need to begin writing those ballots.    
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If someone were to have asked me in the spring of 2008 if I thought that I 
was providing an honest and reliable interpretation of my communication analy-
sis model, I would have said yes. Several months removed from the speech 
community, my answer remains the same. This letter is my response to Dr. Leah 
White‘s criticisms of my interpretation of I Lose, Therefore I Think: A Search 
for Contemplation Amid Wars of Push-Button Glare by Shuen-shing Lee—the 
article that served as my communication analysis model (Conner, 2008). I hope 
that this letter provides a more in-depth justification of my interpretation. How-
ever, I recognize that I may have incorrectly, albeit innocently, interpreted the 
article. If the community ultimately decides that such a misinterpretation oc-
curred, I contend that the misinterpretation can be attributed to flaws within the 
event and the speech community. 
In 2007, Iraqi-American performance artist Wafaa Bilal unveiled an online 
interactive experience entitled Domestic Tension (Artner, 2007, para. 1). For one 
month, gaming enthusiasts could shoot Bilal with a paintball gun that had been 
programmed to fire when instructed to do so by a computer (Artner, 2007, para. 
1-3). Bilal‘s goal was to draw a parallel between the game and the conflict in 
Iraq; gamers saw, first-hand, the damage that computerized weapons could 
cause (Artner, 2007, para. 10). After shooting Bilal, one group of guilt-ridden 
gamers refused to relinquish control of the gun; countless others apologized for 
their actions (Artner, 2007, para. 6). Thus, I asked the following question: how 
did participation in interactive violence encourage some players to adopt non-
violent rhetoric? (Conner, 2008) 
Finding a model was not easy. I started by looking at communication ar-
ticles on performance art – the Theatre of the Oppressed, specifically. Because 
Domestic Tension was not scripted and because gamers did not have the tradi-
tional opportunity to demonstrate conflict avoidance, I decided that a Theatre of 
the Oppressed paradigm was inappropriate for the analysis (Artner, 2007). Dur-
ing the fall 2007 semester, I answered the research question using Gallagher and 
Zagacki‘s Visibility and Rhetoric: Epiphanies and Transformations in the Life 
Photographs of the Selma Marches of 1965 (2007). Judges commented that, 
while the model applied nicely to the artifact, Domestic Tension relied on more 
than just visual rhetoric to convey its message. Moreover, a few judges noted 
that the model was very similar to the model used by Emily Winderman in the 
2007 AFA-NIET finals; if memory serves me, Winderman used an article by 
Gallagher and Zagacki that applied their rhetorical framework to the paintings of 
Norman Rockwell (Winderman, 2007). Nonetheless, I felt compelled to find a 
new model over the holiday break. In her paper, Dr. White suggested that I 
could have used a model based on cognitive dissonance (White, 2008, p. 18). 
What‘s funny is that I seriously considered cognitive dissonance, but given its 
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age and basis in social psychology, I figured that its use would be competitively 
disadvantageous. The sense of relief that I felt when I found Lee‘s article is in-
describable, and I still believe that the article was appropriate for the analysis. 
I justified the use of Lee‘s article by stating that it ―attempts to explain why 
some violent video games cause players to act or think in a nonviolent way‖ 
(Conner, 2008). Dr. White contends that the article‘s main focus is on ―the ways 
games influence gamers‘ critical reflections of the game industry itself‖ and ―the 
qualities of art games which lead gamers to critical reflection of the violence 
present in games‖ (White, 2008, p. 14). Both of these elements are part of Lee‘s 
thesis (Lee, 2003, para. 1). I concede that Lee does not explicitly state that video 
games can cause players to act or think in a nonviolent way (Lee, 2003). How-
ever, the idea is implicit in the thesis and throughout the article; thus, I contend 
that my justification was valid; moreover, it avoided complicated gaming jargon. 
The thesis paragraph reads that some video games ―offer alternative goals, such 
as meditative play or off-gaming engagement‖ (Lee, 2003, para. 1). I argue that 
the term ―meditative play‖ means that players think critically while playing the 
game, and the term ―off-gaming engagement‖ means that players act outside of 
the gaming realm. The idea that some video games can make players act or think 
in a certain way is further illustrated in the section on intentionally unwinnable 
games. Lee argues that these games create ―off-gaming thinkers who wonder 
what sort of player the game would like him or her to become‖ and that ―they‘re 
trying to make you think‖ (Lee, 2003, para. 11-12). In sum, my rhetorical ques-
tion asked why Domestic Tension players responded with nonviolent rhetoric 
(Conner, 2008). The use of Lee‘s article was a valid means of answering that 
question because it discusses how video games produce both off-gaming en-
gagement and critical thought, the latter of which can lead to action. 
I argued that ―games must produce feelings of guilt‖ in order to create non-
violent thought or action (Conner, 2008). Dr. White is correct in arguing that 
Lee never once mentions the word ―guilt‖ (White, 2008, para. 15). In retrospect, 
―guilt‖ is a word that was used to shorten the tagline. However, the word ―guilt‖ 
describes the negative reflection that I alluded to when I argued that games must 
―use realistic elements, in order to force the player to consider the implications 
of his or her actions‖ (Conner, 2008). Lee clearly addresses this idea in his pa-
per. Lee describes the game Adam Killer, in which players shoot at a photograph 
of a person (Lee, 2003, para. 24). He says that the game ―frightens one in a cer-
tain way by conjuring up the memory of the Columbine shooters‖ making ―fun-
seekers uneasy with ‗trigger happiness‘ since the shooting is distinct from that 
executed in confrontation with a horde of monsters or an army of anonymous 
pawns‖ (Lee, 2003, para. 24). Lee concludes that ―the combination of real and 
surreal or artificial disrupts the player's gaming habitus and diverts him to the 
dimension of social critique‖ (Lee, 2003, para. 24). I‘m guilty of condensing 
ideas to save time, but my argument is no different from Lee‘s complicated ex-
planation. 
Communication scholars may not agree with my interpretation, and I ac-
knowledge the possibility that I may have inadvertently misinterpreted Lee‘s 
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article. However, I argue that such a misinterpretation is attributable to flaws 
within the event and the speech community.  
First, communication analysis has some serious time issues which inevita-
bly cause critical and relevant materials to be cut from the speaker‘s speech. 
Lee‘s article comes to thirteen Microsoft Word pages and has seven subsections 
(Lee, 2003). For competitive purposes, students are told to choose two or three 
main points to explain the article. Thus, students either cut pertinent ideas or try 
to combine ideas in a way that deviates from the author‘s original intention. 
Moreover, communication analysis, more so than any other event, encourages 
an unequal time distribution; students are told to spend more time on the impli-
cations than on the explanation and application. I could have included the parts 
of Lee‘s thesis that Dr. White highlighted, but that would have been competi-
tively disadvantageous. To prevent misrepresentation, the community either has 
to extend the time limits or change the judging paradigm to focus less on impli-
cations. But something has to be done. If accuracy is ignored, misrepresentation 
will still occur. If too much emphasis is placed on accuracy, students will use 
short models that don‘t apply to their artifact. 
My second argument is one that I am hesitant to make, but I feel as though 
it has to be made because I do not hear anyone else making it. I was very fortu-
nate in that I found competitive success while on one of the smallest teams in 
the community. I realize the irony in what I‘m about to say, but I don‘t think that 
communication analysis promotes equality amongst programs. First, the discip-
line of communication is expanding and many subcategories have been recog-
nized, including business communication, political communication, and even 
computer gaming communication. A student from a larger program seemingly 
has a better opportunity to interpret his or her model correctly; there is a better 
chance that a larger school will have a faculty member that specializes in a 
communication subcategory. My undergraduate institution had two communica-
tion professors; both were forced to teach introductory and organizational com-
munication courses, and neither had a clue about computer gaming communica-
tion.  
Second, students from small programs are less likely to have coaches with 
communication backgrounds; thus, without guidance, students are more likely to 
misinterpret communication articles. My undergraduate institution had two 
coaches. Both were working towards their doctorate degrees in political science, 
and one does not touch individual events with a ten foot pole. That left me and 
our head coach to figure out if our interpretation was reliable, whereas students 
from larger programs had more opportunities for input. Finally, students from 
small programs are less likely to be able to create communication analysis 
speeches. Communication analysis requires students to follow a recipe more so 
than any other event. Neither my coach nor I knew how to write a communica-
tion analysis. For a semester, I tirelessly transcribed the speeches of Kashif 
Powell, Matthew Collie, and Christine Zani, among others. But even after I got 
the basic structure down, my coach and I had a laundry list of questions, includ-
ing: does the model have to be communication-based; must the artifact have 
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been created with a communicative purpose in mind; do you have to have three 
tenets; may you combine several tenets to into one tenet; if the author did not 
make an argument clear, may you extrapolate on that argument? While my 
coach and I eventually found answers to many of these questions, I would im-
agine that there are students that limit themselves to familiar events because they 
don‘t know how to write a competitive communication analysis. 
The creators of communication analysis had good intentions. As public 
speakers, we should strive to understand the foundations of communication. 
However, I don‘t know that those intentions are being met, and I believe that the 
event should be changed dramatically. First, communication majors aren‘t the 
only ones who participate in the event. I double majored in biology and political 
science; while I did my best to accurately represent the works of communication 
scholars, I never felt as comfortable in communication analysis as I did in ex-
temporaneous speaking – an event in which I knew what I was talking about. 
Some would say that students who do not feel comfortable with the event should 
not participate in the event; it‘s a good argument, but it‘s not feasible in a com-
munity where students are pressured to participate in as many events as possible, 
so that their school wins sweepstakes awards and receives funding. Moreover, 
judges and audience members are not always familiar with complicated commu-
nication jargon; competitors end up being judged based on the uniqueness of 
their artifact, rather than on the power of their rhetorical arguments. Finally, as I 
mentioned earlier, communication continues to mesh with other disciplines. Of-
ten, a framework from another discipline would be more appropriate and more 
effective in answering the research question, but many judges refuse to consider 
non-communicative frameworks. 
I think that a dramatic change is needed. While I am no longer part of the 
speech community, I hope that scholars use my suggestions to transform com-
munication analysis into a more effective analytical forum. Perhaps we should 
drop the ―communication‖ part and create an event called ―artifact analysis.‖ 
Students would use the same formula that is currently used in communication 
analysis; the only difference is that students would not be limited to the discip-
line of communication. For example, let‘s say that a peace agreement is signed 
between Israel and Palestine within the next month. A student would explain a 
political science theory, apply that theory to the peace agreement, and draw im-
plications about the potential success of the agreement. This method would not 
solve all of the problems that I‘ve discussed, but it mitigates some of the major 
ones. First, a major reason why misrepresentation happens is because students 
do not feel comfortable discussing communicative principles. This event would 
allow students to use artifacts and models from their major, making misinterpre-
tation less likely. Additionally, students from smaller programs could choose 
disciplines in which their coaches or faculty members specialize, again decreas-
ing the likelihood of misrepresentation. Furthermore, some judges and audience 
members would better comprehend the speeches presented. Some would argue 
that judges with backgrounds in communication would be less effective adjudi-
cators, but I would argue that judges currently comprehend topics, from other 
disciplines, in events like informative and persuasion with little difficulty. Final-
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ly, this event would call attention to social issues that would be difficult to 
present in other events. The example about the peace agreement could potential-
ly be done as an informative, but most judges would not appreciate three specul-
ative implications.  
I have no hard feelings towards Dr. White, nor will I have hard feelings to-
wards scholars who disagree with my interpretation. A contentious dialogue 
may be necessary to advance an event that meant a lot to me as a competitor and 
to further the interests of the speech community as a whole.   
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